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· ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to propose guidelines for the 
·development of an ethital code for South African clinical 
psychologists. A discussion of the philosophical basis 
of ethical codes and a critical examination of the most 
developed and useful existing ethical code for psychologists -
the APA code.- serve as background information for identifying 
the essential elements of a code for clinical psychologists in 
this country. It is concluded that such a code should consist 
of three levels- an ethical theory, ethical principles and 
rules for specific situations. The application of this 
structure to practical situations in which the clinical 
psychologist functions is illustrated in the final section of 
the thesis with particular reference to psychotherapy, psycho-
logical assessment, research and professional conduct and 
relationships. The particular circumstances of South African 
society which may complicate ethical issues in these areas 
are considered, and procedural recommendations are made 
concerning the establishment of an ethical code which will 
have specific relevance to the practise of clinical psycho-






The development of a code of ethics is an essential aspect 
of the general establishment and development of any autonomous 
profession which serves the public. 
The South African Institute for Clinical Psychology has 
recently expressed concern over the lack of adequate ethical 
regulation of the profession in this country. It was felt 
that in order for South African clinical psychologists to 
fulfill their functions adequately, a code should be developed 
which would address the specific ethical issues important to 
clinical psychologists in South Africa. The aim of this thesis 
. is to present some proposals for the development of such an 
ethical code. In order to achieve this aim it was felt that a 
three stage development of the thesis would be appropriate, 
and the arguments contained within the thesis are therefore 
presented in three major sections. 
0 
The first section is concerned with the philosophical background 
to the study of ethics and provides an introduction to the 
philosophical structure of ethical codes in general. The 
particular functions of professional ethical codes are also 
discussed in this section. 
' ~ 
. In the second section, the development and application of 
.ethical codes within the profession of psychology are considered. 
On the basis of the arguments presented here, this ·section 
culminates in a set of proposals for the process by which an 
ethical code could be developed which will be specifically 
relevant to the functioning of clinical psychologists in South 
Africa. 
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The final section of the thesis serves as an illustration 
of how the concepts and principles discussed in the previous 
sections have relevanceto four major areas of general 
functioning of clinical psychologists, and of how an ethical 
code such as the one proposed in section two would be useful 
to South African clinical psychologists in approaching ethically 
problematic situations within these areas. This section also 
considers special issues pertinent to South African society 
which may have significance for the ethical practise of 
clinical psychology in this country. 
I 
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SECTION ONE 
PHILOSOPHICALBASlS OF ETHICAL CODES 
The study of ethics is concerned with issues such as the 
definition of 11 good" and "bad" and is essentially philo-
sophical in n~ture. · For this reason, before exploring 
the requirements for an adequate ethical code for South 
·African clinical psychologists in more detail, some 
discussion of the philosophical study of ethics and the 
philosophical basis of ethical codes seems necessary. 
This section will therefore be concerned with the structure . 
of ethical codes and the components - ethical theories, 
ethical principles and rules - which make up this structure. 
The development of ethical codes for application in 
professional practise constitutes a special branch of the 
study of ethics and will also be briefly considered within· 
this section. 
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THE STUDY OF ETHICS 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief outline of the 
philosophical approach to ethics and the philosophical basis 
of ethical codes. Two major types of ethical theories- i.e. 
utilitarian and deontological theories - and the four ethical 
principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice 
which may be encompassed within either of these theories will 
be discussed. Following this, the nature of rules and the 
origins of ethical dilemmas will be reviewed. Finally, the 
specific nature of professional ethics as a specialized branch 
of the general field of ethics will be considered. 
1.1 MORALITY AND ETHICS 
The concepts of morality and ethics are closely re·lated, both 
being concerned with the definition of human co~duct as "good" 
or 11 bad". A standard dictionary definition of ethics is: 
"the science of morals, that branch of ~hilosophy which is 
concerned with human character and conduct: a system of morals, 
rules of behaviour"~ (Chambers 20th Century dictionary). 
Individual moral judgements in specific situations therefore 
imply a more basic system of definitions of gener~l moral 
norms or values which system constitutes an ethical theory. 
The philosophical basis of ethical codes, according to 
Beauchamp and Childress (1979), consists of such a basic ethical 
theory which encompasses certain ethical principles out of which 
rules for conduct in specific situations maybederived. In 
this chapter, consideration will be given to the nature of two· 
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major ethical theories, four ethical principles which may be . 
encompassed within -these theories and the nature of rules 
which may be derived from these principles. 
1.2 ETHICAL THEORIES 
Beauchamp and Childress (1979) have listed four requirements 
for a valid ethical theory: 
1) Internal consistency and coherency 
2) Completeness and comprehensiveness 
3) Simp 1 i c i ty 
4) Sufficient complexity to account for. the whole range 
of moral experience, including ordinary moral 
judgements. 
In· recent years, the types of ethical theory which have·-
received the. most attention have been utilitarian and 
deontological theories· (Beauchamp and Childress, 1979; Moore, 
1967; Jones, Sartag, Beckner and Fogelin, 1977; Sidgwick, 
1967). It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide 
a detailed critique of the philosophical validity of either 
of these theories. Consequently, they will be accepted at 
face value and an attempt will be made to outline the most 
.important features and assumptions of each theory. 
1.2.1 Utilitarianism 
Broadly speaking, this theory asserts that the only basic 
principle in ethics is that of utility, which implies that 
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in all circumstances one must produce the greatest possible 
balance of value over disvalue for all persons affected and 
that human actions are to be assessed in terms of their 
production of maximal·nonmoral value. While there has been 
much argument amongst theorists working within this model as 
to what constitutes 11 the good .. or 11 maximal nonmoral value .. , 
in recent times the most popular definition is that 11 the good 11 
relates to the preference of the individual in specific 
situations. Maximising the good would therefore involve 
maximising the potential for the greatest number of individuals 
to realise their preference. A further tenet of this theory 
is that value~ which are intrinsically good should be pursued 
before these which are extrinsically good. An intrinsic 
value would be something which is assumed to b~ good in 
itself (e.g. life), while an extrinsic value is good as a 
means to something els~, which may itself be an intrinsic 
value (e.g. money). Within the utilitarian position th~re is 
a further distinction between act and .rule utilitarianism. 
In act utilitarianism the consequences of each particular act 
are considered, whereas the rule utilitarian considers' the 
consequences of generally observing a rule which has itself 
been derived from the basic principle of utility. Thus the 
rule utilitarian would adhere to the principle 11you should not 
break a promise" because in the past this rule proved to 
generally produce maximal utility, while the act utilitarian 
would be prepared to break a promise in particular situations 
where he perceived this as the most beneficial course to take. 
Because such situations do arise, act utilitarians suggest that 
rule utilitarians viol ate the demands of the principle of 
utility. Rule utilitarians, on the other hand, argue that 
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the utility of whole codes or systems of rules, rather than 
individual rules, should be considered, pointing out that 
the overall utility of adhering to suchcodes outweighs the 
individual values that could be gained in a ruleless society. 
1.2.2 Deontological Theories 
As opposed to utilitarian theories in ~hich the consequences 
of an act determine its morality; deontological theories hold 
that features of some acts other than their consequences make 
them right or wrong. Deontologists maintain that there are 
one or more basic rules or·principles -such as universalisability, 
fidelity, beneficence and justice -from which one can derive 
all other rules or judgements. 
As in utilitarianism, there is also a distinction between act 
and! r~edeontology~ Act deontology. is relatively·rare • it 
involves acting by individual conscience or intuition, or by 
immediate and direct perception of God's will. This position 
is rarely defended as it is so obviously open to distortion due 
to self-interest. Rule deontology, on the other hand, asserts 
a set of principles and rules that identify classes of acts which 
are right or wrong, obligatory or prohibited, regardless of their 
consequences. 
There are four basic points on which utilitarianism and 
deontology differ: (Beauchamp andChildress, 1979)~ 
; . 
1. Utilitarianism argues in terms of means to ends 
whereas deontology asserts that we lack the 
capacity to predict and control the future in 
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the way utilitarianism .implies •. In addition, 
responsibilities to others are more varied and 
specific than the responsibility to promote good.·. 
2. Utilitarians agree that there is only one 
significant moral relationship between people, 
which is that of benefactor and beneficiary, while 
. 
deontologists maintain that people are related in 
various ways according to their own previous acts. 
The relationship of one man to his wife, his son, 
his lawyer and his own clients are all morally 
different in terms of the obligations incurred by 
both parties within the relationship. 
3. There is considerable disagreement concerning the 
role of past actions in moral assessments. For 
utilitarians, the past is of little or no 
significance, whereas for the deontologists, acts 
performed in the past (such as making a promise) 
are a determining factor for present actions. 
4. Deontologists argue that in some cases, 
particularly act utilitarianism can lead to 
morally unacceptable conclusions. If, for 
example, acts A and B have identical consequences, 
but act A involves lying while B does not, act 
utilitarians would maintain that both actions 
were equally justifiable. This would in fact 
conflict with the requirement of an ethical 
theory that it be congruent with the ordinary 
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moral convictions of most people. 
If called upon to make a choice between the theories described 
above~ the difficulties inherent in both act utilitarianism 
and act deontology are immediately apparent. However few 
differences are to be found between rule utilitarianism and 
rule deontology in terms of the tests of consistency and 
coherence~ simplicity, completeness and comprehensiveness and 
capacity to account for moral experience. From both stand-
points it is possible to defend and assign the same weight to 
the same rules. In addition, the same issues have to be 
· faced within each theory, the most prominent of these issues 
' being the problem of ethical dilemmas. · 
·1.3 E:THICAL.PRINCIPLES 
Ethical principl1~s can be seen as general ethical statements 
which giv~ rise to specific rules and can be encompassed · 
within a broader ethical theory. Beauchamp and Childress (1979) 
have outlined four'basici ethical principles, which could be 
! -,.----- -·--J 
encompassed within either the rule-utilitarian or rule-deontological 
theory, and which have relevance for the practise of psychology. 
These principles are those of Autonomy, Nonmaleficence, 
Beneficience, and Justice. They will be discussed in general 
here, while their specific relevance and application to areas 
of functioning of clinical psychologists will be explored in 
later chapters. 
1.3.1 Principle of Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy owes its development to two philosophers 
.. ,, .... 
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of different schools - the deontologist, Kant, who understood 
autonomy as meaning freedom of the will; and the utilitarian, 
Mill, who was concerned with autonomy as freedom of action. 
According to Kant, freedom of will is the choosing on the 
basis of reason (rather than desire) one's own moral 
principles subject to only one condition which is that these 
principles should be universalisable (i.e. can be willed to 
be valid for everyone). Mill's understanding of freedom of 
action involves the freedom of all people to act on their 
convictions as long as such action does not interfere with 
the freedom of others to do the same. 
A synthesis of these two understandings into a unitary view of 
autonomy would dictate that people should be free to act 
according to their own self-formulated principles, while 
showing respect for the autonomy of others by acknowledging 
their right to similar beliefs and actions. Kant describes a 
moral relation.as one in which two autonomous agen~s have 
respect for one another's autonomy. 
An important concept which arises out of the principle of 
autonomy and which is relevant to the practise of clinical 
' I psychology is that of informed consent~ The basic idea behind 
this concept is that in order for people to make truly 
autonomous decisions they must do so on the basis of all the 
relevant information. about what the decision would_. involve, 
what its consequences might be and what alternative decisions 
are open to them in particular situations. It will be seen 
·in· further ~hapters that it is often the psychologist's · 
_,,_ 
responsibility to ensure that all this information is J 
available to clients so that they may participate autonomously 
in their own treatment. 
An important proviso of the principle of autonomy is that it 
applies only to people who are capable of making an autonomous 
choice, and not to those whose decision-making is hampered by 
environmental or psychological· restrictions. Thus, prison and 
mental hospital inmates may not be autonomous agents by virtue 
of the external environmental constraints put upon their ability 
to choose autonomously, while the decision of a severely 
depressed patient to commit suicide may not be regarded as an 
autonomous choice because the psychological disability of 
depression may be hampering his ability to make a rational moral 
decision. In such cases it is the res pons i.bil ity of some other 
person - frequently somebody who has a degree of authority over 
the non-autonomous agent - to make decisions for them which 
they would presumably have made themselves, were they in a 
position to do so. 
The relationship between the concepts of autonomy and authority 
is also one of some complexity as they are apparently contra-
dictory, with some theorists going so far as to say that an 
autonomous agent makes decisions totally unimpeded by any 
authority'sinfluence. However, the adequate functioning of 
society is obviously impossible without the allocation of authority 
to certain people in different areas, whether this·authority is 
administrative or based on particular skills possessed by the 
person in authority. However within most nondictatorial social 
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systems authority is ·autonomously accepted and sometimes 
allocated by the members of the society and therefore the 
two concepts need not necessarily be incompatible. The 
complex interplay between the authority held by psychologists 
and the t;"ights to autonomy of their clients as this occurs in 
various areas of.psychological functioning will be discussed 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
1.3.2 Principle of'Nonmaleficence 
This principle has as its basic axiom the directive to "do 
no harm". The definition of harm seems to vary from a narrow 
one of specifically physical and mental suffering and injury 
to a broad one which includes injury to reputation, property 
. and liberty. Within the field of psychology the broader 
definition is probably more relevant as some psychological 
procedures may carry attendent risks of harm to at least the 
reputation and liberty of clients besides to their mental and 
physical well-being. 
Both intentional harm and the risk of harm are included under 
this principle, with the former being in all cases prohibited 
and the latter being permitted only when the goals of an action 
are sufficiently important to justify the risk of harm arising 
out of such an action~ This process of weighing the importance 
of the outcome against the degree of risk involved .is known as 
detriment-benefit analysis, which demands that at.all times 
agents should act carefully and with due consideration for the 
possible cons~quences of an action. In other words agents 
should at all times act with "due care" and where such "due 
care" has not been taken the person responsible may be 
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justifiably accused of violating the principle of nonmaleficence 
through negligence. 
A final important concept to be considered here is that of 
"double-effect", in which a harmful effect constitutes an 
indirect foreseen consequence of an action. Such harm does 
not necessarily constitute a violation of the principle of 
nonmaleficence as long as the effect is indirect and not the 
intended direct effect of the action. If, for example, it 
was decided to undertake some research because of its possible 
wide-ranging beneficial effects despite a degree of mental 
suffering which would be caused by some of its procedures, the 
harm constituted by the mental distress would fall under the 
principle of double effect. If, how~ver, the aim of the 
research was to investigate the best way of inducing distress 
and had no other aim, then the mental distress would be a 
direct effect of the research procedure and would violate- the 
principle of nonmaleficence. 
1.3.3 Principle of Beneficence 
Closely related to the principle of nonmaleficence,this 
principle asserts that a ~uty exists to actively contribute to 
others' health and welfare in a positive way through prevention 
of harm, removal of harmful conditions and positive benefitting 
of others. Two types of actions are encompassed within this 
principle - positive beneficence, which refers to the conferr-
ing of benefits and active prevention and removal of harms; 
and balancing the good which involves weighting the good an 
action will possibly produce against the harm that might result 
from doing or not doing the good. 
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Positive beneficence involves the production of positive 
benefits for society as for example is the purpose in 
community mental health programmes. Some philosophers 
call this positive benefitting a duty on the basis of the 
reciprocal relationship in society- i.e. I receive benefits 
from society and therefore owe society something in return. 
However, most agree that while positive beneficence is a 
virtue it cannot be seen as an absolute duty. For example, 
leaving one•s lucrative private practice to work in a 
deprived community for little or no financial gain is morally 
admirable, but not a moral requirement. 
The best means of providing benefit for the majority of 
people falls under the principle of balancing benefits and 
potential harms, or cost-benefit analysis. The chosen beneficial 
action is arrived at through such analysis as being the one 
~hich provides the most benefit for the least cost, where cost 
is seen in terms of the risk of harm involved in an action. 
This type of analysis implies a quantifying model and often~ 
especially in the psychological fiel~ poses many difficulties 
as it is problematic to talk about potential benefits and harms 
here in quantitative terms. Often a non-quantitative approach 
must be used. There is no easy solution to the problems 
inherent in this, but possibly an ethical· cbde for clinical 
psychology would need to incorporate some weighting of the 
kinds of benefits and harms commonly arising out of psychological 
procedures and methods. 
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1.3.4 Principle of Justice 
The basic idea underlying the principle of justice is that 
of fairness, which dictates that people should be given what 
they deserve or can legitimately claim. Comparative justice 
involves the determining of what one person deserves by weighing 
I 
the competing claims of other people against his claim, while 
noncomparative justice is concerned with judging deserving by a 
standard independent of other's claims. Although both forms of 
justice can be seen as applicable to clinical psychology and its 
functions, it is in cases of comparative justice that most 
ethical problems are encountered. 
An example of the application of noncomparative justice occurs 
when there is scarcity of an amenity (such as psychological 
treatment) and therefore competition for the benefits arising 
out of this amenity. The allocation of these scarce resources 
is known as distributive justice. The question then arises as 
to how these resources are to be distributed in a just way. 
Formal principles of justice propose a basis for the distribution 
of goods, but do not specify the mechanics of doing so. A 
popular example of such a principle first proposed by Aristotle, 
is that equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally, 
wi~hout specifying the relevant ways in which people should be 
judged as equal·or unequal, or the kind of differential treatment 
unequals should receive. ·This task falls within the range of 
material principles of justice, which generate lists of valid 
criteria by which people's claims can be judged. A popular list 
includes the following principles: 
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1) to each person an equal share 
2) to each person according to individual need 
3) to each person according to individual effort 
4) to each person according to societal contributions 
5) to each person according to merit. 
Differing philosophical and social theories differ as to which 
of these principles takes priority in the administration of 
justice. Professional ethics generally rate the client's 
interests and-claims as being more valid and important than 
the claims of any non-client, but within the client population 
there must still be some guiding principle as to which clients 
will receive the benefit of scarce treatment resources and 
here, once again, theories differ as to which principle will 
be used. ·Utilitarian approaches would emphasize a mixed use 
of these criteria so that public and private utility could be 
maximised. Once again, difficulties arise in the practical 
application of this principle in that concepts such as 11 need 11 
and 11merit 11 are difficult both· to define adequately and to 
~eigh against orie another, and-an ethical code must take some 
account of this problem. 
1.4 THE NATURE OF RULES 
In previous s.ecbons the dra\1-Jbacks·of both act.u.t·ilitarianism and 
act deontological theories were briefly discussed and the 
value of rules within both ethical theories was outlined. 
Beauchamp and Childress (}979) distinguish between situation 
ethics (practised in the act variation of both theories) and 
' 
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ethics in which rules are applied. In situation ethics, 
a.lthough rules may be partially recognized, they are viewed 
primarily as 11 rules of thumb 11 and therefore expendable in 
particular situations. This is in contrast to absolute 
rules such as 11 be caring .. , 11 be conscientious .. or 11you must 
not murder .. , which may never be overruled in any situation. 
Rules which include all possible exceptions can also be 
absolute. The debate about whether some rules can be absolute 
hinges, according to Beauchamp and Childress on the definition 
of the moral terms included in them - such as 11 murder 11 - and 
that these definitions may lead to problems in their application 
and justification. 
Ross (quoted in Beauchamp and Childress) proposes a third way of 
seeing rules as neither 11 rules of thumb 11 nor absolute. He 
proposes that rules should be seen as prima facie binding and 
has distinguished between prima facie duties and actual duties, 
saying that one's actual duty in a situation can be determined by 
examining the weighting of all the competing prima facie duties 
(as expressed in rules). Prima facie duties 11 constitute strong 
moral reasons for performing the acts in question .. , but do not 
necessarily prevail over other prima facie duties and may there-
fore be over-ridden in particular situations. 
This way of conceptualizing the nature of rules may assist 
psychologists in confronting situations in which two different 
rules seem equally applicable. These types of situations are 
known as ethical dilemmas. 
• 
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Ethical dilemmas arise, even with the most adequate ethical 
theories, when practitioners are confronted with situations 
where accepted rules came into conflict. For example, the 
rules 11 You must not betray a confidence" and "You must not 
lie 11 - both of which may be encompassed within the same 
e~hical theory - come into conflict when to tell the truth 
would be to betray a confidence. While conceptualization of 
rules as prima facie duties rather than absolute duties would 
mean that one of these rules could prevail over the other in a 
specific situation, some basis for deciding which rule should 
prevail needs to be derived. Without such a basis, there is 
no standard, ethical way of approaching such difficult and 
ethically conflictual situations. This crucial issue will be 
central to much discussion in this thesis. 
1.5 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
There has been much dispute amongst sociologists about the 
definition of a profession and which occupations "qualify" 
as professions, with definitions ranging from the broad and . 
general to the specific incorporating well defin~d c~iteria. 
Talcott Parsons.(l954) defines a profession as "a cluster of 
occupational roles, that is, roles in which the encumbents 
perform certain functions valued in the society in general, 
and by these activities, typically earn a living at a full-
time job", a definition which would seem to incorporate a 
wide-ranging variety of occupations. 
More recent theories (Sundberg and Tyler, 1963, Beauchamp and 
Childress, 1979), stress the following characteristics: 
1) High standards of training 
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2) Controlled entry into the profession by certifying 
that candidates have developed the requisite body 
of skills and knowledge 
3) Autonomy in performing its functions, which are 
valued by society 
4) Autonomy to pursue creatively the problems which 
fall in its domain 
5) Independence in regard to policy-making, including 
specification and enforcement of responsibilities 
and obligations, so that those who enter into a 
relationship with a member of the profession may 
trust them. 
Part of the policy-making mentioned in the final point would 
involve the development and implementation of a professional. 
code of ethics, the functions of which may now .be considered. 
Beauchamp and Childress (1979) define a professional code as 
.. an articulated statement of the role morality as seen by 
members of the profession .. and specify the function of such 
a code as being 11 to facilitate relationships of trust and 
confidence that permit and encourage certain activities to 
be performed for socially valued ends 11 • Downie (1980) proposes 
that a professional code should embody three main components: 
1) Standards of professional competence 
2) Standards of professional integrity 
3) Accepted professional procedures 
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to which could be added a fourth component in the form of 
effective mechanisms for ensuring that these standards are 
maintain.ed by individual practitioners. It is obvious 
that such ·codes should promote trust in professions amongst 
the community in that they provide protection and security 
for members of society who have dealings with professionals. A 
further function of these codes is, however, to ensure the 
autonomy of the profession itself by protecting it from the 
interference of outside agencies, such as the State. An 
adequately self-regulating profession provides assurances to 
the agencies responsible for protecting members of society by 
guaranteeing the welfare of its clients. With absence of 
external constraints, a profession may freely develop and 
refine its range of functions. Individual practitioners are 
protected in certain respects too from external prosecution 
./ 
by ~~~.se to a professional ethical code. 
In summary, codes of professional ethics specify and enforce 
accepted limits of expertise, behaviour and integrity of 
members of the profession, thereby protecting members of 
society from exploitation and ensuring a climate within which 
the profession can function independently and autonomously. 
The question may arise as to the essential differences between 
societal ethics and professional ethics. Societal ethics is 
that set of principles and rules, embodying generally accepted 
value,s, to which all members of a society, including those who 
I 
are professionals, are expected to adhere. Naturally, no 
professional ethical code can establish rules which violate 
the general ethical standards of the community and, for this 
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reason, there are many similarities between societal ethics 
and professional ethics. The differences appear to lie in 
.. the priorities, emphases, intensities and applications .. of 
the agreed-upon principles (Loewenberg and Dolgoff, 1982). 
These differences are especially evident in the principles 
governing the relationship between two people. Although both 
societal and professional ethics stress the principle of 
equality, in professional ethics the client•s interests are 
given priority above the interests of others. Frequently, 
this leads to the kind of ethical dilemma discussed 
previously, when the interests of a particular client clash 
directly with the interests of society as embodied particularly 
in the law. Thus, there may be conflicts not only within an 
ethical system but also between differing ethical systems, 
which need to be resolved by practising professionals. Sieghart 
(1982) proposes that these conflicts are, in fact, the very 
subject matter of ethics, writing: 11 lts central field of 
study is how people behave when they are faced with a conflict 
between two or more moral principles to which they subscribe ..• 
without such conflicts there are no moral problems ... Thus, 
an adequate professional ethical · code, such as is considered 
in this thesis, should not only identify possible conflict 
area~ but should attempt the far more difficult task of · 
proposing some means of resolution for the practitioner who 
is confronted with them. For, as Sieghart maintains, 
.. professional codes, if they are to be worth anythil']g, cannot 
merely confine themselves to asserting that there is a problem, 
and leaving it at that - l~t alone leaving it to individual 
I 
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members of the profession to solve the dilemma as best 
they can, after consulting their unguided conscience and 
perhaps a few respected colleagues. At the least, such 
a code must say:something about. how to approach this kind 
of problem. And nothing I have yet seen begins to do 
anything of the kind". 
An adequate professional code of ethics for psychology must 
therefore fulfill all the general requirements for a 
professional code, but must also, following on Sieghart's 
last point, take account of the possibility of ethical 
dilemmas and provide some approach to these situations. In 
the 'f6l1owingJsecti~n·t~e· profession of.psychology 
will be considered in general and the adequacy of one of the 
most developed codes of ethics for the profession will be 
discussed both in terms of its general utility and in terms 
of its adequacy in accounting for and guiding psychologists 
in dealing with ethical dilemmas. 
I . 
' . ' 
SECTION TWO 
ETHICAL CODES IN ·CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
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SECTION TWO 
ETHICAL CODES IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
In the previous section, the philosophical basis of· ethical 
codes and the particular functions of such codes within 
professions were discussed. This section considers the 
development and application of ethical codes specifically 
within the profession of clinical psychology. It begins 
with a description of the profession and the areas of 
functioning of clinical psychologists which require ethical 
regulation and then examines in some detail the development 
and adequacyof the current ethical code for American psycho-
logists. The reasons why this particular code has been 
chosen for such examination is that it currently constitutes 
the most comprehensive and detailed ethical code in the field 
of psychology and is generally regarded as having relevance 
and utility for guiding American clinical psychologists in 
ethical conduct. Consideration of its strengths and 
limitations may therefore be useful in developing such a 
code for South African clinical psychologists. With discussion 
of the American code as background, the current situation in 
South Africa as regards ethical regulations .is critically examined 
and proposals are made for the development of a more adequate 
ethical code for clinical psychologists in this country. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A PROFESSION 
Having considered the nature and functions of professional codes of 
ethics in relation to the broader field of the study of ethics, it 
may be useful at this point to describe the development of the field 
of clinical psychology from its academic beginnings, to the point 
where it developed into a profession in the true sense of offering a 
range of services to the public. The nature of these services, which 
are briefly described in this chapter, necessitated professional 
organization in order to ensure the competence of practising clinical 
. ' 
psychologists and along with professional organization and autonomy 
came the need for a professional ethical code to regulate the conduct 
of these practitioners. At present, the American Psychological 
Association's Ethical Standards for Psychologists represents the 
most comprehensive set of guidelines for ethical practise in 
clinical psychology and for this reason some discussion of this 
ethical code will be pertinent to the aims of this thesis~ This 
chapter will conclude with an outline of the process.by which the 
American code was developed, \-thile in the following chapter the 
structure and contents of the code will be considered in more detail. 
2.1 THE HISTORY OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Two_major fields of study which emerged during the 19th century 
may be seen as forming the roots of clinical psychology as a 
profession. These were, firstly, the study of abnormal behaviour 
undertaken primarily by European physicians such as_ Charcot and 
Kraepe 1 in and, 1 a ter, by the American Lightner Witmer, and, , 
secondly, the study of individual differences in which the English 
Scientist Galton was the major figure. 
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Research in these two fields gave.rise to early interest in 
the possibility of assessing mental handicap, with the term 
11 mental test 11 being coined in 1890 by Cattell. The following 
two decades saw the appearance of numerous books and articles 
on the study and assessment of human abilities, culminating 
in Binet•s development of the first intelligence test in 1905, 
a test which constituted ·the first objective psychological 
instrument for the diagnosis of mental abnormality. This was 
a landmark in the history of clinical psychology as it 
provided the impetus for'the development of numerous further 
tests and made the clinical psychologist a valuable staff 
member in institutions and clinics established to deal with 
problems of mental abnormality. 
Until the outbreak of World War II, the role of the Clinical 
Psychologists within such institutions was largely confined to 
psychological testing and making recommendations on the basis 
of test results. Most of their work centred on problems of 
children and was conducted in university and community clinics 
(the first of which was established at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1892 by Witner) and institutions for mentally 
retarded or delinquent children. Towards the end of the 1930s, 
emphasis on personality testing of adults in mental institutions 
began increasing, but the primary focus remained the testing of 
mental ability and deficiency. 
The situation changed significantly with the advent.of World 
War II, a change which Rotter (1964) attributes partly to the 
large-scale migration of European psychologists and psychiatrists, 
many of whom were psychoanalytically trained, to America. Their 
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influence was to r~duce .the emphasis on intelligence testing 
and to increase the emphasis on tests of personality and 
I 
deviant personality characteristics. This movement was 
simultaneously reinforced by the large number of psychiatric 
war casualties, which led to greater public concern with the 
prevention and treatment of mental disorders. Psychologists 
and their testing techniques and skills proved extremely 
valuable in predicting susceptibility to the stresses of war 
in psychologically vulnerable recruits. 
The number of men requiring psychiatric treatment at this time 
proved too large for the relatively small number of psychiatrists 
qualified to offer this treatment and psychologists were called 
upon to assist, with short training courses being established to 
equip them for this task. This trend persisted in the postwar 
years with psychologists becoming increasingly involved in 
working with adults with "personality breakdowns" or pro~lems, 
and official sanction for this new role was established at the 
1949 Colorado Conference on the training of clinical psycho-
logists, in which the United States Public Health Service 
strongly supported the training of clinical psychologists as 
psychotherapists. The range of employment possibilities for 
psy~hologists now expanded to include State Hospitals, 
Universities, Private Practice and Industrial Consulting firms. 
Concurrent with the growth of the field of clinical psychology has 
been the establishment of professional organizations, particularly 
in the United States. In 1892, the American Psychological 
Association (APA) was founded with its aim being the promotion 
• 
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of psychology as a science, and as early as 1917 the American 
Association of Clinical Psychologists was created. These two 
organizations remained separate until the postwar period when 
they amalgamated, with the latter becoming the Clinical Section 
of the former. At this time the .APA was asked to specify 
standards of training and competence, and to set up_ boards and 
committees to develop criteria and methods of assessment of 
clinical psychological practice. Accompanied as it was by the 
increasing trend of psychologists towards private practice in 
which they exercised a wide range of skills, this development 
firmly established clinical psychology as a profession in its 
own right. 
2.2 THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS 
2. 2.1 
As is apparent from discussion in the previous section, the 
roles and functions of clinical psychologists have developed 
and diversified considerably since the beginnings of the 
profession in the 1890s. Clinical psychologists are currently 
employed in a wide variety of settings and work in collaboration 
with numerous other professionals such as psychiatrists, social 
workers and psychiatric nurses in mental institutions and 
community health services, teachers in schools and businessmen 
in industry. The functions which they are expected to perform 
in these varying settings may be classified as follows: 
Psychological Assessment 
The earliest developed field of expertise, this range of skills 
remains the exclusive domain of .-:·1 ·•.:: ·• psychologists who alone \ ... - - ···-. • .. -·' 
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are qualified to administer, interpret and make recommendations 
on the basis of the vast range of psychological tests which 
have been devised to date. The psychological· assessment 
procedure requires highly developed interviewing and observational 
skills which complement the data obtained from psychological 
tests. The following categories of_ tests are most commonly 
administered: 
a) ~Rtjtuge t~J.t~which provide some indication of the 
client's abilities and potential in specific areas 
of functioning. 
b) achievement tests which assess clients'success or 
--~-··.._..- ... · .. --.-.... -~
otherwise in attaining certain expected levels of 
competence. 
c) intelJjg_eJlC::~_Je_s_ts_which measure overall cognitive 
capability. 
d) P~l:?J>Jl_ajjj:y __ te2JS_,_both projective and objective, 
indicating th~ existence of and relationship between 
particular personality traits, as well as the complex 
intrapsychic components underlying manifest personality, 
and 
e) -~pecific_~ia~~Q3ti£_tests designed to elicit symptomatology 
of psychiatric syndromes. 
2.2.2 Psychotherapy 
This a rea of functioning .is genera 11 y shared by a 11 members of 
the mental health professions, most notably psychiatric nurses, 
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clinical social workers, psychiatrists and clinical psycho-
logists. ·Thr.ee; major types ef-.psycflbth~ra:py are pra·ctised 
today - individual therapy, group therapy, and marital and 
family therapy. 
a) Individual Therapy 
Originally practised only by psychiatrists, the first form 
of individual therapy was psychoanalysis, an activity which 
required considerable investments of time and money by the 
client. Currently, analysis or 11 dynamic 11 therapy is also 
practised by other professionals, but the influence of the 
involvement of these others, particularly clinical psychologists, 
has been the development of and growing interest in other 
methods of treatment which are more time and money efficient 
and require less rigorous training for practitioners. The 
most prominent of these new developments are Rogerian .. non-
directive .. therapy, Gestalt therapy and behaviour therapy, with 
the development of the latter being heavily influenced by the 
work of clinical psychologists who have particular training in 
learning theory. The aims of individual therapy may be divided 
into two approaches: Traditional long-term dynamic approaches 
claim to result in .. personality restructuring .. , whereas the 
modern, more short-term approaches have as their aim the 
resolution of problems in areas of current functioning. 
b) Group Therapy 
An increasingly popular method of therapy, group therapy 
focusses on the relief of problems through the exploration 
and modification of interpersonal ·relationship skills of the 
client. Interventions of therapists are primar·t·ly related to 
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the processes within the group.and the patterns of relation-
ship occurring between group members,-with the aim pf 
assisting individual members to recognize and modify 
destructive patterns which they repeat in their private 
lives, and to cultivate constructive patterns which they 
observe and experience within the group. As in individual 
therapy, the therapist may be directive or essentially 
inactive and may employ varying techniques depending on his or 
her basic theoretical orientation. Groups may take many forms 
and have differing aims - e.g. experiential groups for 
essentially normal people wishing to maximise their relation-
ship potentiai, groups of psychiatric patients sharing and 
assisting one another in their experiences of difficulties in 
adjusting to society, or professional groups within organiza-
tions wishing to improve their occupational functioning by 
ironing out interpersonal difficulties. 
c) Marital and Family Therapy 
Often regarded as a special form of group therapy, family 
therapy is based on the assumotion that oersonal oroblems 
arise within a wider svstem of dysfunctional relationshios and 
roles. the most immediate of which is the familv. Essentiallv 
directive in aooroach. the theraoist in this model. removes 
the cause of the oroblem bv manioulatina the oatterns of inter-
action between members of the familv svstem. Once aaain. 
differina techniaues are dictated bv different theoretical 
schools of thouaht. 
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2.2.3 Research 
Traditionally an ·important area of functioning in psychology, 
professional organizations such-as the APA and many 
institutions employing clinical· psychologists, such as state 
mental hospitals and universities, encourage clinical psycho~ 
logists to engage in research as one of their major activities. 
Because of their numefous other responsibilities it,is 
difficult for many practitioners to devote much time to this 
activity and those in private practise are hampered by a lack 
of facilities and equipment~ For these reasons, clinical 
psychologists generally engage·in far less research than the 
psychologists registered in other categories (APA monitor). 
Nevertheless, with their particular training in research methodology 
a~d assessment techniques~ clinical psychologists, of all mental 
health professionals, are probably the best equipped to engage in 
re~earch into what remains an underdeveloped field of knowledge -
the causation, treatment and prevention of emotional and behavioural 
disorder. In this rapidly expanding field, research therefore 
remains one of the most important functions of the modern clinical 
psychologist. 
2.2.4 Community Mental Health- Programmes 
Growing awareness of the role of societal and economic 
circumstances in the etiology of psychiatric disturbance has 
led to a recent emphasis on preventative measures .in the form 
of community mental health programmes. In this context, 
clinical psychologists most reli~quish their traditional roles 
of diagnostician and therapist in a direct service relationship 
and must redefine themselves as operating in a consulting 
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capacity. The important function here is to apply principles 
of action, diagnosis and treatment to ppoblematic situations, 
analyzing these and proposing solutions on the basis of current 
knowledge of common factors underlying emotional and behavioural 
disturbance. Rather than acting as a direct agent of change, 
the clinical psychologist involved in such a programme motivates 
and directs members of specific communities and of the broader 
society to effect reforms which will lessen the probability of 
psychiatric problems being generated. 
2.2~5 Legal Involvement 
Increasingly, as clinical psychologists' expanding roles bring 
them into contact with a wider range of human concerns, the 
necessity for co~operation with the legal system, traditionally 
the guardian of the best interests of all members of society, 
increases. Clinical psychologists may be required to assist in 
the assessment of criminal responsibility or fitness to stand 
trial in criminal cases. They are also frequently assessors in 
compensation claims resulting out of physical or emotional 
injury, and in custody disputes. A third form of .involvement 
may arise when clinical psychologists are required to give 
evidence in cases involving a client who is in therapy'with them. 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL CODES IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The need for professional codes of ethics has been outlined 
in chapter one.· This section describes the process of develop-
ment of such a code for clinical psychologists, s~ecifically 
focussing on this process as it occurred in the United States 
of America, :for~ttie reasons st~ted :~arlier in this chapter. 
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The growth of the American Psychological Association has been 
briefly described earlier in this chapter. This is a powerful 
body with a large proportion of its membership (approximately 
thirty seven per cent according to Sundberg and·Tyler (1963)) 
being clinical psychologists. Up until the immediate post war 
period, the ethical codes applied to psychologists had been 
largely bound by existing codes of other professions, most 
notably medicine ·(Holman, 1965), a situation which proved un-
satisfactory as these codes lacked authenticity and relevance, 
failing to provide adequate guidelines for psychologists who, 
in their professional capacities, were faced with particular 
kinds of ethical problems, which could not be accommodated by 
the principles embodied in the ethical codes of other professions. 
It was for this reason that, under the direction of the United 
States Public Health Service, the APA undertook in 1948, to 
derive a code of ethics .specifically for clinical psychologists. 
The strength of the resulting code arises out of the method by 
which it was derived. Rather than working from general ethical 
pr.inciples towards specific rules, the council adopted an 
empirical, inductive approach to the problem, inviting all of 
its-members to submit examples of situations which they felt had 
ethical signicance. On the basis of these examples, major problem 
areas were defined and principles derived. The result was the 
booklet entitled Ethical Standards of Psychologists, published in 
1953. The code embodied in this booklet was supported by a 
casebook of illustrative examples providing direction for 
practitioners faced with ethically problematic situations, and 
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was greeted with widespread approval by American psychologists. 
Wolman (1965) writ~s: "To be effective the psychologist's 
code of ethics·must be continually revi~ed andbrought up to 
date". This is particularly true of clinical psychology in 
which research and practise are continually expanding the areas 
of functioning within which practitioners operate. In 1974, 
' 
the APA set about· this ·process of review and attempted to 
update their existing standards. They submitted successive 
drafts (of which there were at least eight) to the scrutiny of 
APA members and finally adopted the revised Ethical-Standards of 
Psychologists in ··1977. Following this revision, it became apparent 
that psychologists registered within different categories were 
working in differing settings and employing different methods and 
therefore required more specific guidelines for work within their 
respective fields. In 1980, after three years of research this 
problem was solved by the adoption of the "Speciality Guidelines 
for the Delivery of Services Provided by (Clinical, School, 
Counselling, Industrial/Organizational) Psychologists", which 
serve as an adjunct to the more general standards. Enforcement 
of the standards embodied in the APA code is entrusted to the 
Committee on Scientific and Professional ·conduct, which was 
established to assess and adjudicate claims·of malpractice by 
psychologists. They operate within specific procedures which 
guide them in decid·ing on the validity of claims and the. 
punitive measures to be taken against transgressors~ 
This chapter has reviewed the development of professional 
psychology and the various ways in which members of the profession 
may come into contact with members of the public and other 
professionals •. The extent of this involvement makes an ethical 
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code to regulate this contact obviously essential and the 
methods used to develop ·such a code in the Unit~d States of 
America have been described. At this point some discussion 
of the adequacy of this code must occur. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A CRITIQUE OF THE 'APA' ETHICAL STANDARDS 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CRITIQUE OF THE APA 11 ETHICAL STANDARDS .. 
Numerous papers have been written since the publication of the 
APA•s Ethical Standards on the topic of the many ethically 
problematic situations still confronted by psychologists. This 
is testimony to the fact that, although generally acknowledged 
as a practical and relevant guideline to ethical decision-making, 
the code as it stands has certain limitations. This chapter 
begins with a description of the content and structure of the 
code, proceeds on to a discussion of its major shortcomings and 
ends with a proposal for revision of the code, which may assist 
in alleviating some of its major drawbacks. 
3.1 STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS OF THE APA CODE 
The method by which the Ethical Standards were derived have been 
described in Chapter Two. Problematic situations submitted by 
psychologists to the committee responsible for devising the code 
were seen as falling into nine major categories and rules for 
conduct were set up under each of these categories. 
The code begins with a general statement of the values and 
responsibilities of psychologists. Called the preamble to the 
standards~ it reads as follows: 
.. Psychologists respect the dignity and worth of 
the individual and honour the preservation and 
protection of fundamental human rights. They are 
committed to increasing knowledge of human 
behaviour, of people•s understanding of themselves 
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and others and to th~ -utilization of such 
knowledge for the promotion of human welfare. 
While pursuing these endeavours, they make 
every effort to protect the welfare -of those 
who seek their services or of any· human being 
or animal that may be the object of study. 
They use their skills only for purposes 
consistent with these values and do not know-
ingly permit their misuse by· others. While 
demanding for-themselves freedom of inquiry 
and communication, psychologists accept the 
responsibility this freedom requires, competence, 
objectivity in the application of skills and 
concern for the best interests of clients, 
colleagues and society in general. In the 
pursuit of these ideals, psychologists subscribe 
to principles in the following areas: 
1) Responsibility, 
2) Competence, 
3) Moral and legal standards, 
4) Public Statements, 
5) Confidentiality, 
_6,. Welfare of the Consumer, 
7) Professional Relationships, 
8) Utilization of Assessment Techniques, and 
9) Pursuit of Research Activities" 
(APA Ethical Standards of Psychologists (1971), p.l). 
The nine areas mentioned in the preamble are then exp-anded upon, 
with each consisting of a generally stated principle followed 
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by a set of rules and guidelines for practise. The principles 
and briefly summarized rules are presented belciw: 
Principle 1, Responsibility. 
"In their commitment to the understanding of human 
behaviour, psychologists value objectivity and 
integrity, and in providing services they maintain 
the highest standards of their profession. They 
accept responsibility for the consequences of their 
work and make every effort to ensure that their 
services are used appropriately." (p.l). 
In this first section, the rules refer to the duties of psycho-
logists as researchers, employees of government or private; 
institutions, teachers, practitioners and supervisors. They 
outline the necessity for careful consideration by psychologists 
of the methods and techniques they employ and of the possible 
consequences - especially abuse by others - of the results of 
their work. Willingness to reveal all facts about methods and 
results to interested parties is demanded and it is stated that 
the psychologist has a responsibility to ensure that institutional 
practises which may be to the detriment of individual clients or 
society as a whole are exposed and reformed. 
Principle 2, Competence. 
11 The maintenance of high standards of professional 
competence is a responsibility shared by a 11 
psychologists in the interest of the public and 
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the profession as a whole. Psychologists recognize 
the boundaries of their competence and the 
limitations of their techniques and only provide 
services, use techniques or offer opinions as 
professionals that meet·recognized standards. 
Psychologists maintain knowledge of current 
scientific and professional· information related to 
the services they render ... (p.2). 
In this section the duty of psychologists to accurately represent 
their abilities to clients and to re-educate themse.lves 
constantly in order to develop and expand these abilities is 
described. The necessity to be aware of and avoid the possi-
bility of personal problems interfering with effectiveness as 
practitioners is emphasized. Finally, the propagation of 
inaccurate knowledge through insufficient preparation by teachers 
is indicated as a problematic area requiring attention. 
Principle 3, Moral and Legal Standards 
11 Psychologists• moral, ethical and legal standards 
of behaviour are a personal matter to the same 
degree as they are for any other citizen, except 
as these may compromise the fulfillment of their 
professional affiliations and functions or reduce 
the trust in psychology or psychologists held by 
the general public. Regarding their own 
behaviour, psychologists should be aware of the 
prevailing community standards and of the possible 
impact upon the quality of professional services 
provided by their conformity to or deviation from 
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these standards. Psychologists are also aware of 
the possible impact of their public 1 behavi.or"; upon 
I_~--__,..-·- _____ ._., 
the ability of colleagues to perform their 
professional duties... (p.2). 
Here, the psychologist•s duty to uphold the rights 
of members of the public by opposing institutional 
practises that involve discrimination on the basis 
of race, sex, age, religion or national origin and 
by avoiding in their own practise aetions Whith diminish 
the civil or legal rights of their clients. They 
are al~o directed to:be aware of state legislation 
which may have implications for the conducting of 
their practise and are specifically directed to 
develop legal and quasi-legal regulations which best 
serve the interests of the public and to work 
towards changing existing regulations which.are not 
beneficial to public and professional interest. -
Principle 4, Public Statements. 
11 Public statements, announcements of services, and 
promotional activities of psychologists serve the 
purpose of providing sufficient information to aid 
the consumer public in making informed judgements 
and choices. Psychologists represent accurately 
and objectively their professional qualifications, 
affiliations, and functions, as well as those of 
the institutions and organizations with which they 
or the statements· may be associated. ·In public 
statements providing psychological information or 
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professional opinions or providing info,rmation 
about the availability of psychological products 
and services, psychologists take full actount of 
the limits and uncertainties of present psycho-
logical knowledge and techniques." (p.3). 
Advertising procedures as such are considered unethical within 
the APA code, with public statements being largely limited to 
a statement of the practitioner's name and qualifications. No 
description of services offered or mention of the psychologist's 
employer is allowed unless the latter is directly supervising 
the services offered. Psychologists are expressly forbidden to 
endorse any product themselves and may not use members of the 
public to endorse their services~ The psychologist concerned 
is directed to correct public statements made by other members 
of the public which violate these standards. 
Principle 5, Confidentiality. 
"Safeguarding information about an individual that 
has been obtained by the psychologist in the 
course of his teaching, practice or investigation 
is a primary obligation of the psychologist. 
- Such information is not communicated to others 
unless important conditions are met." (p.4). 
Rules within this section state the psychologist's responsi-
bility to inform the client of the limits of confidentiality 
and to safeguard confidential records, releasing confidential 
information only when the client has given express ·permission for 
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this release, there is clear and imminent danger to the 
individual or society, or the investigation has been requested 
by another professional who, in this case, is the only person 
to whom the information may· be communicated. 
Principle 6, Welfare of the Consumer. 
"Psychologists respect the integrity and protect 
the welfare of the people and groups with whom 
they work. When there is a conflict of interest 
between the client and the psychologist's 
employing institution, psychologists clarify the 
nature and direction of their loyalties and 
responsibilities and keep all parties informed 
of their commitments. Psychologists fully inform 
consumers as to the purpose and nature of an 
evaluative, treatment, educational or training 
procedure, and they freely acknowledge that 
clients, students or participants in research have 
freedom of choice with regard to particip,ation." 
(p.4). 
Here, the psychologist's duty to ensure that activities and relation-
ships with clients are always beneficial is specified. Where this 
is n6t the case, the relationship must be terminated. Dual 
relationships with clients are labelled as detrimental and 
sexual intimacies are specifically mentioned as being unethical. 
Psychologists are directed to keep payment for services in 
accordance with professional standards and to devote a certain 
proportion of their time to societally beneficial activities for 
which they receive little or no remuneration. 
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.. Principl~ 7, Professiohal Relationships. 
"Psychologists act with due regard for the needs, 
special competencies and obligations of their 
co 11 eagues in psycho·l ogy and other professions. 
Psychologists respect the prerogatives and. 
obligations of the institutions with which they 
are associated." (p.5). 
Psychologists are directed to.recognize the possible contributions 
of other professionals to the maximal well-being of their clients 
and to co~operate with these others in providing sefvices. The 
responsibilityof psychologists to attempt to rectify malpractice 
within institutions or by professional colleagues is outlined, but 
it is stated as.necessary to do this within professionally 
recognized channels, with public exposure being used only as a 
last resort. Acknowledgement of major contributors to publications 
via.the assignment of publication credit is also included in this 
section. 
Principle 8, Utilization of Assessment Techniques. 
"In the development, publication arid utilization 
of psychological assessment techniques, psycho-
logists observe relevant APA standards. Persons 
examined have the right to know the results, the 
interpretations made, and, where appropriate, the 
original data on whichfinal judgements were based. 
Test users·avoid imparting unnecessary information 
which would ·compromise test security, but they 
provide requested information that explains the 
.basis for decisions that may adversely affect 
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that person or that person's dependents." (p.6). 
Under this heading~ .the psychologist is allocated the responsi-
bility of using understandable, non~technical language in 
explaining the purposes, results and implications of these 
results to the clie~t. In scoring and interpreting tests, the 
necessity of taking into account possible limitations and 
reservations about results is outlined as is the psychologist's. 
responsibility to prevent misuse of these results. In developing 
tests, the psychologist·is directed to state clearly methods of 
administration and interpretation and the nature of the standard-
ization sample in order that the above conditions may be met. 
Principle 9, Pursuit of Research Activities. 
-
"The decision to undertake research should rest 
upon a considered judgement by the individual 
psychologist about how best to contribute to 
psychological science and to human welfare. 
Psychologists carry out their investigations· 
with respect for ·the people who participate and 
with concern for their dignity and welfare." 
( p. 6). 
The major emphasis in-this section is on the protection of 
human subjects involved.in research by avoiding unnecessary 
physical or emotional distress and fully informing participants 
of the methods, possible deleterious effects and relative 
responsibilities of experimenter and subject embodied in the 
research procedure.· Confidentiality· of par~i.cipants •- identities 
is regarded as an important protective measure. 
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3.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE CODE 
Criticisms of the APA's Ethical Standards appear to fall into 
two broad categories, which are related but may be discussed 
separately. The first of these concerns the failure of the 
code to emphasize·sufficiently the societal responsibilities 
of psychologists, while the second is concerned with conflicts 
within the code leading to ethical dilemmas for which the code 
itself provides no method of resolution. 
3.2.1 Societal Responsibilities of Psychologists 
Zemlick (1980) claims that the existing ethical standards in 
practice serve more as "cosmetics for the face of the profession" 
than as a protection for members of society from malpractises. 
He attributes this to inadequate policing of the standards, 
selection of trainees and faculty staff who are unlikely to 
challenge the status quo, and inadequate training in ethics, 
warning that these are resulting in increasingly restrictive 
external legislation which is threatening the integrity of the 
profession. 
Other writers (Beck (1971); Kelly (1972), Simon (1974) ,and 
Sundberg and Tyler (1963)) assert that this failure to adequately 
protect members of society has a more fundamental cause than the 
mere failure to adhere to the existing standards. Rather, they 
demand that the standards themselves should more specifically 
demand the active.involvement of psychologists in.altering 
environmental, social and 'political circumstances which 
adversely affect the functioning and growth of the individual 
members of society who constitute the psychologist's clientele. 
This is expressed by Sundberg and Tyler ( 1963) as fo 11 0\'/S: 
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11Psychologists not only need to be loyal to the 
highest ethical standards,· but they must plan how 
they should relate themselves to the political 
forces which will decide just how psychology is 
to be utilized. In a democratic society, 
psychologists should be as commftted to the 
development of independent thinking as the 
physician is to the preservation of life ... (p.487). 
These critics are reacting to what they perceive as the 
essentially conservative nature of the existing standards. They 
suggest that psychologists should be as concerned with wider 
positive social change and reform as they are with positive 
change in their individual clients, and, further, that this 
concern should not be the choice of the individual psychologist 
but should be part of the essence of the profession and should 
therefore be explicitly reinforced through the Ethical Standards. 
There is some mention of the psychologist•s responsibility to 
change state legislation which is not in the best interests of 
the public made under principle 3 of the Ethical Standards, but 
these authors maintain that this point is not made strongly 
enough, nor emphasized in the preamble to the code. 
3.2.2 Conflicts generated by the Standards 
Talbutt (1981) states: 11 0n one hand there are conflicts within 
the standards. On the other, there are legal and ethical issues 
not covered by the standards ... (p.llO). The example he quotes 
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of an internal conflict is that between the responsibility of 
the psychologist to his clien~ and his simultaneous responsi-
bility to his employing institution, cla·iming that the code 
I 
provides no guide-lines for action when these two responsi-
bilities came into conflict, as when the demands of the 
institution are at variance with the client's needs. Legal 
and ethical issues not .covered by the code cause dilemmas when 
the specific duties of the-psychologist as outlined in the 
code came into conflict with the laws of the State. Once again, 
no guidelines are provided as to which of his duties - that to 
his client or that to the State - should be given priority by 
the practitioner. 
Talbutt's reservations are echoed by Hobbs .(in Wolman, 1965) 
and Michels (1976), with the latter.including the profession -
therapist - patient triad as a potential source of conflict, 
expressing concern that the tendency (and duty) of the profession 
to protect its members against public condemnation may make it 
easier for therapists to capitulate to the demands of larger 
more powerful bodies such as the State or employing institution 
than to support the client against these bodies. 
In summary, then, there are two kinds of ethical conflicts, of 
whi~h the APA code does not seem to take adequate account. The 
first are conflicts within the code itself, that is, rules 
contained within the code may conflict in specific situations, 
while the second kind of conflict is conflict between the rules 
contained within the psychologist's ethical code and rules 
which are enforced by the legal structure of the society. One 
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of the major criticisms which can be levelled.at the APA 
code as it stands is, therefore, that it provides no guidelines 
for psychologists as to how to approach such ethically 
conflictual situations. 
3.3 PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THE APA CODE 
As was indicated in Chapter· One, there is no possible ethical 
code which will not give rise to the kinds of conflicts and 
objections described in the previous s~ction. No code can 
account for all possible ethically problematic situations in 
which individual-practitioners may find themselves. However, 
it is proposed· in this section that further development of the 
existing AP A code could provide psychologists with a guide to 
the kind of approach which.could be taken in making difficult 
ethical decisions. 
In Chapter One the essential structure and development of an 
adequate ethical code was mentioned briefly. At this point it 
will be useful to review this structure, which can be 
conceptualized as consisting of four levels. These levels are 









RULES FOR CONDUCT 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
BASIC ETHICAL THEORY 
ETHICAL THEORIES GIVE RISE TO ETHICAL PRINCIPLES UPON WHLCH RULES 
FOR CONDUCT ARE DERIVED. THESE RULES ARE THEN APPLIED IN PRACTICAL 
SITUATIONS .. 
In their construction of the Ethical Standards, the APA in 
fact worked in reverse order, starting inductively with reports 
of ethically significant situations from which they derived 
rules for conduct. 
Working backwards from these rules they proposed that these 
seemed to fall into 9 distinct categories which the Ethical 
Standards refer to as principles, but which could perhaps more 
acc-urately be termed 11 practical principles .. , to distinguish 
them from the 11 ethical principles .. referred to in the above 
diagram. 
While this method of deriving the standards had the advantage ~f resulting 
in rules which are practical.and relevant to real situations, 
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their system lacks an explicit coherent ethical basis, which, 
had it been present, would have placed the rules within a 
broader ethical perspective. It is apparent that, in constructing 
the code, the rules derived for different situations must have 
been grounded in some more basic ethical assumptions and 
principles, but these basic principles and the ethical theory 
from which they derive have not been made explicit in the body of 
the code. As the system exi~ts, the rules stand by themselves 
with no justification apart from their practical relevance and 
consistency with the broad values outlined in the preamble. This 
is problematic in that in all situations all rules can be seen as 
carrying equal weight and it is therefore difficult, if not 
impossible, to make an ethically justifiable choice as to which 
rule to follow in situations where one or more rules conflict. 
A solution to this problem may be to explicitly relate the 
practical principles and rules outlined in the body of the 
standards to more basic ethical principles, which in turn would 
be derived from the central tenet of one of the ethical theories 
described in Chapter One. In problematic situations where rules 
conflict it would then be possible to appeal to these more basic 
principles or, if necessary, to the ethical theory itself in 
deciding which action to take. The chosen action would then be the 
one which best fulfills the demands of the ethical principle or of 
the central tenet itself. 
A commonly encountered ethical dilemma occurs when psychologists 
are requested to reveal confidential information about a client 







difficult to decide which duty takes.priority- the duty of 
confidentiality or the duty towards the legal standards of 
the society. When placed within the context of an ethical 
system defined according to the outline in the previous para-
graph, this conflictual situation is depicted in figure 2. 
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'in doing good to one 
do not deprive others of good 
rule utilitarianism 
'maximise the good' 
PRACTICAL SITUATION 







FIG 2: THE STRUCTURE UNDERLYING AN ETHICALLY CONFLICTUAL SITUATION 
It can immediately be seen that, at the level of rules, there 
can be no resolution as both rules have equal weight although 
they demand opposing behaviours of the psychologists. This 
problem continues to exist at the level of practical principles, 
which is the most basic level encompassed by the APA code. 
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Thus, in this situation, the contents of the code are inad~quate 
in providing guidelines for ethical decision-making. Reference 
to the more basic ethical principles is still not sufficient as 
the rules derive ·out of different principles having equal 
importance within the system. However, by referring to the 
most basic axiom of the ethical theory on which the system is 
based, some guide to decision-making is possible. Here, the 
decision can be based on which of the two possible courses of 
action would best satisfy the directive to 11 maximize the good ... 
This judgement needs to be based on a careful evaluation of all 
the relevant environmental factors operating in the situation 
and would seldom be an easy task, but the resulting decision 
would be less likely to be arbitrary or possibly based on the 
psychologist's self-interest. It would be an ethically informed 
choice and one which could be publicly justified on the basis of 
the psychologist's accepted ethical position. If such a system 
were in operation, not only would ethically based choices be 
easier to make in cases of ethical dilemmas, but the psychologists 
could be held accountable by his profession and by the broader 
society in the event of his failing to make such a decision. 
Besides addressing the problem of the resolution of such ethical 
dilemmas, the development of such a system may well go some way 
towards answering.the question of the extent of the~psychologist's · · 
societal and·.political responsibility. For example, if the rule 
utilitarian theory were adopted as the basis of th~ ethical code, 
the clinical psychologist could be .viewed as having a duty towards 
effecting societal and political reform, where this would be the 
best method of maximising the good. · This duty could be comfortably 
~ncompassed and emphasized within a code based on a fundamental 
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directive of this nature. 
It is not suggested that psychologists working within such a 
system would inevitably make choices which would have the 
best possible outcom~s. It .is seldom possible to be fully 
aware of all the possible variables op~rating within a 
particular situation or to accurately predict the future 
consequences of any action. Weighing "the good" is also in 
essence an extremely difficult task. However, the evaluation 
of an action lies not so much in its· consequences as in the 
intentions which underlie it. If it can be proved that an 
individual psychologist made a decision which to the best of 
his knowledge was consistent with the ethical system within which 
he was operating, then his resulting action cannot be judged as 
unethical. Ot~er problems arise when, within particular social 
systems, an action which is not unethical may well prove to be 
illegal, but this is an area which will be discussed at a later 
stage of this thesis. 
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PROPOSALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ETHICAL CODE FOR SOUTH 
- : AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGI$TS. 
This chapter has two major aims. The first is to critically 
review the existing legislation concerning ethical standards 
for South African psychologists, while the second is to 
propose ways in which a more adequate code may be developed. 
As background to this discussion the professional organization 
of psychology in South Africa will initially receive 
consideration. 
4.1 PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In South Africa, psychologists are registered with the South 
African Medical and Dental Council and therefore fall under 
the jurisdiction of this body. Although carrying ultimate 
authority over the regulation of the profession, the council 
delegates most of the responsibility for matters directly 
relating to psychology to the Professional Board for Psychology. 
The powers assigned this board are specified in the Government 
Gazette of December 1976 (R232) - as follows: 
The Professional Board may -
l) make to, or through the council, representation 
for the making, amendment or withdrawal of any 
regulation or rule which applies to the professional 
board to psychology. 
2) inquire into any complaint, charge or allegation 
against any person registered under section 18 or 
section 25 as a psychologist or psychotechnician, of 
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improper or dtsgrac~fu} coriduct.or coriduct which, 
when regard· is had to such person's profession is 
improper or disgrac~ful; 
3) hold an inquiry, under 1the provisions of section 
51 of the Act, in·respect of a person registered 
as a psychologist or psychotechnician under seition 
18, or section 32 of the Act. 
The composition of the Professional Board for Psychology is 
laid down in the Government Gazette of March 1979 (R437). 
The Professional Board shall consist of ten persons 
and shall be constituted as follows: 
1) Two persons, designated by the council, who shall 
be members of the council 
2) Six persons, who shall.be registered psychologists, 
elected by the persons whose names appear on the 
register of psychologists under Section 18 of the 
Act. 
3) One person, who shall be a registered psychotechnician, 
elected by the persons whose names appear on the 
- register of psychotechnicians kept in terms of 
Section 32 of the Act. 
4) One person, designated by the co unci 1 , who sha 1 1 be 
a medical.practitioner or dentist and who shall 
have a special knowledge of psychology • 
. . 
The election in terms of subregulations .2 and 3 shall 
be conducted by the council-and members shall be 
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elected for a period of.five years, at .the end of 
which period they shall vacate office. Provided 
that such members are eligible for re-election. 
The Medical and Dental Council itself consists of 28 members, 
all of whom are medical practitioners. ·while there is a 
directive that one of these members must be the chairman of 
a Professional Board, at present this person is also a 
medical practitioner. 
4.2 EXISTING ETHICAL REGULATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
At present thise regulations are contained within the 
Government Gazette of September 1977 (Rl856) and are listed 
as 11 Rules specifying the acts or omissions in respect of 
whichdiscipl inary steps may be taken by the Professional 
Board for Psychology and the Council ... 
While there have been other sets of guidelines for ethical 
conduct which have been developed by non-statutory professional 
organisations such as the now defunct SAPA (South African 
Psychological Association)·and PIRSA (Psychological Institute 
of Republic of South Africa), these guidelines have borrowed \1 
heavily from the American code and therefore suffer from the \ 
limitations of this code discussed in chapter three. The most \, 
serious drawback of these codes .is, however, that they were 
developed by bodies of which membership was voluntary and - \\ 
which ha~e no legislative powers within the profei~ion. Thus, 1 
the rules set ·out in the Government Gazette of September 1977 
( 
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will be regarded as the official set of ethical regulations 
for South Afric~n psychologists. These;rules are listed in 
the Gazette as follows: 
1). Advertising 
A set of very specific rules are listed, outlining the extent 
and manner in which psychologis~s may publicize their services. 
2) Business Advertisement 
An extension of the rules on advertising, these rules refer 
to the prohibition of public association of the psychologist•s 
name with any test material or institution. 
3) Name Plates 
Once again concerned with advertising, rules regarding the 
exact nature and position permitted for psychologists• name-
plates are specified. 
4) Visits by a psychologist to a place other than that at 
which he resides or.practices 
Secondary practises.are disallowed unless they correspondend 
exactly in terms of time allocation and costs of services to 
the-primary practise. 
5) Letter-heads and Account Forms 
Again concerned with advertising. Precise information listed 
on the above documents is limited by these rules. 
6) Canvassing and Touting 
These are prohibited. 
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· 7) Fees and Commission 
Receiving and paying commission and sharing of fees are 
prohibited. 
8) Covering 
All locums must be registered psychologists •. Consultation 
with any person not.registered with the council is disallowed. 
9) Clu6s, Societies, etc. 
Apsychologist may not hold financial interest in an advertising 
psychological ~linic or association. 
10) Association with charitable institutions 
No organization falsely purporting to be charitable in nature 
may be joined by a psychologist. 
11) Tendering 
This is prohibited. 
12) Supersession 
Taking over a case which has not terminated services with a 
·previous psychologist is disallowed. 
13) Improperly impeding a patient or client 
Clients must not be prevented from obtaining a sec~nd opinion. 
14) Professional r~putation of colleagues and other registered 
persons. 
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False or urijustifiable criticism of the r~putation, skill, 
knowledge, service or q·ual ifications of any other registered 
person is prohibited. 
15) Professional secrscy 
' 
Divulging of confidential information about a client is only 
permissable wtth the client's consent. 
16) Certificates 
Certificates issued to clients must be based on personal 
observations or carry the words 11 as I· am informed .•• 11 • 
17) Professional Appointments other than appointments made 
under the Public Service Act 
The conditions under which psycholo~ists may accept ~ppointments 
are, noted. 
18) Secret remedies, etc. 
No form of testing, treatment, procedure, apparatus, or 
technical process·may·be kept secret by the psychologist. 
19) Consulting Rooms 
These may not· be shared with persons not registered as psycho-
logists without the board's approval. 
20) Council's statutory duties 
Psychologists may not impede the council in carrying out these 
duties. 
21) Performance of professional acts by psychologists 
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Psychologists are neither permitted to.perfo.rm services for 
which they are not adequately trained, nor to ·undertake 
treatment under improper conditions, except in emergencies. 
They are not allowed·to· undertake intensive long-term therapy 
unless the client has been referred by a med·ical practitioner 
or to diagnose a person~s illness or prescribe medicine or 
surgery except in· collaboration with a medical practitioner. 
22) Performance of professional acts by psychotechnicians 
The limits of the permitted functions of psycho-technicians are 
outlined. 
23) Restriction in Practice of Psychologists 
Psychologists may only practice within the category under which 
they are registered and may not be in partnership with or employ 
psychologists registered in other categories. 
24) Exploitation 
Psychologists must prevent exploitation of their services which 
are detrimental to public or professional interest. 
Criticism of these regulations may be made in two areas - the I 
method by which the rules were derived and the format and content rJ. 
of the set of regulations. 
The essential difference between the American and South African l\.f 
systems at this level lies in the fact that while the APA \ 
(which constitutes the regulating body in America) is independent ~~ 
and composed entirely of psychologists, this is not the case in 
South Africa. The Professional Board for Psychology falls under 
For these reasons, it .is possible that the intere~ts of 
psychology as a profession may be served better by the 










psychologists would determine and enforce their own.present 
and future professional standards. As has been described in 
previous chapters, over the years psychology has developed 
its own distinct professional identity and it seems inappropriate 
for this profession to be subsumed under an organisation 
established to regulate another profession which differs from 
psychology in many respects. In fact, referring back to the 
definition of a profession proposed in chapter one, it would 
appear that because of psychology's lack of autonomy and 
independence in South Africa, it does not fulfill the require-
ments of this definition and therefore cannot be fully regarded 
as a profession in this country. 
4.2.1 The Development of the Current Regulations 
Possibly due in part to the absence of an independent statutory 
professional body there has been no attempt to conduct extensive 
research into the particular problems faced by psychologists in 
South Africa. The current regulations appear to be heavily 
influenced by .the regulations applying to medical practitioners 
with perhaps some detectable derivations from the AP~code. In 
Chapter Two the problems inherent in transferring an ethical 
code from one profession to another have already been noted. 
These problems centre on the lack of authenticity and specific 
relevance arising out of such a transferral. Similar criticisms 
apply to the transferral of codes from one country to another, 
in that, as\will be elaborated upon later, the particular kinds 
of ethical dilemma faced by psychologists must of necessity 
differ between countries with differing social, economic and 
political circumstances. The South African regulations appear 
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to.be based.on twokinds of transferral -.cross-profession 
- . 
and cross-country - and .therefore must .inevitably :suff_er 
from certain shortcomings. 
4.2.2 The format and content.of the existing regulations 
Hobbs (in Wolman, 1965) writes: 
11 (ethical standards) must be more than a compendium 
of approved and disapproved ways of handling fees, 
referrals, advertising and countertransference ... -
(pp.l507-1508). 
The first criticism to be made here is that the existing 
regulations- in South Africa are not only not more than the 
compendium quoted by Hobbs,~but in fact:less than this.- The 
list of regulations reproduced earlier are merely a list of 
disapproved activities of psychologists and make no mention 
of approved actions in any situation. Psychologists are 
therefore left with no .guidelines as to what constitutes 
ethical behavio~r within their practise. 
A lack of organization of these prohibited behaviours into 
logical categories makes them difficult to assi~ilate and 
apply, but this is an aesthetic-objection-and minor in relation 
to a far more serious objection whicn_ seems to be .-.a result of 
the method by_:which the regulations were derived. Probably 
because_ there has been no investigation of the di_fficulties 
encountered by South African psychologists,· there is a 
detectable discrepancy between the content and extent of the 
regulations and that of the psychologist's every day functioning. 
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This means that a disproportionate emphasis is placed on 
relatively minor areas of concern such as advertising, 
whereas concerns more intr~nsic to the psychologist's roles 
and functions, such as ensuring the welfare of clients and 
furthering knowledge through research, are largely neglected. 
At present, there is also no statement of the essential 
values and eth-ical·attitudes to be held by psychologists, such 
a·s is presented :in the preamble to ·the APA standards, and in 
the light of this, it is barely possible to call the existing 
list of rules an ethieal code in any meaningful sense. In 
essence, the s-ituation in South Africa may be compared with 
that existing in America prior to the publication of the 
original Ethical Standards in 1953. 
It i~ unacceptable that~a professi6n,which has·bee~ established 
in· South Africa for many years and which has an ever increasing 
number of members~does not have an adequate ethical code. · If 
psychology in South Africa is to adequately.fulfil its functions, 
it.is essential that .this situation should be remedied. 
4.3 PROPOSALS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADEQUATE ETHICAL CODE 
FOR SOUTH AFRICAN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS 
An adequate ethical code for practising clinical psychologists 
should be relevant to practical situations and should take 
account of ethical dilemmas, providing psychologfsts with some 
guidance as to how to approach these ethically conflictual 
situations. The APA code, as was illustrated in Chapter three, 
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fulfills the first.criterion, but does not.fare as well in 
dealing with·the.problem of ethical dilemmas. ·lt is suggested 
that in developing an ethical code for South Africa which 
fulfills both of these.criteria, the· practital releVance and 
uti 1 ity of the APA code be retained,. but some attempt should 
be made to meet the limitations of this code in addressing 
ethical dilemmas~ In this section. the ways in which these 
aims may be achieved will be considered with reference to 
firstly the structure of the code and secondly its contents. 
4.3.1 Structure·of an adequate ethical code. 
The philosophical basis of an ethical code - that is, its roots 
in a specific ethical theory and the ethical principles 
encompassed with1n this theory -was outlined in Chapter one, 
while in Chapter three it was see~ that the limitations of 
the APA code appear to arise out of its lack of a specific 
grounding in such a theory and principles. For this reason, it 
seems that in order to avoid the same limitations, an ethical 
code developed for South African clinical psychologists should 
be explicitly based in one of the major ethical theories dis-
cu·ssed in Chapter one. The central tenets of this theory and 
the basic relevant ethical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
-
beneficence and justice should be concisely and clearly stated 
in an introductory .statement contained with:in the body of the 
ethical code.· To be maximally helpful, the introduction to ~uch 
. . . 
a code should outline how the rules for conduct in specific 
situations derive from the basic principles. It has been seen 
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that one of ~he major 'functions of an ethical code should 
be to provide an approach to the resolution of ethical 
dilemmas. It would therefore be desirable "to' desq·.ibe the 
nature of these dilemmas and the process by wh·ich they may 
be resolved via reference to the ethical dilemmas, and, if 
necessary·, to the underlying ethical theory within this 
introductory section of the code. 
The question arises as to which of the two ethical theories -
rule-utilitarianism or rule-deontological theories -would be 
most appropriate in forming the basis of an ethical code for 
clinical psych~logists. Beauchamp and Childress (1979) 
argue that the same four ethical principles may be encompassed 
within both theories, and if this argument is accepted without 
further philosophical.consideration, it appears that on this 
theoretical level there is little to choose between the two 
theories. However, psychologists are concerned with choo~ing 
a theory which will have maximal practical relevance and utility 
in guiding them in situations which are ethically conflicted, 
and at this point it may be useful to consider each ~f the 
ethical theories in· the light of their potential usefulness in 
th~se kinds of situations. 
Referring back to Ross•s conceptualization of rules as prima 
facie duties.outlined in Chapter one, it will be remembered 
that one • s actua 1 duty in a situation may be determi n.ed by the 
relative weighting of prima facie duties encompassed within 
this situation. The question arises as to how this relative 
weighting is to be assigned. Within a rule.;.utilitarian theory 
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.the weighting assigned to prima facie duties.or rules would 
be based on an assessment of the :likelihood.of ea~h rule 
accomplishing the basic aim outlined in util·itariariism, which 
is to maximisethe good. The chosen action in this situation 
would be to follow the rule whi'ch would result in more good 
relative to the other rules. In deontological theory, 
however, it will be remembered that rules arise out of more 
basic principles which are absolute in themselves and therefore 
equal to one another in importance. Using this latter theory, 
it would be necessary to choose between rules by devising, on 
the basis of ~hese absolute principles, a hierarchical ordering 
·of the rules to determine which would take priority. It is 
conceivable that across different situations in which different 
rules and environmental factors are operating this hierarchy 
~auld need to change in content and structure. 
Psychologists, in their day-to-day functioning are confronted 
by a wide variety of situati'ons encompassing differing demands 
in which their decisions may· have widely varying consequences •. 
To devise a different hierarchy of·rules for each of these 
specific situations would be an impossible task, and, for this 
reason, on the level·of practical application, the rule-utilitarian 
th~ory may constitute the best basis to be adopted for an ethical 
code for psychologists, providing, as it does, a standard approach 
to the evaluation·of actions dictated by conflicting rules in 
working situatiohs. It must be noted that the choice of rule-
.• 
utilitarianism as a· basic ethical theory is not based upon a 
detailed critical review of each of the ethical theories and 
their philosophical· compatibility with the ethical principles, 
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as such a review has not been within the scope.of this thesis. 
It is possible that in the light of more detailed consideration, 
a deontological theory may possibly prove to be preferable. 
However, accepting at face value the rule utilitarian theorists• 
assertion that these ethical principles may:be encompassed 
within their theory, the above arguments are valid. For this 
reason,. for the purposes of this thesis, rule-utilitarianism 
will be regarded as the most useful ethical theory on which to 
base an ethical code for South African clinical .psychologists. 
In summary, the structure of an adequate ethical code which · 
can account for and suggest an approach to the resolution of 
ethical dilemmas in the practise of clinical psychology must 
conform with the following format: 
1} A basic ethical theory. This may be either rule-
utilitarianism or a deontological theory, although 
on the basis of the arguments presented in this· 
thesis rule-utilitarianism is proposed. 
2} Ethical principles encompassed within the ethical 
theory. These are the four principles of autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. 
3) _Rules for conduct in· specif,ic situations. It would 
be made explicit within the code that these rul~s 
are based on the ethical principles as outlined. 
The specific areas of functioning which should be covered by 
these rules wi11 be discussed in the following section. 
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4.3.2 · Contents of pn adequate ethical code for. South African 
clinical psychologi~ts · 
The rules contained within the body of an ethical code for 
South African clinical· psychologists· must fulfill the first 
criterion of an adequate ethical .code- .that is, they must 
be relevant to practical· situations encountered by psycho-
logists and they must be comprehensive, covering all areas 
of functioning within which ethically problematic situations 
may arise. 
The areas of functioning of clinical psychologists were 
identified in Chapter. two as·being psychological assessment, 
psychotherapy,.research, community work and medico-legal work. 
Rules containedin an ethical code must regulate the psycho-
logist's conduct and·.provide guidelines for approaching ethical 
' dilemmas in a1l.these areas of functioning and must also 
. account for more genera 1 issues of profession a 1 conduct'· such 
as the ways in which psychologists make themselves known to the 
public, the ways in which professional relationships are 
conducted·and maintained, and ·the ways in which psychologists 
as professionals may receive remuneration. 
It has also been noted that the kinds of ethical dilemmas 
which may arise within each of these areas will differ across 
different countries with different societal structures. For 
this reason, it can be expected that while there wi-ll be 
commonalities between ethical codes in different countries, 
the details of the regulations may differ according to the 
particular needs and difficulties of differing societies. 
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In order to ensure .that.the regulations. contained within an 
ethical code for clinical !psychological practising in South 
Africa are sufficiently comprehensive and ~elevant to the 
particular social circumstances of this country, it would 
seem that an empirical study similar to that on which the 
APA Ethical Standards are based should be conducted to ascertain 
which areas of:functioning present difficulties for psychologists 
in this country andwhat the nature of these difficulties are. 
These difficulties could then be taken account of by devising 
rules applicable in this situation, which rules, it must be 
remembered, would be based:on the ethical principles which 
underline the· code as a whole. 
SUMMARY 
The current situation in South Africa as.regards professional 
organization of the profession of psychology and ethical 
r 
standards for psychologists which are currently operative, has 
been critically· reviewed~ and suggestions have been made as to 
how this situation could be improved. These suggestions include 
the reorganization of the profession so that it has independence 
and autonomy in policy decisions, and the development of an 
ethical code which would· be adequate in guiding psychologists 
-
in ethical decision·making·within all their are~s of functioning. 
It was proposed that: such a code should hav~ a structure which 
is explicitly grounded in an ethical theory and ethical 
principles and therefore allows a .standard approa·ch to the 
resolution.of ethical conflicts. In addition, it was argued 
that the content of the regulations should cover all potentially 
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problematic situations in .the country and .that the nature 
of these situations should be ascertained·via an empirical 
study similar to· that conducted by the APA in -the development 
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PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
In previous sections the philosophical basis of ethical codes 
and proposals for the development of an adequate ethical code 
for South African clinical psychologists were discussed. It 
was seen that such an ethical code should be constituted of at 
least three levels- that is, an'underlying ethical theory, the 
four ethical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence 
and justice, and rules for conduct in specific situations. It 
was noted that the nature of the specific situations which 
require ethical regulation should be ascertained via an 
empirical study of the actual ethically problematic situations 
encountered by South African psychologists. This section is 
intended to provide an overview of the possible ethical diffi-
culties encountered in some of the: major areas of functioning 
of the clinical psychologist, and to demonstrate how ethical 
principles may be applied to these situations in order to derive 
guidelines for ethical conduct. This section is intended to be 
' 
illustrative rather than exhaustive. It is not within the scope 
of this thesis to consider in detail all the major areas of 
functioning in which ethical dilemmas may be encountered by 
clinical psychologists, and for this reason it was decided to 
examine one major area - that is, psychotherapy - in depth and 
to highlight the major ethical issues in three other areas, 
namely research, assessment, and professional conduct and 
relati~nships. The reason for choosing psychotherapy as the 
area to receive the most attention is that it is on this area 
that the bulk of the literature on ethics in clinical psychology 
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has centred, whic~ suggests that this area contains the 
most ethical complexities. Although not covered in this 
section, the areas of community work and medico-legal 
involvement would also require regulation within a fully 
comprehensive-ethical code. 
The section concludes with a consideration of the particular 
socio-political context of South Africa and the additional 
compexities which this may contribute to ethical conduct of 
South African clinical psychologists in many of the areas of 
functioning considered. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ETHICS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ETHICS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
The definition of the roles and responsibilities, and the 
related issue of what constitutes ethical and unethical 
behaviour, of clinical psychologists as psychotherapists, 
has given rise to many conflicting arguments in the literature 
on the practise of psychotherapy. Opinions differ not only 
between differing schoo 1? of psychotherapy but a 1 so between 
individual practitioners within each school. Many of these 
conflicts seem at present irresolvable, with each opinion being 
supported by theoretical and empirical data. The aim of this 
chapter is therefore not to propose a resolution of all these 
conflicts, but to outline the kinds of arguments which have 
been put forward and to review some of the suggestions which 
have been made in the literature concerning ways in which the 
therapist can deal with commonly encountered ethical· dilemmas. 
The major areas in which ethical dilemmas are encountered in 
psychotherapy will be discussed in this chapter under the sub-
sections of the societal role of psychotherapists, values and 
goals in psychotherapy, the psychotherapist's responsibility 
towards clients, and methods and techniques of psychotherapy. 
Finally, the value of the rule-utilitarian ethical theory in 
providing an approach to these problems will be considered. 
5.1 THE SOCIETAL ROLE OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 
This constitutes one of the central issues which has engendered 
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disagreement amongst psychotherapy practitioners. Classical 
theoretical writings on psychotherapy appear to make little 
or no mention of the broader societal role of psychotherapists, 
focussing on the responsibility of therapists towards the 
individual client. This has given rise to the widely-held view 
that therapists should not concern themselves with broader social 
values and should concentrate on developing the capabilities of 
the individual client. In other words, these theorists see the 
psychotherapist's role as encompassing only responsibility 
towards their clients, and the particular pathology of these 
clients. The welfare of the individual client should therefore 
be their only concern. Engelhardt (1973), Breggin (1971) and 
Kennedy (1973) argue that this implies that psychotherapists 
should be "value-neutral" and that the process of psychotherapy 
is therefore "not telling the patient what the good is, but 
allowing the patient to choose the good". 
This view is not uranimously held by psychotherapists, some of 
whom argue that by virtue of being members of society, therapists 
inevitably also have their own conceptualization of what "the 
good" is. (A commonly held view is put forward in Lederer's (1971) 
argument: "'good' is that which, in the overall and in the long 
run, furthers the survival of the human community" (p.83). This 
means that there is a body of psychotherapists who advocate that 
therapists should guide their patients in the direction of "good" 
behaviour. For example, Smith and Peterson (1977): "We need to 
·. guard against emphasizing individual autonomy at the expense of 
the community" (p.316); Graham (1980): "I do not think we ever 
conVince our patients that we are neutral observers or that we 
• 
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are devoid of moral judgement. I think a patient can and must 
be informed at times that his/her behaviour is odious'' (p.371); 
and Garfield (1974): 11 the therapist has to make a decision that 
he can not only 'help' the client, that is, move towards the 
client's goal, but also that the goal is a 'desirable' one" (p.202). 
Critics of this conceptualization of psychotherapy (most notably 
Szasz, 1960, 1961 and 1967) argue that this leads the process of 
therapy into becoming a means of social control in that the 
therapist's values are frequently identical wit.h society's values, 
as the professions of psychiatry and psychology are created and 
maintained by society. These writers argue that many emotional 
problems are directly or indirectly caused by the values of the 
society and the restrictive roles it assigns to various of its 
members. Psychotherapy in the form described in the previous 
paragraph may therefore be seen as a self-defeating activity because 
it "accepts the so~iety which established it and by enabling the 
society to maintain itself, perpetuates the problems it was 
planned to abolish" (Statman (1970), p.l5). Even where therapists 
do not advocate directly advising clients as to what constitutes 
desirable or undesirable behaviour, it is felt by some writers that 
the inherent emphasis on the pathology of the individual client 
may indirectly be a mechanism of social control in that, as Hurvitz 
(1973) argues, "it trains the individual in continuing intro-
spection and in the interpretation of people, processes and events 
by methods associated with investigation of the unconscious and 
away from the social causes of self-defeating behaviour" (p.233) 
and thereby, "makes personal problems of political issues" (p.235). 
Bugental (1971) argues against this viewpoint, asserting that 
methods of psychotherapy which espouse humanistic values such as 
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autonomy and responsibility automat~cally foster in clients a 
·concern with broader societal issues and, furthermore, provide 
clients with the ability to tackle these issues and become 
involved in social reform. There has been no research which 
has investigated whether clients become more or less socially 
conscious and involved after therapy and until such research 
has been conducted, there will be no way of verifying the 
validity of either of these two opposing opi.nions. 
Halleck (1971) proposes the viewpoint, supported by Strupp and 
Hadley (1977) that the diagnosis of maladaption or mental 
illness is made with reference to societal norms and that one 
of the implicit goals of psychotherapy contained within its 
explicit goal of "curing" mental illness, is therefore helping 
clients to adapt to these norms, rather than to challenge them. 
Halleck attributes this emphasis in psychotherapy to a reluctance 
on the part of therapists "to criticize institutions that have 
brought them to positions of relative affluente and power that 
they wish to retain, and they are concerned over whether it is 
· ethical for a "pol iticall.y neutral" healer to fight for reform· 
(p.34). However, he argues against the popular assertion that 
psychotherapy~ politically neutral, writing: "By reinforcing 
the positions of those who hold power, the psychiatrist is 
committing a political act, whether he intends it or not 11 (p.32). 
In the light of this inevitable political involvement, Halleck 
goes on to suggest that therapists should work towards changing 
societal conditions which are not conducive to mental health. 
This can be achieved by treatment which encourages·clients to 
examine and confront their environment, thus making the 
individual client an agent of social reform, but Halleck feels 
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that this may not be suffi.cient in view of the fa~t that 
therapy clients constitute a small minority of people who are 
.. miserable enough or fortunate enough·to obtain psychiatric 
help... Rather, the therapist should become actively involved 
in confronting those societal institutions which are oppressive 
and restrict the autonomous functioning of individual members of 
society. Halleck .states further that, in fact, psychotherapists 
have more of an obligation to do this than ordinary citizens by 
virtue of their specialized knowledge which enables them to 
identify the specific factors in society which cause mental 
distress. 
There will be no attempt in this thesis to suggest a resolution 
bf this particular issue, which appears to be primarily related 
to the role-definition of psychotherapists, and thus an issue of 
professional policy. It is possible that through the process of 
the evolution of psychologists• conceptualization of themselves 
as professionals, some clearer stance may be adopted as to 
whether an aspect of the psychologist•s role should involve 
active involvement in social reform. Until such time, this must 
remain a contentious issue. 
Despite the continuing conflict of opinions over the precise 
nature of the therapist I S...-'respons i b1Titi es towards society' 
there is general agreement that the psychotherapist cannot ignore 
the demands of society completely. Promotion of the client•s 
welfare (which is encompassed by the professional values of the 
therapist) is on occasion challenged by and must be tempered with 
the therapist•s general responsibility towards the society in 
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which he lives and works (in other words, the responsibilities 
which he holds in common_withiall other members of society as 
opposed to his specific professional responsibilities). The 
ways in which conflicts between professional and societal 
responsibilities arise, the nature of these, and suggestions-
for ethical management of such conflicts, constitute the body 
of this chapter. 
5.2 VALUES AND GOALS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
The issue of the psychotherapist•s values and the effects that 
these have on the process of psychotherapy is one which is 
frequently considered in the literature. As was briefl~ dis-
cussed in the previous section, many practitioners (e.g. 
Breggin (1971), Engelhardt (1973), Kennedy (1973), Strupp 
(1980) and Will (198l))argue that the most important guiding 
pr_i_~~ i e]~ ~is- a~to~~l~l.'{ ~~i~~~-~impl ie~- t_~~~!-~~ !_heTapi st Is 
obligation is ~to ensure that, through the exploration and 
unde~~-~~.!!_<ii~g _of the cl ie!l~as!.._an9.~R!~~-~-n_t_~o~n_i~J~~,__!b_e 
client will eventually arrive at a position where he can 
"evaluate and select the ethics by which he wishes to conduct 
his life" (Breggin (1971), p.60). The "personal freedom,. of 
clients to make their own choices regarding values and to choose 
values which may be different from those of the therapist is 
therefore held to be essential. Even therapeutic models which 
concentrate on "symptom-removal" rather than exploration of 
intrapsychic factors maintain that they are upholding the 
principle of autonomy in that they are removing symptoms which 
impair the client•s ability to function autonomously. 
-80-
The therapeutic values regarded as essential .within this 
framework have been summarized b)" StrupQ (1980) as follows: 
"1) People have the right to personal freedom and 
independence 
2) They have rights and privileges but they also 
have responsibilities towards others 
3) People should be responsible for conducting their 
own lives without undue dependence on others 
4) People are responsible for theif actions but not 
their feelings, fantasies, etc . 
. 5) People's individuality should be fully respected and 
they should not be controlled, dominated, manipulated, 
coerced or indoctrinated. 
6) People are entitled to make their own mistakes and 
to learn from their life experiences" ~p.397-398). 
Will (1981) expands on these, emphasizing the autonomy of the 
individual client within the therapeutic relationship as well 
as in .his outside life, writing: "The patient's freedom is a 
matter of great concern. He is to have freedom of choice 
about the form of therapy, the selection of therapist, and 
his ways of expressing himself within the limits of safety, 
public acceptance, and the necessity to preserve the treatment 
process itself; he is free to live in ways that may not be 
congenial to the therapist 11 (p.209). Strupp (1980) expresses 
the basic tenet of this group of practitioners thus" ... what 
is unique about the enterprise of psychotherapy is the basic 
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belief that~ •• peopl~ will search for and find .their own 
solutions to basic life problems" (p.400). 
Although the approach suggested by the above authors may be 
the ideal approach, several writers have questioned the 
possibility of its practical application. Weisskopf-Joelson 
(1980) questions the possibility of the therapist maintaining 
a value-free neutrality in therapy, writing: "values are bo,und 
to be disseminated during the therapeutic process regardless of 
the therapist's intentions. The therapist's appearance and 
clothing as well as the appearance of his/her office communicate 
values. Even a noncommittal 'mmm• or a Rogerian reflection 
might, by its timing, suggest to the client what the therapist 
values as important" (p.462). Even the process of diagnosis, 
theoretically based on objectively observed symptomatology, 
appears to be heavily influenced by the therapist's own values. 
Research conducted by Braginsky and Braginsky (1973) showed 
. that when dummy 11 patients 11 expressed political views which 
differed radically from those of the therapist they were 
judged as far more disturbed than patients who presented with 
the same symptoms, but expressed political views consistent 
with the therapist•s. Further, this 11 Worsening 11 of pathology 
was also noted when patients made critical comments about 
mental health professionals rather than flattering comments. 
There has been some empirical evidence to support the notion 
that therapist•s values are communicated to the client during 
therapy and that this has some influence on value changes in 
the client. Beutler (1979) quotes several research studies, 
including his own, which have revealed three relevant facts: 
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1) patients· tend to .evaluate the suc~ess of therapy 
on the basis of the therapist's initial goals 
rather than their own, 
2) they acquire the "interest'' patterns of their 
therapist, and 
3) patients acquire their own therapist's values while 
concomitantly moving away from the value patterns 
of similarly trained therapists. 
It would appear from this, that, while consciously attempting 
to avoid imposing their values on clients, therapists are 
unconsciously communicating their own values and reinforcing 
clients for adopting these values. In the light of these 
facts, it seems necessary for therapists to be continually 
aware of their own values and the extent to which these differ 
from those of the client and it may in fact be preferable for 
therapists to make their own values explicit while simultaneously 
reassuring the client that he has a right to disagree with these. 
This may avoid the seemingly inevitable implicit transmission of 
these values and the unconscious coercion of clients into adopt-
ing them. 
Decisions as to the goals of psychotherapy are closely related 
·to the issue of differing values of therapist and client. The 
writers reviewed earlier in this section seem to assert that 
there should be only one goal common to all therapy which is the 
ultimate autonomous functioning of the client, unhampered by 
intrapsychic conflict or debilitating psychiatric symptoms. The 
goal of adaptation to societal norms, criticized in the first 
se~tion, is devalued by these writers who feel that the goal of 
X 
-83-
. autonomy implies that .the choice of .whether .or not to conform 
to sodety•s demands is in the hands of the client and is not 
the therapist•s decision. However, even within this model 
conflicts over goals may arise. For example, a client may 
come into therapy with the specific aim of adapting to a 
restrictive environmental situation. To take a hypothetical 
case: A woman who feels depressed and dissatisfied with her 
life due to pressures on her to conform to the traditional 
societal role assigned to women may request therapy with the 
specific aim of being able to accept this role without feeling 
depressed. The goal of the therapist whom she consults may, 
on the other hand, be the development of autonomy in this client, 
after the achievement of \'lhi ch she may well choose not to conform 
to this societally defined role. In other words, the client•s 
• goal is acceptance of and adaptation to these externally-imposed 
pressures, while the therapist•s goal for the client is freedom 
from these same pressures. The question arises as to whether 
the therapist has the right to pressure the client to become 
autonomous when in fact what she wants to do is adapt. 
The same conflicts are more obviously present in the types of 
therapies previously discussed in which the therapist feels that 
the client should work towards a "desirable"- goal. The principle 
of autonomy as outlined in Chapter one asserts that clients 
have the right to decide on their own present and future actions 
as long as these do not affect the ability of others to do the 
same. Thus, where the client•s goal is freedom from guilt so 
that he can continue to physically assault or even kill others, 
there is no conflict. Apart from this extreme example, though, 
there are many imaginable instances in which the goal which the 
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client perceives as 11 desirable 11 is not seen this way by the 
therapist. A possible approach to such conflict situations is 
suggested at a later stage in this chapter. 
Another potentially difficult situation may arise when the 
therapist realises that the agreed-upon goal of therapy may require 
the client to sacrifice other aspects of his or her life which are 
valued in themselves. A well-known case reported by Cohen and 
Smith (1976) and discussed at some length in the literature (e.g. 
Coyne (1976), Mclemore and Court (1977)) provides a good example 
of this kind of situation. In this case, the therapists felt 
that the cause of the patient•s subjective distress and obsessional 
symptoms was the restrictions imposed on her by virtue of her 
religious affiliation (which was Christian Science). Therapeutic 
outcome was regarded as successful, but, as had been predicted by 
the therapists, but never made explicit to the client, this 
outcome involved some challenging of her religious beliefs which 
eventuated in her renunciation of her religion. As a result of 
this, her marriage became conflicted, in that her husband remained 
a staunch Christian Scientist, and she eventually obtained a 
divorce. The issue here was that the client, on entering therapy, 
had no intention of changing her religion or of obtaining a 
divorce and was not aware that working towards her goal of relief 
from distress would possibly involve these losses. Had she been 
aware of this possibility, she may well have decided not to 
engage in therapy. Such indirect effects of therapy are frequently 
recognized by psychotherapists and the question arises as to 
whether a clicnt•s decision to begin therapy can be fully 
autonomous unless he or she is aware of the possibility of these 
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effects and can.weigh the benefits of achieving the therapeutic 
goal against the possible losses which may be involved. This 
weighting should arguably not be the therapist•s task as he can 
never be fully aware of the value which the client assigns to 
the various facto~s involved. 
5.3 RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS THE CLIENT 
There is considerable agreement in the literature as to the 
range of responsibilities which the therapist incurs in 
relation to the client. These responsibilities can be seen 
as concerning issues of confidentiality, competence, dual 
relationships with clients, and involuntary hospitalization 
and the right to treatment. The nature of these responsibilities 
and their ethical justification in terms of the principles of 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice will be 
discussed. Despite general agreement as to the nature of 
these responsibilities there are arguments within the literature 
as to the specific ways in which these responsibilities are 
realised within practical situations. These arguments will also 
be presented in this section. There will also be some consid-
eration of the ways in which responsibilities towards the client 
commonly conflict with the therapist•s more general societal 
responsibilities, but proposals for ways in which to approach 
these conflicts will be left for discussion in a later section 
of this chapter. 
5.3.1 Confidentiality 
Numerous authors have discussed the issue of confidentiality in 
psychotherapy (Dubey (1974); Plaut (1974); · LO\'Jental (1974); 
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Teichner (1975); Denkowski and Denkowski (1982); Mariner 
(1967)). The rationale for the ensuring of .therapeutic 
confidentiality is based on the principles of autonomy (the 
client should be able to choose which information he wishes 
to reveal to which persons); beneficence (the client will be 
unable to reap the full benefits of therapy without a trusting 
relationship with the therapist); and nonmaleficence (the 
tlient may be harmed by the release of private infor~ation to 
other sources). Denkowski and Denkowski (1982) question the 
necessity for absolute confidentiality in non-psychoanalytic 
therapy, but still maintain that in order to protect patients 
from potential harm, it is essential to respect confidentiality. 
Several factors, especially in the United States, are making 
the maintenance of confidentiality increasingly problematic for 
therapists. The major difficulties appear to derive from the 
increased subsidisation of therapy fees by third parties such 
as medical aid associations, the increasing use of computer 
storage for confidential material, the nature of therapeutic 
work in institutions or mental health agencies and several recent 
legal rulings which appear to reduce the patient's rights to 
confidentiality and emphasize the demands on the therapist to 
breach confidentiality in certain circumstances. 
Insurance companies in the United States who are increasingly 
bearing the financial burden of many clients' therapy payments 
are naturally concerned about the nature and effectiveness of 
the services for which they are paying and this has led to 
their increasing demands on therapists for information regarding 
the diagnosis, treatment plans and therapeutic progress of 
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individual clients. Many therapists are concerned about the 
release of this information to such bodies particularly where the 
client•s employer may also have access to it. 
Increasingly, large institutions and therapeutic agencies are 
making use of computer storage systems for confidential data. 
While this facilitates the efficient organization of the 
institution, it also provides easier access to confidential 
information by many potentially interested parties. There is 
special concern over the fact that many government agencies can 
gain access to such information by putting their own computers 
directly on-line to an institutions system and, through this so-
called 11 computer rape 11 obtain confidential data without the 
institution•s knowledge. Therapists are therefore encouraged to 
carefully monitor the nature of the information programmed into 
such systems, maintaining it at a minimum level. 
Demands on the therapist working within such an institution are 
also frequently not conducive to maintenance of confidentiality. 
The sharing of information with other members of a therapeutic 
team via case conferences immediately diffuses the responsibility 
to maintain confidentiality and the release of information there-
fore becomes more difficult to maintain and control. In addition, 
the established tradition of 11 Co-operation between agencies .. 
means that therapists within such institutions are frequently 
requested to reveal information to other agencies who have some 
interest in the client. Dubey (1974) argues that this policy 
deprives the client of the right to confidentiality and, 
particularly where the client refuses to release such information, 
the therapist should run the risk of being labelled .. unco-
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operative" by his employing institution and also refuse to 
divulge such data. He argues that despite the potential extra 
expense, such other agencies should employ their own independent 
psychologists to evaluate the particular aspects of the client 
in which they are interested, pointing out that, as soon as 
information is released by an individual therapist to a third 
party, the therapist loses control over the further dissemination 
of this data and the client's rights may be more easily further 
eroded. 
The major recent area of concern has been the legal injunction 
on therapists to breach confidentiality when the client is 
perceived to be dangerous to himself or others. Here, "dangerous-
ness" has not been clearly defined and appears to encompass any 
form of criminal act. Robinson (1974) has argued against this 
broad definitionland recommended that the concept of dangerousness 
be limited to private harm as in many societies activities which 
do not involve private harm, such as political activism, are also 
frequently defined as criminal acts. However, no legal ruling 
has as yet been made on this. According to the APA code the 
therapist is obliged in the case of dangerousness to inform 
"appropriate professional workers or public authorities", however, 
in the· United States the much publicized "1arasoff" case (1974) 
has raised doubt as to whether this limited breach of confiden-
tiality is regarded as sufficient in the eyes of the law. This 
case highlights the conflicting loyalties that therapists feel 
towards their clients and towards society and has given rise to 
conflicting arguments in the literature. The circumstances of 
the case were that the psychotherapist was informed by his client 
of the client's intention to kill his girlfriend. Satisfied that 
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th is was a serious threat, the therapist, in conformity with 
APA standards, informed .the campus police at the client's 
university and requested that the client be detained. He was 
duly arrested by the police who questioned him and thereafter 
felt that further detention was not justified. Two months later 
the client killed his girlfriend whose parents then sued the 
therapist for negligence. The therapist was initially acquitted, 
but on appeal the Supreme Court ruled that he had not taken 
adequate enough precautions to ensure the safety of the woman as 
he had failed to warn her directly of the threat to her life. 
The judge in this case recognized the necessity for confidentiality, 
but ruled that "the protective privilege ends where the public peril 
begins". While this latter statement is generally accepted by 
psychotherapists, the extent of the responsibility to warn 
potential victims of danger is regarded with apprehension. Dubey 
(1974) and Bersoff (1976) amongst others point out that, firstly, 
"dangerousness" is notoriously difficult to predict beyond 
reasonable doubt, and, secondly, several ill-effects can arise 
out of direct war.ning to the potential victim, for which the 
therapist may be held responsible by the client. Dub=y argues that 
in the event of ~uch a warning, it is possible that the potential 
victim may "get at" the client first. Bersoff writes that, more 
commonly, "knowledge by the putatively potential victim may lead 
to abrupt disruption of the relationship between client and third 
party in instances where such disruption would not, in fact, be 
warranted" ( p. 2-3 ) . The therapist may, as a result of such 
consequences, be vulnerable to defamation of character law suits 
or be considered liable for the assault on the client or 
disruption of his relationships. 
-90-
At this point it is important to note that the privilege 
of confidentiality is considered to be the client's 
privilege and not the therapist's, and ther~fore if the 
client gives consent for the release of certain kinds of 
information, the therapist is generally regarded as being 
under obligation to comply in revealing the information. 
Dubey (1974) presents several arguments for making the 
privilege of therapeutic confidentiality the therapist's 
as well as the client's. 
Firstly, clients are frequently unaware of the possible conse-
quences of giving consent for the release of confidential 
information and may be unwittingly compromising their 
position by so doing jn certain circumstances. 
Secondly, in some situations clients may be coerced into 
giving this consent. For example, in applying for employment, 
clients are frequently asked whether they are or have been in 
therapy. If they are honest and reply affirmatively to this 
.. question they are then asked to give permission for the 
potential employer to contact the therapist and ask questions 
about the client's condition and-progress. If the client 
were to refuse to grant this permission his application 
would undoubtedly be jeopardised and he has little choice but 
to consent. 
Finally, in cases where the revealing of confidential therapeutic 
information would benefit the client in some way (for example, in 
gaining exemption from military service), Dubey argues that the 
therapist's compliance in supplying the information reinforces 
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the secondary gain which the client derives from his sympto-
matology. This situation would be antithetical to the goals 
of the therapeutic process. 
Thus, Dubey argues for a form of absolute confidentiality in 
which the therapist refuses to reveal confidential information 
about the client to any third party no matter what the purposes 
of the request for information and regardless of whether the 
client has given consent or not. Obviously where the therapist 
is required by law to reveal such information a dilemma arises, 
but Dubey suggests that all agencies which commonly request 
such information from therapists, including the courts, should 
employ independent professionals who are trained in eliciting 
the kind of information which the agency requires. He maintains 
that wherever possible, the therapeutic treatment of the client 
and evaluation of the client for other purposes should be 
separate tasks performed by separate professionals. 
· Laudable as this suggestion may be in maximising the welfare of 
the client, many practical problems may be encountered in its 
implementation including wastage of both time and money resources 
·and it therefore seems unlikely that such a system will be 
implemented in the near future. Psychotherapists will therefore 
continue to be faced with many conflicts over the issue of 
confidentiality for some time to come. Proposed approaches to 
the resolution of these conflicts will be outlined in the final 
section of this cha~ter. 
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5.3.2 Competence 
Clients who consult psychotherapists do so with the 
expectation that the therapist will be able to assist them 
in resolving their difficulties. The principles of non-
maleficence and beneficence dictate that, in undertaking 
psychotherapy with a client, the therapist will possess 
the necessary competence to perform services which will 
not harm the client and which will have some beneficial result. 
Clients are frequently poorly informed as to the competence of 
therapists and the ensurance of competency must therefore lie 
in the hands of the therapists themselves and the professional 
organizations responsible for ensuring professional standards 
of practice. Several factors appear to be important in assess-
ing and maintaining the competence of clinical psychologists as 
psychotherapists. 
a) Basic Training and Professional Qualifications: 
~ 
Most countries have an agreed upon set of academic qualifications 
without which the potential clinical psychologist may not become 
registered and may therefore not practise psychotherapy. Due to 
. the relatively short time period of these basic training courses, 
frequently they provide only a broad introduction to the various 
· modes and models of psychotherapy or else emphasize the practise 
of only one model, while affording other models only a cursory 
examination or negle~ting them completely. In addition, it 
could be argued that it is only through experience in psycho-
therapy that an adequate level of competence is eventually attained. 
It is doubtful that there is sufficient time during the duration 
of the basic training course to gain enough experience to achieve 
this level. Therefore, although psychologists are theoretically 
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academically qualifi~d to engage in any model of ~sychotherapy 
of their choice upon .. gr~duation from such a training course, 
their competenc~ is of necessity initially limited due to their 
limited exposure to both the theoretical and practical aspects 
of many of these models. The differences between training 
programmes at differing universities both in terms of the focus 
and the intensity of training in psychotherapy·produces extra 
complications in that psychologists who initially embark on 
careers as psychotherapists do nqt have a standardised minimal 
level of competence in any aspects of psychotherapy. Although 
it would not be practical or even desirable to standardise the 
main focus or preferred models of all psychothe~apeutic training 
programmes, it may be helpful to set certain basic minimal 
standards for these programmes so that the public may be assured 
of some basic level of competence in novice therapists. 
In order to achieve the desired level of competence in psycho-
therapy with the minimum risk of harm to clients it appears 
necessary then to advocate some post-graduate in-practice training 
for newly graduated therapists in the form of advanced training 
programmes in particular models and techniques and/or regular 
required supervision by more experienced practitioners for a 
stipulated time period. 
b) Continuing Training and the maintenance of Competence 
Singer (1980) points out that: "psychotherapy is best understood 
as an application of available scientific knowledge" (p.372). J 
Because "available scientific knowledge" is constantly expanding 
1 
and revealing new facts and relationships between facts, Singer 
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asserts that in order to maintain an optimum level of 
competence, psychotherapists must regularly scan scientific 
journals in order to modify both their theoretical understanding 
and practical applications of psychotherapeutic methods in 
order to benefit their clients maximally. 
It could be argued that to adhere tenaciously to one model of 
therapy and apply it in the treatment of all clients, even 
where it is obviously not maximally beneficial may constitute 
incompetence in psychotherapists. In such cases, therapists 
must be prepared to refer such clients to more appropriate 
sources of help, or remain alert to the possibilities of other 
methods, especially those newly developed which may be of more 
benefit. Continuing training and education in such new techniques 
and methods even for experienced therapists would then be desirable 
to ensure competence. This aspect will be discussed further in the 
section on methods and techniques in psychotherapy. In any event, 
it remains essential for therapists to be aware of new developments 
and discoveries within their preferred model and not to assume that 
their basic training and years of experience make them sufficiently 
competent to continue practising within that model. 
c) Personal needs of the therapist 
Conflicts and problems within the therapist himself frequently 
interfere with the competent delivery of psychotherapeutic 
services. Such difficulties may obscure the therapist's under-
standing of the client's situation and may also lead him into 
using the process of psychotherapy to fulfill his own needs. In 
his discussion of the major causes of unethical practice, Schwebel 
(1955) identifies the therapist's self-interest as one of the 
major factors to be considered. He lists three main types of 
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self-interest: 1) personal profit motive- clients may be 
engaged inappropriately or the therapeutic process itself 
artificially prolonged because of the therapist's reliance 
on a regular clientele for his livelihood. 2) need for self-
enhancement- inappropriate dependence in clients may be 
fostered as a means of validating the therapist's conceptuali-
zation of himself as an expert and helpful person. 3) need to 
maintain security and status- the limitations of the therapeutic 
relationship and the possible failure of the therapeutic endeavour 
may not be recognized by the therapist who needs his role as 
therapist to gain social status and security. 
Brown (1980) in his discussion of.the various forms of 
usuriousness in psychotherapy agrees with the points raised by 
Schwebel and in addition mentions 11 those instances wherein the 
patient is used to continue to work out the therapist's personal 
dynamics in relationship .. (p.422). 
The therapist needs to be constantly aware of the possibility of 
such personal problems and needs interfering in the psychothera-
peutic process, and where he has identified such difficulties 
should consult with peers, or a supervisor, and if necessary, 
enter therapy himself in order to resolve these problems. 
d) Recognition of Limitations 
Although clients frequently feel that therapy will be the panacea 
for all their problems, it is widely recognized that all 
therapeutic models and methods have limited effectiveness. It 
is the therapist's responsibility to recognize these limitations 
and, where therapy is no longer beneficial to the client, to 
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terminate the process and refer the client to alternative 
sources of help. 
Apart from these technical limitations, the therapist•s personal 
limitations need to be considered. Some of these were considered 
in the previous section, but, in addition, many therapists find 
that because of personal factors, they prefer working with some 
clients and find it very difficult to work with others. As the 
therapist•s personal feelings towards the client undoubtedly 
affect his competence in offering adequate therapy, these types 
of personal limitations also need to be recognized. Many 
personal needs of therapists obscure their recognition of 
limitations whether technical or personal, and this must be 
detrimental to clients who are consequently denied the opportunity 
for more successful treatment elsewhere. This situation is 
aggravated by the fact that the more inexperienced a therapist is, 
the more inadequate and insecure he feels in his role and conse-
quently the less willing he is to admit to these kinds of 
limitations. This means that the more incompetent therapists 
are in fact the least likely to recognize their limitations, and 
highlights the need for monitoring through supervision, especially 
for novice therapists. 
In summary, the ethical psychotherapist ensures his competence by 
ongoing training and supervision, caution in the practise of new 
or unfamiliar methods, recognition of technical and personal 
factors which li~it his competence with particular clients. He 
consciously attempts to resolve these latter limitations by 
adequate supervision or by himself entering psychotherapy. 
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5.3.3 Dual Relationships with Clients 
The APA code outlines the responsibility of psychotherapists 
to avoid engaging in dual relationships with clients which 
could be detrimental, specifically identifying sexual relation-
ships with clients as unethical. It is primarily the principle 
of nonmaleficence from which these injunctions appear to be 
derived. This section will look at the theoretical and ethical 
arguments against such dual relationships, firstly in general 
and then specifically with regard to sexual relationships. 
Some suggestions for ameliorating the negative effects of dual 
relationships other than sexual ones (which are always ill advised) 
will also be considered. 
Roll and Millen (1981) discuss the negative effects of dual 
relationship with clients, where the client is a friend or 
acquaintance of the therapist. They identify the following 
negative effects: 
a) Loss of the friehdship: 
Because of the particular restrictions and roles 
inherent in the practice of psychotherapy, new 
stresses are introduced into the relationship 
which may lead to the end of the friendship. 
b) Complication of the transference: 
The client who knows the therapist in another 
context will experience difficulties in establish-
ing a therapeutic transference relationship. 
Interpretation of transference will also be more 
complicated in that the therapist cannot be 
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sure whether the client's reactions to him are 
based in the therapeutic relationship or on 
the client's perception of him outside the 
relationship. This increases the complexity 
of an already difficult aspect of therapy and 
may impede the client's therapeutic progress. 
c) Support of grandiosity 
The inevitable disequilibrium_ of power and the 
relative powerfulness of the therapist may 
well extend back into the previously established 
relationship and, should the therapist be 
susceptible to this kind of inflation of his 
role, his professional competence and standards 
in general may be eroded. 
Despite these contra-indications, Roll and Millin (1981) 
recognize that in so~e cases, particularly in relatively small 
communities, the therapist will not be able to avoid treating 
some patients with whom they also have some extra-therapeutic 
contact. The client may be a friend, a student or even a 
professional such as the doctor or dentist of the therapist. 
In the light of this, they provide some guidelines for dealing 
with such cases which minimize the potential negative effects. 
a) 11 Don't do it 11 - it is re-emphasized that, wherever 
possible, such r~lationships should be avoided by 
referring acquaintances to professional colleagues 
or alternative sources of help. 
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b) 11 The transference relationship is real and the 
'rea1' relationship is real" - two temptations 
may arise in these cases. One is to treat all 
reactions of the acquaintance-client as trans-
ference and the other is to ignore the transference 
and concentrate on the real relationship. 
Therapists are advised to discuss the problems of 
the dual relationship with the client early in 
therapy, and to continue to interpret the trans-
. ference. Failure to do so may contaminate the 
extra-therapeutic relationship with the unresolved 
transference reactions of the client. 
c) "Corollary to above : get supervision or consulta-
tion ... Supervision is an aid to distinguishing 
transference and countertransference reactions 
from the transactions which derive out of the 
original relationship. 
d) "Rigidify_"-. Th~ negative effects of overlap between 
the therapeutic relationship and outside relationship 
may be minimized by more than usually strict 
. adherence to the limits of therapy (especially time 
limits) and by specifica~ly requesting that issues 
raised in therapy not be carried over to the outside 
context. 
e) "Organize a hierarchy of values .. 
Some decision about the relative importance and 
dominance of each relationship appears to be 
necessary. Because special obligations are incurred 
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by the therapist towards the client which are 
qualitatively different from those in relation-
ships with friends and acquaintances, it is 
suggested that the therapeutic relationship 
should always be given priority as long as the 
dual relationship continues. 
f) ~'Be prepared to lose the friendship" 
Not only must the therapist be prepared to lose 
the friendship of his client in the interests of 
therapeutic progress, but where the client is a 
close friend or a relation of a friend of the 
therapist, the therapist must be prepared to 
forfeit this friendship as well. Where he is not 
prepared to lose the friendship, the therapeutic 
endeavour should not be undertaken. 
g) "Avoid discussing case material" 
This advice seems to apply not only when the client 
is a friend, but also where there is the danger 
that the people to whom the material is being 
presented may be friends or relations of the client. 
h) "Know when to stop" 
Because of the increased danger of the therapeutic 
relationship with an acquaintance becoming 
complicated and possibly even pathological, the 
therapist should be more than usually alert to the 
point where therapy is becoming destructive so that 
the therapy may be terminated and the client referred. 
.) 
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i) · 11 Be gratified .. 
The danger of gratifying personal needs through 
therapy with a client who is also a friend, is 
greatly increased. The therapist must be 
especially sensitive to this possibility .and 
take active steps to ensure that his own life 
is sufficiently gratifying. 
Roll and Millin confined their discussion to therapy with 
clients with whom the therapist has an already established 
relationship. The establishment of friendships or other 
extra-therapeutic relationships with clients already in 
therapy is always regarded as anti-therapeutic (Chipman, (1978)). 
By far the largest proportion of writings in this area are 
devoted to the negative effects of sexual relationships 
established during the process of therapy with clients (e.g. 
Kardener (1974), Hare-Mustin (1974), Finney (1976), Stone (1976), 
Davidson (1977), Barnhouse (1978) Hays (1980) and Serban (1981)). 
Barnhouse (1978) presents a primarily theoretical argument 
against therapist-client sex arguing that, particularly in 
psychodynamic therapy, it is detrimental to the client for three 
major reasons. Firstly, within the transference relationship the 
client almost invariably enters into a type of parent-child 
relationship with the therapist and therapist-client sex can 
therefore be seen as having incenstuous overtones. Particularly 
where oedipal problems are involved, this metaphorical violation 
of the incest taboo may have very detrimental effects on the 
client whose ego strengths are poor. Kardener (1974) supports 
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this particular.argument against therapist-patient sex. 
Barnhouse's second reason is that an important part of 
therapy is frequently the interpretation and understanding 
of the client's sexual fantasies, particularly where these 
involve the therapist. Where these are acted out, the 
oppo~tunity for interpretation is lost. Finally, the 
argument is frequently put forward that clients voluntarily 
and autonomously enter into sexual relationships with their 
therapists, but Barnhouse considers this invalid because of 
the relatively greater power of the therapist in the relationship 
which means that the client is frequently not in a position 
psychologically to refuse to engage in a sexual relationship. 
Finney {1976) supports this final point and suggests that even 
after the therapeutic relationship has officially terminated, 
1. 
y 
the same objections to a subsequent sexual relationship of this 
nature may be made. He quotes the case of a woman who was sexually 
propositioned by her ex-therapist two years after terminating 
therapy. She felt betrayed by the therapist, expressing her 
feelings thus: 11 A psychotherapist should not ask his patient 
to go to bed with him. It's taking unfair, personal advantage 
of knowledge that he gained in a relationship of professional 
trust and confidence 11 (p.595). Finney also warns that seduction 
by a client may be an unconscious expression of hostility towards 
the therapist, perhaps in an attempt to equalize the perceived 
power imbalance. Serban (1981) supports this viewpoint and adds 
that should the th~rapist end the sexual relationship, the client's 
anger and hostility is exacerbated and frequently leads to law-
suits against the therapist. If these possible unconscious 
motivations of the client are not perceived and dealt with in 
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therapy in a constructive way, rather than acted upon, the 
therapist may be said to have failed in his therapeutic task. 
Sexual relationships with clients are frequently justified by 
therapists as being beneficial for the client and therefore 
in some ways perhaps an acceptable therapeutic technique. 
Hare-Mustin (1974) strongly challenges this assertion, maintaining 
that, on etbical grounds, therapist-patient sex is not an 
acceptable therapeutic technique despite the beneficial effects 
it may have for some clients. She writes: .. How can it be 
determined if sexual contact is indicated and the treatment of 
choice? And, is the therapist the most competent person to 
provide such treatment?.. And further, .. If the therapist does 
feel competent to offer sexual contact to the patient ... the 
obvious next question would be, does the 11 competent 11 therapist 
offer sexual relations to all his patients who could benefit 
from it, rather than just young attractive patients of the 
opposite sex? For example, would a male therapist be equally 
ready to offer himself in this technique to an old unattractive 
female, or male for that matter? .. (p.308). She goes further to 
show that not only is therapist-patient sex theoretically 
unsound, but also violates both principles 3 and 8 of the APA 
Ethical Standards. Principle 3 states that the therapist 
should display 11 Sensible regard for the moral and legal 
standards of the community in which he works. Hare-Mustin 
maintains that most communities would regard client-therapist sex 
as immoral, particularly as the client could be regarded as 
paying for the sexual relationship. Principle 8 directs the 
therapist to inform the client of important aspects of the 
therapeutic relationship which may affect the client's decision 
to enter therapy. The use of sexual intercourse as a therapeutic 
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technique could well be classed as such .an important aspect, 
but most sexual relationships with clients are formed at a 
point in therapy where the client has developed an involvement 
in and dependency on the therapeutic process and the therapist 
himself and is therefore no longer in a position to refuse the 
relationship as easily as prior to beginning therapy. 
Thus, several authors have demonstrated that there is no 
justification for therapist-client sex which may be condemned 
on both theoretical and ethical grounds. Kardener (1974) feels 
that it is the therapist's unresolved needs combined with the 
powerful position he holds in relation to the client which may 
propel him into such relationships against his better judgement. 
Once again, the need for awareness of such needs, and safe-
guarding against their fulfillment in the therapeutic context, 
through consultation and supervision are advised. 




In this section the ethical principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence and justice all come into play. Involuntary 
hospitalization in itself immediately violates the principles of 
autonomy and nonmaleficence, and protecting the rights of 
patients whose freedom has been restricted in this way means 
that therapists must ensure more fully that patients benefit in 
some way from this action (beneficence) through the provision of 
adequate treatment which caters for their needs {justice). In 
this section we will consider the process of involuntary 
hospitalization and the issues involved in respecting the 
rights of involuntarily hospitalized patients. 
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In considering the moral and legal justifications for 
involuntary hospitalization, the concept of dangerousness 
once again becomes important because it is on the grounds 
of imminent danger to self or others that:people may be 
committed to mental institutions without .their consent. 
Shah (1975) expresses concern about these grounds pointing to 
the difficulties of accurately predicting dangerousness and to 
the discreparicy between the grounds for detention of potentially 
dangerous criminals and those for the detention of mental 
patients. Even a habitual criminal who has committed numerous 
violent crimes in the past may not be detained on the basis of 
potential dangerousness alone, but must actually have committed 
a new criminal act. Mental patients are not protected in this 
way and there is no substantial evidence to suggest that they are 
any more dangerous than so-called mentally healthy people. Shah 
ventures to suggest that in fact mental patients could be proved 
to be far less potentially dnagerous than people who engage in 
drunken driving and questions whether the loss of liberty and 
other undesirable consequences of hospitalization are justifiable 
in the light of these difficulties and inaccuracies in the 
prediction of dangerousness in mental patients, particularly 
where the patient has never before displayed violent behaviour. 
The socia{st{gmati;!:a~tiq~'attached to mental patients is 
undoubtedly aggravated by this conceptualization of them as 
dangerous. Shah proposes that, rather than basing the 
hospitalization of the mentally ill on medical judgements of 
dangerousness, this should be a legal procedure in which the 
principle of proof ,.beyond reasonable doubt 11 \'lould be required 
before people are hospitalized on the grounds of their potential 
dangerousness. 
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The issues invol'ved in protecting the rights of individuals 
whose freedom has been curtailed by involuntary hospitalization 
have been extensively debated in the literature (e.g. 
Schwitzgebel (1975), Rachlin, Pam and Milton (1975), Miller 
and Burt (1977), White and White (1981) and Cahn (1982). The 
right to treatment of such patients is an issue which was 
highlighted in the recent Donaldson vs. o•connor case in the 
United States (discussed by Kopolow (1976)), in which a mental 
patient successfully sued the mental institution where he had 
been involuntarily committed for fifteen years. He claimed that 
during this time he had not received adequate treatment and his 
claims that he was neither insane nor dangerous were rejected by 
the hospital authorities without an adequate assessment of their 
validity. The Court rules that all mental hospital inmates have 
a basic right to adequate treatment during their period of 
/ hospitalization. 
Difficulties inherent in the provision of adequate treatment in 
these cases include one which was brought up in discussion of 
the Donaldson case (1976) in the literature, namely the chronic 
shortage of staff and treatment facilities which make adequate 
treatment of all inmates a well-nigh impossible task at many 
mental institutions. The responsibility of the state to provide 
funding and resources necessary to correct these inadequacies 
was emphasized to avoid placing therapists in the impossible 
position of having to satisfy the state by treating all mental 
patients while being denied the state resources which would make 
it possible to do so. 
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0ther difficulties highlighted by Cahn {1982) involve the 
fact that frequently effective treatment of a patient's 
disorder is not available. In addition, the court has ruled 
that the least restrictive treatment alternative be the treat-
~ent of choice, but in many cases the most effective treatment 
is also the most restrictive {e.g. pharmacotherapy). The 
therapist in the mental hospital therefore has a difficult task 
in providing treatment which is "adequate" {i.e. effective) and 
simultaneously providing the least restrictive treatment. 
A corollary to the patient's right to treatment is the 
simultaneous legally upheld right of patients to refuse treat-
·.ment {a right which is based on the principle of autonomy). 
·Here, one of the most pressing issues is that of the patient's 
competence to make such a decision regarding his treatment. 
Mental health professionals frequently treat mental patients 
involuntarily with the justification that by virtue of the 
patient's mental state he is not able to act autonomously in 
making such decisions. White and White {1981) point to the 
potential abuses inherent in this system and assert that the 
judgement of incompetence should be essentially a legal one and 
not one to be made by treating professionals. Cahn {1982) 
discusses the legal ruling that treatment against a patient's will 
may only be administered in "emergency•• situations to prevent 
death or serious deterioration in the condition of the patient. 
He points out that the concept of emergency is however not legally 
defined and this presents problems for therapists iri deciding 
what.constitutes an emergency and therefore also in deciding when 
the emergency is over. 
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Several suggestions have been made as to the ways in which 
some of the patient•s rights may be respected. Schwitzgebel 
(1975) proposes a contractual model for treatment decisions 
in which therapist and patient collaborate in drawing up a 
contract, specifying the goals and methods of the treatment 
programme, after the patient has been informed of the relative 
effectivene~s and potential side-effects of the available 
treatment opinions. While this may be a part-solution to the 
problem, it is difficult to imagine how a psychotic patient would 
be able to participate in such a task and there therefore must 
remain instances in which the patient does not partipate in this 
way. In these cases, it is recommended that the therapist 
consult with some third party, such as relations, who have an 
int~rest in the wellbeing of the patient, and that these people 
be informed of, and possibly participate in treatment decisions. 
It is apparent that this particular aspect of the therapist•s 
functioning is fraught with many potentially conflictual situations. 
Possible approaches to be adopted in such situations will be 
considered in the final section of this chapter. 
5.4 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
The principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence dictate that 
the chosen method and techniques of treatment in psychotherapy 
must firstly not harm the patient and secondly must benefit 
the patient in objectively verifiable ways. Recently there 
has been concern expressed about the extent to which psycho-
therapy does benefit clients and whether in some cases the client 
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~ay end therapy in a worse position than when he started. 
This section examines some of the attempts that have been 
made to assess therapeutic effectiveness, to highlight the 
potential dangers inherent in psychotherapy and to determine 
what factors guide the therapist in deciding on his therapeutic 
approach. Some suggestions as to ways in which therapeutic 
efficiency may be maximised and the outcome of therapy may be 
more successfully measured are also considered here. 
In a review of the outcome studies to date which have been 
attempted to determine which of the therapeutic methods and 
techniques are more effective, Bergin (1975) states that there 
is some evidence that therapy is more beneficial for clients 
·than no treatment at all. A well controlled study showed that 
65% of therapy clients showed some improvement over a certain 
period of time as opposed to 50% of untreated controls. However, 
only 5% of the control group showed deterioration over this, 
period, while lD% of the therapy clients deteriorated. Outcome 
of therapy did not seem to be related to the particular methods 
and techniques employed by therapists, but rather to the personal 
~ 
style of the therapist. Truax and Mitchell found that therapists 
who showed high levels of empathy, warmth and genuine concern 
during therapy sessions produced better results, while in a 
similar study, Yalom et al~related deterioration in therapy to 
therapists who were impatient and authoritarian in nature or 
intrusive and aggress·ive in their approach to clients. Thus, no 
specific method of therapy has been identified by these studies 
as being more or less beneficial than any other method in any 
significant way. 




This failure to identify differences between approaches which 
relate to outcome may not be so much a reflection on the 
absence of these differences as of the methodological difficulties 
which have characterized much of the research. The primary 
difficulty is in devising objective criteria of successful 
outcome. Kisch and Kroll (1980) write about the distinction 
between effectiveness and meaningfulness in therapy, defining 
''effectiveness" as the achievement of explicit goals as measured 
by objective, operationally-defined criteria, and "meaningfulness•• 
as the client's subjective experience of the success of therapy. 
Kisch and Kroll assert that, by its nature, therapy frequently 
cannot identify explicit goals and the outcome of therapy should 
therefore be measured in terms of its meaningfulness to the client. 
Strupp (1975) argues against this professed inability to specify 
therapeutic goals. He states that the failure to specify goals 
not only makes the assessment of therapeutic outcome impossible, 
which may in turn allow the continuing use of therapeutic 
methods which are useless or even harmful, but this failure may 
be unethical from the client's point of view in that "if the 
therapist is not clearly aware of the nature of the client's 
problems, the treatment objectives and the kinds of outcome by 
which therapeutic change can be judged, he is asking the client 
to engage in a journey that might lead somewhere or nowhere, a 
venture that is time-consuming, expensive, and demanding" (p.40). 
Strupp maintains that, even in 'types of therapy which have broadly 
stated objectives such as self-realization or personality growth, 
it may still be possible to identify the desired therapeutic 
outcome against which actual outcome can be measured. Strupp 
developed these ideas further in conjunction with Hadley (Strupp 
and Hadley,(l9i7» into a ''tripartite model of mental health and 
y 
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therapeutic outcomes". In this model it is argued that there 
is no consensus on the definition of what constitutes mental 
health, and therefore no consensus on the definition of 
successful therapeutic outcome. Three major participants in 
the dispute over these definitions may be identified as being 
society, the client and the therapist. 
1) Society defines mental aberration largely as the 
basis of observed behaviour, which differs 
significantly from society's norms. Therefore 
success in therapy is measured in terms of 
observable behaviour change. 
2) The client's indicator of mental disturbance is 
subjective emotional distress or discomfort and 
his aim for therapy is the relief of this distress. 
3) The therapist bases his judgement of mental illness 
on the basis of some theoretical model of ideal 
personality structure and his gain in therapy is to 
change the intrapsychic processes and/or behaviour 
of the client which deprive him of such a healthy 
personality. 
The outcome of any particular therapeutic process will therefore 
be judged differently according to which perspective is adopted 
in evaluation. Strupp and Hadley therefore suggest that all 
three of these sets of criteria be used in outcome studies, and 
that therapeutic outcome should not be seen as a unitary concept 
but as one which may be seen from differing perspectives. The 
model makes no evaluative comparisons of the relative merits of 
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the three differing aims of psychotherapy. The point is that 
the choice of methods of therapy for particular clients will 
vary according to the desired goals which could be behaviour 
change, relief from distress, personality change, or a 
combination of any of these. If therapeutic methods are 
evaluated in terms of this model, therapists will be ~ble to 
choose between one or another in terms of their relative 
effectiveness in each of these three areas. Application of 
this model in outcome studies, which does not yet appear to 
have occurred, could help to determine the validity of the claims 
that psychodynamic therapy, aimed at personality change, will 
also automatically result in relief of subjective distress and 
behaviour change, or the claims that behaviour therapy aimed at 
behaviour change may result in relief of distress and personality 
change. The degree to which different types of therapy are 
effectiv~ in each of these areas could also be clarified; and · 
. 
totally ineffective, or relatively ineffective therapeutic 
method~ could be discarded. 
In the absence of such objective grounds for preferring one 
treatment method over another, the question arises as to the 
basis upon which therapists currently decide on which method to 
adopt. Barron (1978) suggests that it is the personality 
~ariables, such as particular attitudes and values, of the 
therapist which determine this decision. This suggestion is 
confirmed by Reiss, Coste 11 and A 1 mond ( 1976), who ex ami ned the 
' technical preferences of staff at mental hospitals and found 
that .. technical preferences are an indication of kinds of 
personal needs an individual wishes to satisfy in an organizational 
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setting" (p.796). The implications of. this are that therapists 
may tend to practise a particular method of psychotherapy more 
for the personal gratification which they derive out of it than 
for its proved effectiveness in satisfying the needs of the 
client and that therapy may therefore become for the therapist 
an end in itself rather than a means to an end. The danger of 
this is that the chosen method of therapy may be inappropriate 
for some clients and that therapy may be artificially prolonged 
by the therapist beyond the point at which it is benefitting the 
client. These factors may be underlying some of the negative 
effects leading to the deterioration in some clients reported by 
Bergin (1975). 
The nature of the possible negative effects of psychotherapy are 
rarely examined. Robitscher (1978) suggests that the direct 
negative effects may include the following: 1) exacerbation of 
presenting symptoms; 2) appearance of new symptoms; 3) the 
client's abuse or misuse of therapy (e.g. developing a sustained 
dependency on the therapy or the therapist); 4) the client 
"overreaching" himself (e.g. undertaking life tasks prematurely; 
undertaking tasks requiring resources beyond these of the client, 
·or in other ways putting excessive strain on the psychological 
resources of the client) and 5) disillusionment with therapy and/or 
the therapist (through the wasting of the client's resources that 
may have been better expended elsewhere which may lead to the 
hardening of attitudes towards other sources of help; or loss 
of confidence in the therapist which may extend to other human 
relationships). Robitscher notes that temporary negative effects 
may be necessary in the course of any successful treatment and 
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that long~term negative effects cannot be definitively 
related to the treatment or treatment mistakes, but it 
appears that more sound outcome research may well determine 
whether the 11 temporary negative effects" are outbalanced by 
the potential benefit to the client in the long run, and 
whether certain kinds of treatment and treatment mistakes 
generally have negative effects. 
Graziano and Fink (1973) discuss what they term "second-order11 
negative effects in therapy which may derive out of the process 
of therapy regardless of which techniques or methods employ and 
which they have grouped as follows: 
1) failure to complete the therapeutic process- i.e. 
11 dropouts 11 from therapy, 
2) implicit labelling and the client's self-evaluation, and 
3) treatment system demands of fees and scheduled appointments. 
1) "Dropouts" from therapy 
Clients who fail to complete the process of therapy 
fail to derive the full benefits of the treatment and, 
in some cases, may experience negative effects in 
terms of feeling that perhaps they cannot be helped 
at all or disillusionment with the process of therapy. 
The reasons why clients may terminate therapy 
prematurely are encompassed within the following two 
sections .. 
2) Labelling and the "sick" role 
The implicit labelling of therapy clients as sick or 
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in some way inadequate may have serious consequences 
for their self-concept and may lead them to adopt. 
the "sick" role actively, unrealistically under-
estimating their coping capacities. The social 
stigma attached to being in therapy may disrupt 
important relationships of the client in that 
friends and relations may also perceive the ~lient 
as sick, inadequate and in need of "special" 
treatment by them. Besides this, the client's 
family's functioning may also be disrupted, by 
·the stigma attached to having produced a "mentally 
ill" member. 
3) Demands imposed by the professional system : fees 
and schedules. Especially for lower socio~ 
economic class clients, the difficulties of meeting 
the demands for payment and attendance in therapy 
may result in particular kinds of negative side-
effects. Fees constitute new demands on the 
family's financial resources and may have to be met 
by curtailing other expenditures, depletion of 
savings and going into financial and possibly con-
comitant psychological debt through borrowing money 
from the extended family or other resources. This 
may increase the emotional strain between family 
members and particularly between the rest of the 
family and the client for whose benefit the 
sacrifices are being made. Time schedule demands 
lead to disruption of normal scheduling which may 
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include taking time off work and consequent loss of 
pay and loss of status at work. 
,-Graz1an0-;and Fink maintain that therapists are frequently unaware· 
·--·----- __ _l 
of these kinds of difficulties encountered by the client and that 
where these are sufficiently great the client may harbour 
resentful feelings towards therapy and the therapist which 
unless recognized and dealt with in therapy, may hamper thera-
peutic progress or lead to premature termination by the client. 
In_assessing the effectiveness of therapy, both the beneficial 
and potentially negative effects of therapy for particular 
clients must therefore be considered. Ellisul980g) introduces 
another element when he points out that in recent times, when 
economic resources are becoming scarce, there is increasing 
pressure on therapists to provide therapy that is efficient in 
terms of time and money as well as effective. He proposes that 
in order to be efficient, therapy should preferably be brief, 
depth-centred, extensive, thoroughgoing and preventative. The 
rationale for these characteristics is that besides brevity, 
which ensures minimum expense in terms of both time and money, 
therapy which is maximally efficient should also ensure that 
therapeutic progress is maintained once the actual process of 
therapy has ended. Therapies which concentrate on symptom-
removal, although brief and effective, may not necessarily be 
the most efficient in these terms unless they also equip the 
. ' 
client with more adequate coping mechanisms which will prevent 
the re-emergence of problems in future difficult situations. 
It has been seen that in choosing a particular method of 
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psychotherapy the .therapist needs to balance the possibility 
of negative effects against the potential benefits to the 
client and must also ensure that the method is maximally 
efficient. The question arises as to whether there are any 
existing methods of therapy involving techniques which make 
them immediately unethical in these terms. Some - such as 
aversive techniques in behaviour therapy involve harm to the 
patient which forms an essential part of the process of treatment. 
It is generally accepted by behaviour therapists that such 
techniques should be employed only where other less harmful 
techniques have failed to achieve the desired results and that 
the degree of benefit which would result from the use of such 
techniques should outweigh the harm involved. In other methods, 
the dangers of harm are less obvious and frequently underplayed 
by the proponents of these methods. Examples of such techniques 
are those involving "deception" of the client as in paradoxical 
techniques and certain strategies in family therapy where the 
therapist consciously deceives or lies to the client in order to 
achieve a desired result. Haley (1977) writes: "If it is 
essential for the cure that deceit be used, it might be justified 
on that basis. However, one must also be concerned about the 
long-term effect of a person experiencing an expert as an 
untrustworthy person, which may be more harmful than the 
continuation of the symptom" (p.203). Annitto and Kass (1979) 
discuss the deceptipn involved in administering placebos in 
pharmacotherapy saying that therapeutic deception "is not 
conscious lying, manipulative deceit, or dishonest chicanery; 
rather it is an example of the expression of the conscious 
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decisions made during psychotherapy" (p.552). Thus, in some 
cases where benefit to the client may definitely be expected 
to result out of deception and where the therapist's motivation 
for deceiving the patient is entirely based on the desire for 
and expectation of this benefit, conscious and deliberate 
deception in therapy may be a valid and useful technique. 
However, as Haley asserts, it is necessary to be constantly 
aware of the balance between the benefit to be derived and the 
possible harm which could arise if the client realises that he 
is being deceived. 
The most ethical concern has been expressed regarding therapeutic 
techniques which involve the "intrusion" of the therapist onto 
the body of the individual and the attendant risks of physical 
and emotional harm in these techniques. Examples are certain 
types of encounter groups and "body therapy" techniques, which 
may involve bodily stress and pain. The necessity of exercising 
"due care" in the execution of such techniques is emphasized by 
Leland (1976), but recent rulings in American courts reported by 
Foster (1977) and Pope, Simpson and Werner (1978) suggest that 
certain of these techniques fall below professional standards 
and are inherently negligent regardless of whether "due care" 
is exercised during their performance. So that even if it 
could be proved that these·techniques benefited some clients, 
the likelihood of physical and emotional harm and the degree 
of intrusion which.is involved invariably outweigh the potential 
benefits and thereby render the techniques unethical. An 
example of such a technique is one developed by Zaslow in the 
United States, known as "Z therapy", in which the patient is 
tickled until an extreme emotional reaction is evoked. 
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A difficult ethical situation arises when new therapeutic 
techniques are being developed. Initially, in such a process, 
the therapist cannot be sure that the new technique which he 
feels may benefit clients will in fact do so or will not 
produce concomitant negative effects. In addition, when 
practising such techniques the therapist cannot claim to be 
competent in this practise. Obviously then there are attendant 
risks in the initial implementation of any new therapeutic 
method and as such methods develop primarily through practice, 
some clients will inevitably be exposed to these risks. 
Advancement in the practice of psychotherapy necessitates the 
continuous re-evaluation of old methods and experimentation 
with alternative methods, but it is suggested that, in order to 
minimize the risk, these innovations be based on sound theoretical 
judgement and that the first clients who serve as the "guinea 
pigs" for such innovations be regarded as research subjects. 
The ethical considerations applicable to research, which will be 
discussed in a later chapter, should then also be applicable in 
these situations. 
This ·section has highlighted the dearth of definitive research 
bn the relative efficacy of various psychotherapeutic methods 
and techniques and emphasized the need for such research in order 
to allow therapists to make treatment decisions on other than 
purely subjective criteria. The nature and causes of negative 
effects in therapy have been examined and it is emphasized that 
in deciding on a treatment method the possibility of such effects 
should be continually ·weighed against the potential benefit of 
the treatment process. The ethical validity of certain existing 
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types of therapeutic methods has been briefly considered and, 
finally, the ethical problems inherent in the innovation of 
new techniques were examined. The major ethical problem in 
this area appears to revolve around the careful cost-benefit -· 
analysis (described in Chapter one) of treatment methods. At 
present, in the light of the lack of satisfactory research into 
the effects of therapy, this remains a difficult task which 
each individual therapist must tackle within his own sphere. 
The major need which is identified in this area is, therefore, 
the need to conduct further, more adequate research into 
therapeutic outcome and the relative efficacy of existing techniques. 
5.5 PROPOSED APPROACHES TO ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Some suggestions have been made in the literature as to ways in 
which the kinds of ethical dilemmas described in this chapter 
may be approached by psychotherapists to minimize the negative 
effects which may arise out of these situations. Because of its 
particular significance in many areas of the psychotherapist's 
functioning the concept and assessment of dangerousness and 
suggested approaches to dea.ling with potentially dangerous 
clients will be examined first. Secondly, the concept of 
informed consent which was briefly described in Chapter one 
has been proposed by many writers as a useful approach in the 
resolution of many conflict situations in psychotherapy. The 
mechanics of the application of this concept in various areas 
will be examined. 
In the first part of this thesis it was suggested that the rule 
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utilitarian ethical .theory may be a valid basis for an ethical 
code fo'r clinical psychologists and that the basic tenet of this 
theory may be applied in approaches to ethical conflicts. The 
fi na 1 portion of this chapter wi 11 be devoted to examining t-he 
application of this approach to conflicts arising in the practice 
of psychotherapy. 
5.5.1 The concept of dangerousness 
It has been seen that the determination of dangerousness is 
crucial in many psychotherapeutic decisions, especially those 
involving involuntary hospitalization and the revealing of 
confidential information. The difficulties of assessing 
potential dangerousness, especially where there has been no 
previous history of violent behaviour, have been briefly 
mentioned. In addition there exists no agreement as to the 
definition of dangerousness - i.e. which behaviours are 
sufficiently threatening to society to be defined as dangerous. 
Shah (1975) asserts that because of the undesirable publicity 
· attracted by the release of or failure to detain a mental patient 
who subsequently engages in dangerous or criminal behaviour, 
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals tend to 
"overpredict dangerousness to an extraordinary degree" (p.504). 
Shah quotes Rosen's (1954) estimate that for every one correct 
prediction of dangerousness there would be between 50 and 99 
false positives. Lane and Spruill (1980) also highlight the 
inaccuracy of prediction of dangerousness and the necessity for 
"a set of criteria that at least represent a consensus of the 
factors that increase the probability of dangerousness in the 
individual" (p.204). 
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In the light of the current lack of such a consensus, the 
therapist needs to exercise special care in the prediction 
of dangerousness. Lane and Spruill suggest that some checks 
on the power of therapists to make far-reaching decisions on 
the basis of demonstrably inaccurate predictions of dangerousness 
should be developed and suggest that these checks could take the 
following forms: 1) the therapist faced with a potentially 
dangerous client should obtain several independent professional 
opinions regarding the possibility of danger, 2) existing 
ethical committees should be used for consultation regarding 
both the prediction of dangerousness and the appropriate inter-
vention; 3) alternatively, one or two representative 
practitioners who would be available for consultation in these 
cases should be appointed by the State. 
Once the therapist is satisfied that the client is dangerous the 
policy of 11 least restrictive alternative .. normally applied to 
choice of treatment should be applied to the decision as to the 
appropriate intervention. Lane and Spruill suggest a hierarchy 
of options to guide therapists in making this decision. 
1) Attempt to talk the client out of it 
2) Change the client's environment- e.g. turning in 
weapons to Police, taking a vacation. 
3) Enlist the help of family members and other social 
support systems. 
4) Chemical restraint in the form of pharmacotherapy, 
the administration of which could be monitored through 
daily appointments. 
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5) Contin~ous monitoring or surveillance of the client 
with the co-operation of family and friends. 
6) Warn the victim via consultation with Police authorities. 
7) Voluntary or involuntary hospitalization. 
The progressive attempting of each of these options reduces 
the likelihood of unjustified hospitalization and provides 
the opportunity for the therapist to assess more accurately the 
extent of the potential danger. 
5.5.2 Informed Consent 
It was seen in Chapter one that the concept of informed consent 
derives from the principle of autonomy and involves the person•s 
right to participate in decisions involving his future. The 
concept and application of informed consent may be particularly 
important in the practise of psychotherapy where the power 
imbalance between therapist and client may provide fertile ground 
for exploitation of the client in order to fulfill the therapist•s 
own needs for control. Karasu (1980) refers to 110ne of the most 
prominent negative effects in the traditional therapeutic rela-
tionship; its insufficient regard for the patient•s intentionality 
or wi 11 11 ( p. 1503). It is suggested by severa 1 authors that 
informed consent by the client to all aspects of the therapeutic 
~rocess may constitute an approach to the resolution of this 
problematic situation (e.g. Ayllon and Skuban (1973); Bastinsen 
(1974); Sadoff (1974); Schwitzgebel (1975); Strupp (1975); 
Coyne (1976); Noll (1976); Robitscher (1978); Coyne and 
Widiger (1978); and Hare-Mustin et al. (1979)). 
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The nature of informed consent implies that the client must 
be fully informed by the therapist, in clear and understandable 
terms, of all the possible factors involved in the process of 
therapy which may affect the client•s decision to enter therapy. 
Without such information the client will not be in a position 
to make an autonomous decision regarding his own treatment. 
In this section, the application of the principle of informed 
consent will be considered with reference to the areas of the 
goals of therapy, including both direct and indirect effects of 
the treatment process; the competence of the therapist; the 
issue of confidentiality, and the proposed methods and techniques 
involved in the process of therapy. Finally, general principles 
and problems of the application of informed consent will be 
considered. 
1) Goals of Psychotherapy 
The importance of setting goals in therapy and the 
difficulties which may arise when the therapist•s 
and client•s goals differ have already been outlined. 
The principle of informed consent implies that the 
therapist must carefully describe to the client the 
goals which he feels are desirable and take account 
• of the client•s desired goals. Some negotiation 
must then occur until both therapist and client agree 
on what would constitute the actual goals of the 
therapeutic transaction. During this process of 
negotiation, the therapist is obliged to explain to 
the client the limits of his expertise as well as 
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the possible benefits that may accrue from therapy 
and correct the client's misapprehension about the 
ability of therapy to change certain aspects of his 
1 i fe. 
As Karasu (1980) says: "Although some degree of positive 
expectation and hope is regarded as a requisite for producing 
therapeutic effects in all psychotherapies, the patient may 
get the erroneous impression that therapy and the therapist 
can solve everything. This can perpetuate unrealistic 
expectations and goals that are deleterious to the patient" 
(p.l505) . 
. Besides the therapist's and the method of therapy's limitations, 
the client's limitations, whether these be intellectual or 
practical need to be taken into account in negotiating appropriate 
goals. For example, setting the goal of personality structuring 
for a client who does not have the financial resources to engage 
in intensive, long term therapy is obviously inappropriate. 
Hare-Mustin et al (1979) and Coyne and Widiger (1978) emphasize 
that, in setting treatment goals, the possible indirect effects 
on other aspects of the client's life, such as his values and 
relationships, must be made explicit to the client.· If the 
value of the threatened relationships or beliefs outweigh the 
potential benefits the client feels he will gain from achieving 
a specific goal, he may well choose not to engage in therapy. 
Failure to inform clients of these aspects may be seen as 
"tricking" the client into a position where his previously held 
values are challenged and changed. Where the client has no 
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objections to having his values challenged this does not 
represent a problem but the choice must remain the client•s 
and not the therapist•s. 
Frequently, during the process of therapy, either therapist 
or client may perceive the possibility of working towards new 
goals or changing the existing goals. At this point the 
changes in perception must be discussed and the goals for 
therapy renegotiated in a similar way as were the original 
goals. 
1) Competence of the therapist 
Hare-Mustin et al (1979) write that clients are 
usually uncertain about the specialities and training 
of various professionals. An example is the 
frequently mistaken understanding of the training 
and qualifications of clinical psychologists as 
opposed to psychiatrists. They suggest that a short 
description of the qualifications and relevant 
experience of the therapist may help to dispell 
clients• unrealistic expectations. 
It is particularly important for therapists-in-training to 
inform clients of this fact, with the reassurance that they 
are under the supervision of a qualified and experienced 
therapist. Robitscher (1978) acknowledges the danger of 
this information o·perating -in the service of the resistance 
of the client, thus impeding therapeutic progress to a certain 
extent, but nevertheless maintains that the client•s right 
to choosing his therapist on an informed basis outweighs the 
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potentia1 negative effects of imparting such information. 
3) Confidentiality 
From previous discussion, it is apparent that th~ 
assurance of absolute therapeutic confidentiality 
is frequently one which cannot honestly be made in 
view of the kinds of pressures therapists may experience 
to breach confidentiality. The therapist therefore 
incurs the responsibility to inform clients of the 
limits of confidentiality before undertaking therapy. 
In institutions and agencies, clients must be informed of the 
therapist's intention to share case material with other staff 
members th~ough cas~~ presentations. Where other agencies 
request information on the client which has been gained during 
the course of therapy, the client's express p~rmission for such 
revelation must be obtained. 
The societal responsibilities of the therapist have been 
demonstrated to have particular consequences as regards th~ 
issue of confidentiality. These must also be explained to the 
client, pointing out that, while violent feelings and thoughts 
are acceptable and indeed need to be expressed during the 
therapeutic process in order to facilitate therapeutic progress, 
at the point where the client actually intends to harm another 
person and informs the therapist of this intention, the therapist 
will be obliged to breach confidentiality and inform the relevant 
authorities. 
In order for the client's decision to be fully informed as regards 
giving consent for the release of confidential information, the 
therapist must ensure that the client fully understands both what 
• • 
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the consequences of such consent may be; as well as the 
implications of refusing to reveal such information. 
4) Methods and Techniques: 
Before beginning therapy, the client mu·st be informed of and 
consent to the type of treatment which the therapist is able 
to offer and the demands that will be made of the client in 
the context of this treatment. Some estimate of the cost of 
treatment in both time and money must be given, and frequently 
a 11 trial period .. may be agreed upon, during which the therapist 
may guage more accurately the possible length of treatment and 
the client may decide whether he finds the style of treatment 
congenial. 
Robitscher (1978) emphasizes the importance of informing the 
client of potentially harmful side effects of treatment, whether 
these involve emotional distress or physical discomfort. All 
forms of therapy, even the essentially non-intrusive 11 ta l king 
therapies .. , involve some degree of emotional distress due to 
the uncovering of emotionally painful material, and this must be 
explained to the client who may then make an autonomous decision 
as to whether the benefits to be derived from therapy outweigh 
the distress involved in the process. 
The therapist also has an obligation to inform clients of 
alternatives to the type of treatment he can offer, such as 
other therapeutic methods or even nontherapeutic support systems 
in the community. These alternatives must be presented in the 
most objective possible way with reference to their relative {)( 
-129-
effectiveness and the kinds of demands they make on the client 
in terms of time and money. The client may then decide on the 
basis of his own personal needs and limitations which of these 
procedures he prefers. 
In order for the principle of informed consent to be applied in 
a way which maximises the achievement of its main aim of 
protecting the autonomy of the client several issues must be 
considered. These are mainly concerned with the nature of the 
. consent which is requested by the therapist and the degree of 
freedom to refuse consent experienced by the client. 
It is the practise in some kinds of agencies to ask clients to 
sign "blanket" consent forms which place decisions regarding 
treatment and the release of confidential information entirely 
in the hands of the agency. This violates the principle of 
informed consent in that clients are almost invariably unaware 
of the implications of signing such blanket consent forms. Some 
authors (e.g. Ayllon and Skuban (1973); Coyne and Widiger (1978) 
and Schwitzgebel (1975)) refer to the lack of clarity and 
confusion that may arise in situations where such blanket consent 
is obtained. They believe that this lack of clarity may even 
extend to verbal agreements between therapist and client and 
suggest that one resolution of this situation may be the use of 
written contracts, signed by both client and therapist, which 
clearly specify the relevant aspects of the therapy to which the 
client is consenting. Such contracts may be renegotiated and 
revised at any point in therapy at which any one or more of its 
elements are no longer relevant. 
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It has been suggested that some clients may give consent for 
various aspects because they are in need of help and fear that, 
should they refuse to give such consent, they will be refused 
treatment. Rosen (1977) confirmed this through research which 
demonstrated that when clients applying for treatment at a 
psychotherapeutic agency were not told that they had the right 
to refuse consent there was 100% compliance. However, when they 
were informed of this right, only 20% complied. In this sense, 
clients are coerced into signing consent forms -a situation 
which defeats the purpose of obtaining informed consent at all. 
Thus, clients should be informed that their choice is fully 
autonomous and that the provision of treatment will not be 
affected by theirrefusal to consent to certain aspects of the 
treatment. 
Objections to the application of informed consent in psycho-
therapy arise out of therapists' fears that if confronted by all 
the possible difficulties and negative effects of psychotherapy 
patients' may lose confidence in the treatment before being able 
to experience its positive aspects, and may be "scared off" 
therapy or else may be so cautious of the therapeutic process 
that progress will be impeded. Epstein (1978) argues that, 
while this may be true in some cases, there is the danger 
inherent in some therapies of a subtle authoritarianism 
emerging in which the client is seen as child-like and helpless, 
unable to make his own decisions regarding his preferences and 
in need of the wiser, parent-like therapist to make these 
choices for him. Epstein believes that "It could be a boon 
for therapeutic efficacy to appreciate what is positive about 
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a patient, and to recognize that an individual makes choices 
and takes action quite freelywith responsibility for these 
choices and actions" (p. 87). 
Indeed it is difficult toiunderstand how the therapeutic aim 
of developing the client's autonomy can be helped by robbing 
the client of all autonomy in decisions regarding the important 
aspects of the therapeutic process. 
5.5.3 Rule Utilitarianism and Ethics in Therapy 
The concept of informed consent has been seen to be based on 
the principle of autonomy, in that it encourages the independent 
I 
informed decisions of clients regarding their own future. In 
the course of this chapter the way in which certain directives 
in therapy may be derived from one or more of the four basic 
principles has been indicated. It appears then that ethics in 
psychotherapy are compatible with the basic ethical model 
proposed in Chapter one. In the light of this, it appears that 
·the rule-utilitarian model put forward may be useful in providing 
an approach to the resol~tion of some of the ethical conflicts 
described in this chapter. Examples of the way in which rule-
utilitarianism can be applied in each of the potentially 
conflictual areas described earlier may be useful to consider. 
~) Values and Goals 
Many ethical principles may come into play in this area of 
concern, but the example to be considered here involves a 




patients should be allowed to choose their own therapeutic 
goals and the principle of beneficence which asserts that therapy 
should be of benefit to the client. To take a hypothetical and 
admittedly somewhat farfetched and simplistic example: suppose 
a client requested therapy because in his job as a teacher he 
felt the use of frequent corporal punishment was necessary to 
control a class of particularly unruly scholars. He experienced 
this as a difficult aspect of his occupation in that his pupils 
resented him as a result and he himself felt guilty and unhappy 
about seeing himself in thi·s punitive role, in that he felt 
himself to be an essentially gentle and amiable person. However, 
he also felt duty-bound to fulfill his teaching duties. If he 
requested therapy in order to be able to rid himself of his 
guilt and unhappiness so that he could fulfill what he saw as 
his occupational duty, the therapist may well be faced with a 
dilemma in that while the principle of autonomy dictates that it 
is the client•s goals rather than the therapist•s which should 
constitute the aim of therapy, the principle of beneficence would 
dictate that therapy should be of benefit to the client. The 
therapist may well feel that helping the client find alternative 
means of discipline and control in the classroom would be of more 
benefit to the client, not to mention his pupils, than would the 
client•s goal. Applying the rule utilitarian approach to this 
problem would mean that the therapist should make a decision, which 
would maximize the good. In deciding what will achieve this, the 
therapist would need to take into account the client•s 
feelings and environmental circumstances and those of others 
who would be affected by the decision. Depending on the 
· .. , · .. '·.·' • .. · ... 
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circumstances in this case, the therapist may·well decide that 
the ethical choice would be to work towards his goal rather than 
that of his client's. This could be explained to the client, 
along with the reasons for it, upon which the client may decide 
to go along with the therapist's aims. If he did not, the 
therapist should then.decide to refer the case rather than 
participate in a therapeutic endeavour which, in terms of the 
rule utilitarian approach, would appear to be essentially unethical. 
b) Methods and Techniques 
One of the most common conflicts here arises out of the conflict 
between the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. 
Techniques which are potentially beneficial may have attendant 
risks of harm, either emotional or physical. Here the rule 
utilitarian approach·can be applied in a fairly straightforward 
way. Not only must the benefit of a particular method outweigh 
its potential negative effects, but in terms of the directive to 
maximize the good, the benefits of a potentially harmful method 
must also outweigh the benefits of alternative techniques which 
do not involve the same degree of risk. 
c) 
The relevant principles here may again be those of nonmaleficence /
1 
I . 
and beneficence. These may be especially important where a 
recently developed therapeutic style or technique is being 
proposed as the treatment of choice. In such cases, there are 
rarely any therapists who can claim to be fully competent and 
experienced in the use of the technique. In other words, the 
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therapist•s competence is of necessity limited. Although the 
therapist may feel that his use of this technique may benefit 
the client, he should also be aware that his own relative 
incompetence may reduce this benefit or even render the 
technique harmful. The particular needs of the client should 
be carefully weighed in such cases and the benefits of 
alternative techniques in which the therapist~ competent 
need to be taken into account as well. Only when these 
considerations have been made and when the new technique still 
appears to be the one most likely to be beneficial despite the 
therapist•s lack of competence should the technique be used. 
d) Confidentiality 
Frequently the most problematical area in psychotherapy, many 
kinds of conflict can arise out of the issue of confidentiality. 
Two kinds of conflict will be considered here. The first concerns 
the conflict frequently referred to in this chapter in which the 
therapist is obliged by law to breach confidentiality in cases 
where the client has committed or may intend to commit a criminal 
act. Here the conflict could be understood as one between the 
principles of nonmaleficence (which requires that confidentiality 
be upheld in order to do no harm to the patient) and justice (in 
the broad societal sense in which protecting one person from 
harm should not result in harm to others). Assessing the 
approach which would maximize the good is frequently difficult 
in such cases. Some examples of the kinds of factors which 
would need to be considered are: 
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1) the nature of the actual or intended criminal act 
and the harm that this would cause to society, 
2) the consequences for the client of breaching 
confidentiality, 
3) the consequences for the profession of psychology 
and the trust .that society invests in this profession, 
of breachinq confidentiality, 
4) the consequences for the professional of refusing 
to reveal confidential information (which may 
include a prison sentence) and the effects on others 
connected with the therapist such as his other 
clients should he accept these consequences. 
Only when these factors have been considered as carefully as 
possible is the therapist in a position to make an ethical 
decision in such cases. 
The second type of dilemma to be considered here is where there 
is the possibility of two types of action, both of which are 
derived from the principle of beneficence. The therapist may be 
asked to reveal confidential information which would benefit the 
client in some way. For example, the therapist may be asked by 
the client to support a job application. In cases where the 
information revealed by the therapist would constitute solid 
support for such an application, a dilemma may arise. Do the 
benefits of maintaining confidentiality in terms of the client's 
trust in the therapist and need for the assurance of confidentiality 
for therapeutic progress outweigh the benefits to the client 
involved in obtaining the employment? Dubey (1974) argues that 
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this·is always the. case, but this is by no means a definitive 
opinion. Once again, the particular circumstances of the case 
need to be carefully considered, such as the importance to the 
.client of the potential employment, and the degree of centrality 
which will be accorded the therapist's report in the employer's 
decision. Where the therapist's report will make the essential 
difference to the client's employment and where the client has, 
for example, been unemployed for some months and desperately 
requires the money, the therapist may well decide that the 
benefits inherent iri writing the report outweigh the benefits 
for the client of being assured of absolute confidentiality. 
The directive maximizing the good could in such cases involve 
revealing the confidential information. 
e) Dual Relationships 
It has been seen that there is general agreement that sexual 
relationships between client and therapist are always unethical 
in that the potential harmful effects cannot be seen to outbalance 
the potential good which may arise out of such relationships. 
·However, some problems for the therapist may arise when he is 
approached for therapy by a friend or acquaintance. This type 
of therapeutic alliance has been shown to have certain attendant 
risks of harm. The conflict here would again be between the 
principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. What the therapist 
would need to consider in such ~ases may include the need of the 
client for his help, the possibility of obtaini~g comparable help 
from other sources, the extent of the damage to the previous 
relationship which could arise from therapy and the extent to which 
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the therapist feels he is competent to deal with the 
complications which may arise out of such a therapeutic 
relationship. Where the client is in dire need of help and 
the therapist is the only available source, the benefits of 
treatment may well outweigh the possible harm and the rule-
utilitarian approach would dictate that the therapy should 
be attempted. In fact, it may well be unethical in such cases 
to refuse to treat the client. 
f) Involuntary Hospitalization and the Right to Treatment 
This area of concern involves all four ethical principles -
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice - and 
conflicts may arise between any of these. Frequently in 
resolving such conflicts the interests of the client need to 
be balanced against the interests of many other people including 
the client•s family and friends, the broader society and the 
professionals who work within the institution. Involuntary 
commitment of a patient to a mental hospital immediately 
violates the principles of autono~y and nonmaleficence and the 
decision to do so must therefore always be to maximize the good. 
The principle of justice then dictates that the needs of such a 
person must be met via adequate treatment within the institution. 
The principles of autonomy and beneficence and nonmaleficence are 
all relevant when a client refuses treatment, the patient may 
not only not benefit but may be harmed in that his condition may 
deteriorate; an eventuality which will not only cause distress 
to himself but also to others who are connected with him. This 
dilemma appears to be particularly difficult because whereas 
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11 maximizing the good 11 would involve giving treatment 
involuntarily to such a patient, this action would immediately 
further violate the principle of autonomy. As the rules which 
arise out of the principle of autonomy also indirectly arise 
out of rule-utilitarianism as a basic orientation, and as rule-
utilitarianism dictates that rules must be obeyed, it would 
appear that in such cases therapists are ethically obliged to 
allow patients to refuse treatment unless they have sufficient 
objective grounds on which to assert that the patient is 
incapable of making a truly autonomous decision with regard to 
his treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the major· areas of concern in the 
_practice of psychotherapy and has reviewed what constitutes 
ethical behaviour in each of these areas with reference to the 
guiding ethical principles-discussed in Chapter one. The 
potential for ethical conflicts in these areas-has also been 
discussed and the concept of informed consent as a possible 
means of resolving·some of these conflicts was reviewed. Finally, 
the rule-utilitarian approach to the problem of ethical dilemmas 
in psychotherapy was outl in~d .. It appears that this approach may 
well be useful in addressing problematic situations commonly 
confronted by the psychotherapist. However, the resolution of 
some areas of conflict is particularly difficult and arises out 
of basic disagreements regarding the definition of the role of 
the psychologi~t. Such a conflict is the degree to which psycho-
therapists should be actively and directly involved in social 
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. reform. There has been no attempt to suggest a resolution 
of this particular issue, as it appears that such a 
resolution will only occur with the evolution of psychologists' 
conceptualisation of themselves as professionals and the roles 
which they should accept .as such professionals. In other 
words, such issues appear ·to be more ones of professional 
policy than of ethical .behaviour and therefore do not fall 
within the range of.this thesis. 
CHAPTER SIX 




ETHICS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
It has been noted in Chapter two that psychological assessment 
is the . , ~-, · psychologist•s one exclusive domain of 
expertise. For this reason, it is especi'ally important for 
psychologists to maintain the highest possible standards in 
their execution of this role. This chapter outlines the 
standards of ethical behaviour required to maximise the usefulness 
of psychological assessment procedures (beneficence), to minimize 
the abuse of such procedures (nonmaleficence) and to simultaneously 
maintain the autonomy of the individual subjected to such 
procedures. These standards will be discussed with reference to 
·the goals of assessment, the available assessment methods and 
techniques, competence of the psychologist, the maintenance of 
confidentiality, and the issue of informed consent as it relates 
to psychological assessment. 
6.1 GOALS OF ASSESSMENT 
Psychological assessment may be requested by a variety of 
interested parties for a number of different purposes. These 
may be broadly categorized ai follows: 
a)_ ~titude testing - an individual may refer himself 
. - -·-·- -~-





b) !!IIE.l~yment - individuals may be referred by potential 
employers in order to assess their suitability for 
positions in their organization. 
c) ~'~-~-~}--~-~-~-~~?_ments - courts may require the assessment 
of individuals i) to judge criminal responsibility or 
ability to stand trial, ii) to assess the degree of 
loss of functioning in, for example, compensation 
claims due to head injuries resulting from accidents, 
iii) to assess the suitability of parents disputing 
custody. 
d) Scholastic assessment - children may be referred for 
investigation of their failure to attain normal 
educational standards or to assess children for 
special class placement. 
e) Qi_~_gDostJ.<: <!.Ssessment - other menta 1 hea 1 th 
~ - " _-- ,,.. ' -·· J •• 
professionals may request assessment to help 
determine the diagnosis of a patient. 
f) Therapy assessment - this may be required to asses 
• -.J·.- ~--~--·· ... , .. ~ ·~-~~ ........... ;...,,-,.. __ , 
the suitability of a patient for a particular mode 
of therapy or to provide further insight into the 
types of intrapsychic conflicts which may need to 
be explored during the course of therapy. 
It is apparent that the results of psychological assessment 
may have far-reaching implications for the future of the 
individual being assessed. A clear definition of the exact 
goals of the assessment procedure is therefore important in 






wfll be relevant, complete and accurate. 
Besides ensuring that the goal is clearly defined and understood 
both by himself and by the referral agent, the psychologist may 
frequently be required to judge whether a particular goal is 
"'-------·--·--·-·--···---·-····-·-···- -· ---------·-··-··--------.,·----- ---·--
appropriate and whether his participation in assisting in this 
·-"·~· ··- ~-·· ... ----·-··--- ... ~ ..... k ...... - ~- ~------~~-- ~ - ....._._ .. 
g __ o_al_i_s_e_t_tljc~ __ .Q!:_!l.f>_t.:._ A useful guideline in deciding on this 
is to consider the ethical principles of beneficence and non-
malificence. That is, the goal of assessment should be concerned 
with the wellbeing of the client and not constitute potential 
danger to the client. In most cases this is easy to determine. 
Even where an individual may be refused a job due to the results 
of psychological assessment it could be argued that it would not 
be in his best interests to occupy a position with which he 
would not be able to cope psychologically. The major difficulty 
that arises in this area is where the interests of society 
conflict with the interests of the individual being assessed. 
This is particularly apparent in legal assessments of individuals 
standing trial for criminal behaviour where the psychologist•s 
assessment may result in imprisonment or commitment to a mental 
institution. In these cases, the psychologist•s participation 
is justified on the basis that society must be protected from 
dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals and therefore 
assessment of such cases falls within.the range of ethical 
behaviour. A more problematic situation is exemplified in the 
. frequently quoted case where a psychologist was empfoyed by the 
United States Defence Force to assess the psychological 
.. 
suitability of soldiers to return to the battlefield after 
suffering psychological disturbance during the Vietnam war. 
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The dilemma experienced .by· the psychologist was that the men 
he was assessing were not wi-lling to return to the war arid 
in no way could the results of the ass~ssment be beneficial 
if it was determined that there were no objective psychological 
reasons to keep them away from the battlefield. The high risk 
of being killed as a result of returning in fact meant that 
the psychologist's recommendation would constitute recommending 
that the men be placed in situations where the potential harm 
to the men was great, thus violating the principle of non-
~aleficence. In addition, the psychologist himself was ethically 
opposed to the war, seeing it as unjust. The psychologist's 
eventual decision was that he would not participate in the 
assessment process. 
Further consideration of this case may shed some light on the 
ethical approach to this situation and those that are similar. 
Firstly, the Vietnam war involved no direct attack on American 
society as a whol~ - in other words, by refusing to participate, 
the psychologist was not directly endangering the lives of 
American citizens. Thus, the war in Vietnam was conducted on 
the instigation of the government in power at the time and 
justified on the basis of the state's interest~ The psychologist 
. is under no obligation to protect the interests of the current 
government of the state at the possible cost of the individual 
client. What this means is that the protective fun~ti9D ~~i~b-
-~-_..... ~,..,.. __ ,_._~,_ .... ____ ~--'~ ... -,...,_, -~-.-~--,·~· ..,--~ ..... ~ ... - _._, .... - ..... --.-~...--.,..,...,-:.--,,..--.-~.,..--~.:.·--:;::, --,~ ""'7'0!~tS. .. -..~-~ ... --~~- -- J- • -~-
the _ps_ycho 1 og is~ f!!U st. ~~rv~ . to\'la_r.ds oth~r- __ me_f!1~et:?, .. ()L.~()£.i~~.Y, .QY.:" 
preventing violent ~ction of a client, does not extend to 
-~-=~·--·· .- ,._ ' . ~ -~ ,.._ --· ' ,. .- ·- --- .,. . : - - . - -, .. -. --· . -- ~ ·- .-_· --.-.- -~.- --
protection of instituions of the state. It appears then that 
---- ·--~ -· . -.--.--.....-...... , .... _,.,.._ .. _-. . 
·where there is no direct threat of violence or danger to society 
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members, the psychologist is under no obligation to support 
the government where such support may damage the image of the 
psychologist .in making him an agent of the state rather than 
of the client and may constitute unethical behaviour where· 
the goals of assessment violate the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, maleficence or justice in relation to an individual 
client. 
A further consideration in determining the goals of assessment 
concerns the right of the referral agent to have access to ----- ----
particular information about a client. It can be argued that in 
c____ . ----· • -- - - --
order to ensure the client's autonomy to a maximal extent, the 
psychologist must release to referral agents such information as 
is directly relevan~ to the agents concerns and the concerns of 
the client in-relation to the agent. For example, an employer who 
requests the assessment of a job applicant needs only such 
information as would be pertinent to their decision on job 
allocation. An em~loyer does not have the right of access to 
private information about the client such as his marital difficulties 
or intrapsychic conflicts where these would not affect his performance 
of any job--related tasks. Although the. psychologist may acquire 
such information during the course of assessment it would be 
inapprop~iate for him to release this even if requested to do so 
by the employer. 
Finally, in determing the goals of assessment the principle of 
nonmaleficence dictates that the p~cho1Egist m~£Q~ider ___ 
the iridi~ect consequences of achieving these goals and where 
··--------~-··- -· ...... ~--«•··- _,.. .. ----·---· __ ,. ______ .-... ~---· 
possible minimize the negative elements-·6f these consequences. For 
~---·--..----··--·---~---....... -.. ,......_ ........... ·-~-- - ·---.. ·---·"···~--- - -... - .... ~ ~-~'""'·~-
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example, when assessing schoolchild~eri for potential special-
class placement, .the psychologist must not only consider whether 
the child's intelligence is not sufficient for normal schooling, 
. . 
but also what the consequences of such placement would be in 
terms of the inevitable stigmatization, the child's loss of 
self-esteem and the .family's reactions to the decision. As part 
of the assessment procedure the psychologist should consider the 
strengths of the child and the family and ways in which these 
may be mobilized in order to minimize the negative side-effects 
of such a decision, even where, overall, the decision could be 
considered as being in the best interests of the child. 
~t is apparent from the above discussion that the clinical 
psychologist's role in psychological assessment extends far 
beyond the unquestioning conducting of an assessment procedure 
at the request of any referral agent. Defining the goals of 
psychological assessment involves decisions as to whether the 
goals themselves are ethically justifiable, determining the 
appropriateness of requests by particular referral agents for 
psychological assessment, and conscious attempts to ameliorate 
the indirect negative effects of assessment procedures and the 
consequences of them~ 
6.2 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF ASSESSMENT 
The two major components of any psychological assessment 
procedure are j_nteryig_~ing __ strat_Elgi~.~-· and the a.Q!ll.tDJ.st.tatJ.o.n~ 
of R~Yshologi.cal ___ t~~!2..: Although texts on psychological 
assessment have traditionally emphasized the latter strategy, 
fi 
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the importance of conducting a concise interview with the 
client in order to gain historical data as well as data on 
I 
current functioning is emphasized by Maloney and Ward (1976);: 
\ 
. I 
. "A well-documented history gives a context in which the client's 
current problematic performance can be viewed in perspective. · 
In fact, case history data are crucial to adequate assessment 
of many problems" (p.7). Anastasi (1976) also states that test 
scores c~nnot not be adequately interpreted without other 
pertinent information about the individual. 
In deciding what information needs to be gathered and which 
tests need to be administered it is important for the psychologist 
to consider both the goals of the assessment procedure and the 
individual who is being assessed. Methods and technique need to 
be selected on the basis of their appropriateness both to these 
goals and to the individual in question. 
6.2.1 Goal Appropriateness· 
A wide variety of tests exist measuring many different aspects 
of psychological functioning. The two crucial considerations 
here are those of validity (does the test measure what it 
·-·--...;;...... 
purports· to measure?). and reliability (does the test measure 
the same function consistently over time?). Before tests are l 
made available for general use it is assumed that the designers 
have taken precautions to ensure that it is both valid and ) 
reliable, but it is the responsibility of the individual psycho-
logist to ascertain by reference to the test manual that this \ 
has in fact been adequately ensured. 
,_) 
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In addition, the psychologist must determine the exact nature 
of the test's purpose. Many tests measure only one particular 
aspect of an area of psychological functioning - for example 
Test A may measure immediate recall of visual material, while 
Test B may measure delayed recall of auditory stimuli. Although 
both tests A and B are measuring memory the two aspects with 
which they are concerned are different in many respects, and 
total memory functioning cannot be assessed by using only one 
or the other. 
Thus, bear:i n_g .. t!U!li.r:td the eventua 1 goa 1 of the assessment pro-
~·~_,_-~~·---~-....,.._...,.,..,.._,~~---.. --·- ~-- """'""""~:=-..,....,...- .• ~ .. -~·--,.·-~---·-
P-~chological functioning which would be pertinent to the 
~- -~~~---~=-~----,~---~---· -.-
ove~all ability of the individual which needs to be gauged, and 
~-4-... ....... - .... __________ ~----~·-----~-- ,._ •. -.......... ·- - -- • -. - .. --- ~- -~ -· .-. - ..... .,_ .•• 
must then select tests which are appropriate to those specific 
rareas of functioning. 
'----------~---'---· -- ·--~ ~-..-.-----,...~~~ -
6.2.2 Individual Appropriateness 
In deciding whether it is appropriate to administer a particular 
test to the referred individual, the concept of standardization 
becomes important. Before a test is released for use, standard-
ization studies must have been conducted to nrovide norms against 
-~------ ----~ .- ___ ... _.,.,.,_<=---~-----·-·-----' ·-··--~ p~---·· .-.- .. - ---- --·· "<'"~-,-_,_-,-~- .. _-.,-,-,..,<,..,.."="'N--""''~.....-==.-:::--":"~7"' .. ~-- ----- _-,-.--
which an individual's functioning on that test may be compared. 
-·-"••·•-·-•--·~-•"<c.--•o'"""=.......-..-,,·_., ... ?~ •• ,~ ••• ~ •• - •· •• , ., • , •• ,,- •• •• • , ·.·•• • -~~-· 
These studies must be reported in the test manual and it i~ 
imp_o.rJ~w-t. that _ _tb.e I?~.YCh9J ()gi sj:_ensur~ ~t-~?_!_ __ th..~~-~sJ:~fldantt?~t.i ()!L.c.-· 
sample wh i~~-p~o9y~e_d the norms constitutes ~n appropriate_ 
comparison group for the individual. For example, the norms of 
- ~--------·--· "'~--.-,... ... ~- ....... ,.-.~ •"''"-""'•~-.o-0""'--=~"'--- .. ,...-_,_ 
a test standardized on white, American college students may not 
be appropriate in assessing a Nigerian labourer who left'school 
at the age of 12. 
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The issue of test bias becomes important here. It has been 
widely argued in the United States that intelligence tests 
based on the American cultural tradition unfairly discriminate 
against lower-class black Americans, and that, on the basis of 
their lowered scores, they are denied employment and other 
opportunities for advancement. Anastasi (1976) agrees that 
certain types of cultural background have an effect on test 
performance and may therefore lower test results. She argues 
however that this is not in itself an undesirable outcome. 
What is important is the interpretation that is put on these 
lowered scores. For example, if intelligence tests are regarded 
as definitive measures of basic intelligence, "culturally 
disadvantaged'' people may well be discriminated against by 
virtue of being seen as less intelligent. Anastasi asserts 
that such tests should rather be seen merely as "behaviour samples" 
and that performance of these behaviours may be affected by a 
wide range of individual factors, including cultural background. 
She writes: "Every psychological test measures a behaviour 
sample. Insofar as culture affects behaviour, its influence will 
and should be detected by tests. If we rule out all cultural 
differentials from a test, we may thereby lower its validity as 
a measure of the behaviour domain it was designed to assess" 
(p.58). However, Anastasi recognises two major sources of 
cultural bias in testing. One is where cultural factors affect 
performance of the tasks which the test is designed to assess 
and the other concerns cultural bias which is "built in" to 
the test design and content. 
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a) Cultural bias in task performance 
--------~--·-~--~------~ 
Performance on particular tests may be affected by factors 
which arise out of the individual's cultural background. 
These may include unfamiliarity with test-taking procedures, 
low test-taking motivation, poor educational background leading 
to reading difficulty or inadequate knowledge of arithmetic and 
hostility towards authority figures of which the psychologist 
is representative. It is therefore important in the interpretation 
of test results that such facts are taken into account in order to 
differentiate between those whose poor test performance results 
from an inherent deficit in performing certain tasks and these 
whose performance is affected by extraneous culturally-related 
variables. Another way of approaching the problems is to avoid 
comparisons across cultural groups by developing subgroup norms, 
so that the individual is evaluated according to the general 
functioning of the cultural group to which he belongs. 
b) Within-test Cultural Bias -· --------·----
Test content which discriminates against members of particular 
cultural groups includes the use of names or pictures of objects 
unfamiliar in a particular cultural milieu and stories or pictures 
depicting life situations in one subgroup, which may lead to feelings 
of alienation in members of other groups (e.g. the exclusive 
representation of members of one racial group in illustrations). 
Until such time as t~sts are developed which eliminate these 
sources of test bias their negative effect must be considered in 
the iriterpretation of test results. 
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In summary, assessment procedures, in order to be effective, 
need to be carefully selected bearing in mind the particular 
functions of test materials, their validity and reliability, 
the standardization sample with which the test was developed 
and possible further sources of test bias particularly when 
assessing members of other cultural groups. Where fully 
appropriate tests are unavailable, test results must be 
interpreted cautiously in the light of the above. 
6.3 COMPETENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST 
The distribution of tests and test materials are universally 
restricted to qualified test users. In South Africa at present 
there are two categories of test users - psychometricians who 
have an honours degree in psychology, and qualified-
psychologists who have a masters degree in_ .. psychology. 
Both of these groups are registered with the South African 
Medical and Dental Council. Psychological tests are classified 
into A, B and C group tests, with ~roup_~~~l~ comprising of 
... eJ_el!)~_(IJ£ry g.ptitude tests and ability tests, B group tests 
•'- ·-~. ~----· ."'-. O-,-. ~- -·- •r • ~- ... ~-~ '"""" ~ ~ •• ·~ 0" ''. 0, 0 , w. ~-#-~' L o•'o•- ...... ._ ---A_.,_.,.._--~--·· 0 ' 0 '00 • • ·'' -:: 
being __ _9_!:9~-~tel~~2,2~~-~~~~-~~-~? .. ~~9'"_a_p_!~i-~-~-9.~_!.~?.!_Land C_grgy_R __ 
t~~_tsbeing_p_ersonality tests and individual intelligence tests. 
• • ·- ·-. • • "J""'-'' ··-·J• ..... -J, '• - ' • -·. -~- -- ••• •• --~- .............. _,.-_ ..... ~ -· .-. .. 
~ychometricians may not administer C group ~~sts and may only 
a.QmtDi_s_ter B group tests under the direct supervision of a ___ .,"·~- ..,._...... .. -~-
Although clinical psychologists are legally recognized as being 
competent to administer and interpret any psychological test, 
the restrictions of current training programmes mean that it is 
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impossible for a trainee to have exposure to all the available 
tests, although most training programmes incorporate training 
in at least one major test in each of the test categories. For 
this reason, it is the responsibility of the individual psycho-
logist to ensure that, when administering a test which is 
unfamiliar to him, he familiarizes himself fully with the tests 
purposes, materials and methods of administration by careful 
study of the test manual. In addition, in both administering 
and interpretation of an unfamiliar test, the psychologist should, 
if possible, consult a colleague who has had experience with the 
test and who is aware of its practical uses and limitations. 
Anastasi (1976) asserts that, besides f~miliarity with the tests 
themselves, clinical psychologists also need to be constantly 
aware of the latest developments in research into subjects such 
as learning, child development, individual differences and 
behaviour genetics, as 11 test scores can be properly interpreted 
only in the light of all available knowledge regarding the behaviour 
that the tests are designed to measure 11 (p.46). As in the practice 
of psychotherapy, clinical psychologists can therefore only be 
competent test administrators and interpreters if they continue 
their own education beyond the point of qualification by continued 
review of the latest developments in research. 
In summary, competence in psychological assessment may be seen as -- -- "-~- - -~----·-----~ .... . -- - -- - ~ - _,___ - .-- -~- ,..._ 
iJ)CO_tPf-U:.aJ i_og....£.ll..2f ~b.ELJ.Q..ll_o_w_i og factors: 
1) kr:!_()Wledg_~_Qf ___ ~l_l_O:Ya_~~-~~-t~sts, _including newly 
introduced tests, and their range of intent; 
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2) ~-~l~£~i-~~ -~!"_app~opriate tests to be administered 
according to the goals of the assessment procedure; 
3) _ m~t!..c;:_ul__q~~-~-<!"!.i~_i strati_<?!l_of ~he test according to 
the instructions given in the test manual; 
4) careful interpretation of ~~?t res.tJ1.ts __ _tg.JingJJJto .. 
a~-~ou.~t-~_11 other relevant data, including i~for~~ti~n 
ae~~~-~h~ ~l __ ient•s cultu~al'backgrou~~ -~nd l_ife_~i_?t_Q_t:Y.,~­
a_nd_ recent research findings relevant to the behaviour 
Q~~_ng_ assessed. 
~ 
It has already been made clear that the consequences for the l 
I 
client of recommendations made by psychologists on the basis ! 
\.~. 
~ 
of psychologists1assessment procedures may be far-reaching. 
It is the psychologist•s ethical responsibility to fulfill all 
the criteria for competence in this area in order to ensure that 
these consequences are appropriate and just. 
6.4 CONFIDENTIALITY 
Th~ major problem that arises here is to whom test results are 
to be communicated and the form that such communication should 






may request such information - the cl ient __ hi!'_l_s_~.lf; in the case of 
children, the~~rents or legal_guardians of the child; and third 
parties who may or may not have been. the r~fe~r~~~~~~nt. The need 
of these parties to know the results-must be balanced against 
~~----- _., ,._, __ .. -----~--- .... . . ·-·-- _, __ .. ,,._ ..... . 
m~intaining the security of test content and the risk of misunder-
standing test scores. 
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It is increasingly felt that no matter the source of the 
referral, the client himself has a right to knbw the results of any 
psychological assessment p~ocedures. In Amer~ca it is regarded as 
necessary to show the client the test report so that he can comment 
on its contents and if necessary clarify or correct any factual 
information contained within it. (Anastasi 1976, p.53). Where 
the client is a child, the parents are regarded as having similar 
rights of access to this information. 
Solomon, Kleeman and Curran (1971) consider cases where the 
assessment has been requ~sted by agencies such as potential 
employers and emphasize the need to explain to the client prior to 
the assessment, the kind of information which will be communicated_ 
to these agencies~ They also emphasize the imp~~~~3l.~~~~gfe~-~~E~~~ 
co~_i~enti_aL_a_ny __ )nfo~'!l~~j_o~ _g_ather~d during the interview which ' 
i.~- not directly _re_l~vant to_the purposes of the referraJ _agent; ~· 
stating that "redundancy, unnecessary details, and extraneous 
matter can often be omitted without weakening the report" (p.l568). 
In all cases where the results of assessments are requested by 
third parties who were not the referral agent, the client•s 
permission must be obtained before any information is released. 
It is apparent that the results of psychological assessment may ~ 




if it is assumed that the client will also have access to the 
assessment report, it is obvious that the way in which test results 
---=---·~--··~-~-~--- - -e-_ • --~ ·• 
are communicated is of centra 1 import_~r:!_<;:e_. 
--"-"" -· ~-,.,. c·- ~ ~,' ·. - ., .,.,. r • • ,,-.. -.,·-~·.· ---· .,- -,-,~·.• ":-. -,:.- "- -~- • .,-.· -~-o _ -·' __ -•. 
The risk of misinter-
pret~t i_on __ ~_!: __ ~!:_s_t: __ ~~-?,~_e~ 5~-- ~~p~cia 111 i~por_ta~t _and _ij:_ aRpe,ars_ 
D-~~e_s~-~!',Y to -~V()~d reporting raw scores. For example, in reporting 




and discussion of abilities should be limited to ranges of 
ability rather than fixed scores. Thera~ scores should be 
stored in a separate file which would only be "available to 
clinical psychologists who are qualifi~d to interpret them 
adequately. In addition, interpret~tions of test material 
should be present in a clear, understandable way without the 
use of technical jargon, and limited to the immediate objectives 
of the assessment procedure. Test protocols and their content 
should also be kept in a confidential file and reported on only 
where they iiluminate an important finding of the procedure. 
The strict confidentiality of test protocols is an obvious necessity 
in the light of the above, and these should not be stored in a file 
which is readily available to anybody other than the psychologist 
who is concerned with the case. In all cases, no information on 
the capabilities of a client should be released without the client's 
knowledge of and consent to this release. 
6.5 INFORMED CONSENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
_psychological assessment procedures frequently _invo"lve,_ sometimes 
of_QE;1C_~~?5 ~y_, reve 1 ati on of charact~r~-~~i~~-~--wi"~h9u~ .!_~-~- c}_i_~~t_ 
.lle_if1g_a._ware ~D{i.:Lhe_ is ~~!~~so. For example, the projective 
tests of personality would not be effective in many cases if the 
client were fully aware of the methods by which his responses are 
interpreted. Ther_:_~ _is therefore an e 1 ement of deception i nvo 1 ved 
• - -' - -----·-- ---~-· .. ~,~-.-.-~-or..-~~-·..-.:·····~,--,,.,...,.-~ ...... ""'-~ 
in some asse.ss.me11t _t_~chn_~g~e-~_-! ___ which .. !:?J.~e,~--~t-~-~~~-~~j~s-~es _for __ the 
.clinical psychologist. It must al.so be borne in mind that any 
~ ~ ·- ·- ·-- ------ ~,...... .._..._ __ ...,. -- , .. 
obs~.ryationgf_the client or routine history-taking will reveal to 
.tbe astute clinician information which the client is unaware of 
-155-
} comm~ni_~~tJn~_ The responsibility of the psychologist to 
. > 
' 
preserve as far as possible the autonomy and privacy of the ·! 
client is therefore extensive . 
. As in the practise of psychotherapy, obtaining the informed 
consent of the client for participation in assessment Rrocedure~-
-------• ..,-... ~c-~-...._ ..... --• ....-.:~~ ..... ~·'""' .. ,~ .o>""' ~.,.,,_ • .,.....,..,.,.......,_,., __ ~_.,_....,.~,~-- ""-' -
may be useful in minimizing the degree of invasion of privacy 
--~~·'<'..._-. ......... ~~.._----,_._'<: -._'J'J.>-,-.--,~·~ ... ~-.-.-.-.-......,.-.- ....-.,-,-.,.~~·~--·L~,....-._,.,...,,, •.. ,-~~....:-;::·~---~~.":7-:-,.~~--,.."~.•:J'~~~.,__.!:"""""""'~-
In assessment, the client should 
therefore always be aware of the general aims of the procedure 
and should consent to participation in procedures with these goals. 
Related to this is the necessity to inform the client which parties. 
will have access to the information gained during assessment. 
Prior to the procedure the client must be informed that he may 
inadvertently communicate information to the examiner regarding 
his genera 1 functioning with the assurance that the examiner wi 11 
use this information only in ways which will be relevant to the 
general purposes of the assessment. Prior to administering each 
test, there should be some general statement of the broad 
purposes of the technique and it is in this area that the 
psychologist needi to exercise special care to ensure that the 
client has enough information to make an informed decision as to 
whether or not to participate while simultaneously avoiding 
reducing the·validity of the test by evoking defensiveness and 
resistance in the client. The amount of information which can 
be communicated will therefore vary according to the nature of 
the test. 
Although some psychologists feel that obtaining informed consent 
·from clients may increase their resistance and reduce the. number 
of clients who agree to participate in assessment procedures 
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this has not in fact been found to be the case. Fink and Butcher 
(1972) assert that "the number of respondents who feel that a 
personality inventory represents an invasion of privacy or who 
consider some of the items offensive is significantly reduced 
when the test is .preceded by a simple and forthright explanation 
of how items were selected and how scores will be interpreted •.• 
such an explanation did not affect the mean profile of scores on 
the personality inventories" (p.638). 
Thus, it appears that applying the principle of informed consent 
in psychological assessment, far from reducing the number of 
clients who agree to participate may in fact provide the necessary 
reassurance for the client to feel free to participate. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the ways in which the ethical principles 
relevant to psychology mai be applied in psychological assessment. 
1/ 
l' Competent and ethical behaviour in this field comprises of a careful 1 
and clear definition of the goals of assessment, selection of tests I 
appr6priate to both these goals and the particular characteristics 
and needs of the client and accurate interpretation of results on 
the basis of these same characteristics. The rights of the client 
are to be protected by maintaining the confidentiality of test 
results and by obtaining the informed consent of the client before 
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·cHAPTER SEVEN 
ETHICS IN RESEARCH 
Psychological research involves many complex ethical issues, 
some of which are common to research in all fields of scientific 
endeavour but many of which arise out of the inevitable use of 
human subjects in research in psychology. The ethical dilemmas 
confronted by clinical psychologists in conducting research will 
be examined in this chapter mainly with reference to the goals 
and methods of research. These two 1ssues will be discussed 
separately although it will become apparent that they are mutually 
interdependent with the goals dictating the methods and the 
methods frequently being evaluated in terms of the ultimate goals. 
7.1 GOALS OF RESEARCH 
The primary role and duty of any scientist is to expand human 
knowledge through research. The basic assumption has been that 
knowledge is a value in itself. In terms of the principle of 
autonomy, all research which expands human knowledge is ethical 
because it provides humans with greater understanding of and 
therefore control over the environment. However, some theorists 
assert that the question of whether some kinds of research are 
ethical or not should extend further than the question of whether 
this research would expand human knowledge. Parker (l974).writes 
that one should ask the question 11 1S the knowledge one wishes to 
acquire valuable or not, in an ethical sense? Ought one to know 
it? 11 (p.209). His justification for asking this is that the 
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acquisition of knowledge cannot be seen as separate from 
the application o* this knowledge, and where knowledge may 
be applied in unethical ways to the detriment of society or 
groups within society, it may be better not to acquire the 
knowledge in the first place. 
An example of such ethically questionable application is 
the development of nuclear weapons which was made possible by 
research into the possibility of splitting the atom. In 
psychology, Jensen's studies of race and IQ could be seen as 
ethically questionable from this viewpoint because of the potential 
for increased discrimination against blacks on the basis of the 
results of the research. These considerations have led Parker to 
assert that "Both the facts and the possible applications are 
dependent upon the aims of and goals of the inquiry; therefore, 
beforehand the aims and methods of the inquiry should be examined 
and an ethical choice made about the knowledge to be gained" (p.209). 
The argument against this assertion is that it may impede the 
development of scienc~and therefore the progress of the human race • 
.._.._ - ..:. ..,---------- - ' 
The APA in their "Ethical Standards for Research with Human Subjects .. 
(1972) point out that "it is rarely possible to predict the uses to 
which scientific knowledge can be put'' (p.2) and in the light of 
this, "the scientist cannot appropriately be asked to limit research 
to topics that appear to have immediate relevance to human and social 
problems. Nor should every research scientist be held responsible 
for making research applications" (p.2). The APA therefore supports 
the contention that resea~ch and the resultant gains in knowledge 
are values in themselves and states further that "for a psychologist, 
the decision not to do research is itself an ethically questionable 
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solution, since it is one of his obligations .to use his research 
skills to extend.knowledge for the sake of ultimate human 
betterment" (p.2). 
In attempting to clarify this dilemma, it may be useful to 
distinguish between "pure" research and "applied" research. In 
the field of psychology, "pure" research may be seen as research 
which attempts to answer questions about human behaviour such as 
"how do humans react when placed in a situation such as X?". 
"Applied" research, on the other hand, would ask questions such 
as lihow can we manipulate the environment (or the person) so that 
person X will behave in this way?". It can be seen that in the 
former type of research, the researcher is concerned merely with 
gaining knowledge, whereas in the latter, the application of 
particular types of-knowledge is investigated. It is apparent 
_ that fewer ethical difficulties arise with "pure" research than 
with "applied" research in that it is in the application of 
knowledge that the potential for harm may arise. It seems in-
appropriate to insist that "pure" researchers should be concerned 
with the application to which the results of their experiments 
may be put in that, as has been stated, it is frequently almost 
impossible to predict what these applications may be. In fact, 
both good and bad applications may arise out of the same basic 
research findings. The Jensen study, for example, may also give 
rise to new approaches to the measurement of IQ, or at least a 
revised look at the interpretation and validity of standard IQ 
tests - a development which could only be seen as a positive 
advancement. 
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Thus, it is at the le~el of applied research .that the goals ~ 
of research may be more accurately judged according to their 
ethicality. Here, the princi_Ples of beneficence and nonmaleficence 
become important yardsticks in that the goals of research should be 
beneficial to human society and should not cause harm. This still 
remains a complex area in that, as has been pointed out in previous 
chapters, the definition of good and harm vary according to who 
evaluates the outcome. Thus, the development of nuclear weapons 
may be seen as unethical because the direct goal of such research is 
the manufacture of mechanisms which will most effectively kill 
l~rge numbers of people, but such research is justified by govern-
ments in terms of these weapons• role in protecting the members of 
a particular society. The decision to continue with such research 
depe~ds on the beneficial effect (i.e. the pro~ective function of 
weaponry) being seen as more important than the potential harmful 
.·effect (the destructive function of these same weapons). 
·It is apparent, therefore, that in evaluating the goals of research, 
both the intended beneficial consequences and the possible harmful 
consequences need to be taken into account, and weighed against one 
another before such research is conducted. While it.is obvious that 
research conducted purely with a harmful aim is unethical, psycho-
logists must be aware of the possibilities of the usage of results 
of research with a beneficent goal being used for harmful ends. 
Thus, while it is apparent that research into the best means for 
continuing discrimination against a group of people is unethical, 
it is not so obvious that research into the best ways of relieving 
discrimination may achieve the same harmful results, by highlighting 
the most powerful discriminative mechanisms within a society. Where 
the possible indirect negative results of research outweigh the 
intended positive results, it may be argued that such research 
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should not be coridu~ted and where the research is 
conducted despite possible negative usages, psychologists incur 
·an obligation to minimize the potential for such harmful 
consequences by reporting and interpretation of research results 
with all due care and qualification. 
7.2 METHODS OF RESEARCH 
The primary ethical conflict in this area is that between the 
psychologist•s duty to conduct research in order to improve the 
welfare of society as a whole and his simultaneous duty to 
protect the welfare of the individuals who participate as 
subjects in his research. As will be seen, the mechanism by 
which such conflicts are resolved frequently involves a form of 
costs-benefits analysis in !which the costs are the potential 
physical or emotional distress experienced by research subjects 
and the benefits are the improvements or gains which may be made 
by society as a result of the research. 
The forms of harm that subjects of psychological research may 
experience may arise out of the necessity to place subjects in 
situations in which they may experience failure, frustration, 
embarrassment, boredom and aggression, and may also force them to 
realise aspects of themselves about which they were previously 
unaware and which they find unpleasant - for example they may find 
themselves conforming blindly or cheating as a result of the 
experimental environment. It is important for the experimenter to 
be aware of the possible emotional effects of his research method-
ology in his subjects and where possible to minimize these. Where 
the goals of the research necessitate inducing any of these negative 
experiences, the researcher must have satisfied himself that the 
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benefits of the research outweigh these negative effects. In 
. addition, the APA in their ••Ethical Standards for Research 
with ~uman Subjects" (1972) propose some further steps to 
ensure the autonomy and well-being of research subjects. 
These will be discussed in the remainder of this section, along 
with the major criticisms which have been levelled against them 
by other writers. 
7.2. 1 Costs-Benefits Analysis 
In deciding whether the costs of a research project are worth 
its potential benefits, the APA recommend that the researcher 
reduce his own biases contaminating his decision to proceed with 
the research via three methods. Firstly, he should bear in 
mind that costs may differ "as they appear to the investigator, as 
they would consensually judged by his colleagues, as members of 
the general public might see them, and as they are seen by the 
research participant himself•• (p.3). They emphasize that all 
these differing points of view must be taken into account by the 
investigator when he attempts to evaluate the potential costs of 
his research. The second means of reducing the bias of the 
researcher in conducting such analysis is to obtain the advice of 
colleagues who will not be directly involved in the research 
project. This advice should be focussed directly on the ethical 
issues which will relate to the research participants. Finally, 
the APA recommend that pilot studies be conducted in which the 
main emphasis would be on gaugin9 the subject•s reactions to the 
research proceduresn. arid ~h~re these are anxiety provoking or 
dehumanizing, attempts should be made to modify the procedures 
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to minimize these negative effects. The APA conclude by 
emphasizing that:no matter what precautionary measures have 
been taken or what advice has been received .by the researcher, 
he remains solely responsible for the c6nducting of the research 
and for any negative effects on participants which may arise out 
of his procedures. Thus, the mere fact of having taken such 
measures does not release the researcher from ultimate ethical 
· res~onsibility .. It is therefore also important for researchers 
to ensure that all other professionals, such as research 
assist~nts, who are involved in conducting the research are 
aware of the ethical issu~s involved. 
7.2.2 ·Informed Consent· 
The APA•s Ethical Standards emphasize·the necessity to obtain 
informed consent from all potential research subjects for 
participation in the research project, stating this requirement 
as follows: 11 The investigator should inform the participant of 
all .features of the research that reasonably might be expected 
to influence willingness to participate. In addition the 
investigator should explain all other aspects of the research 
about which the participant inquires 11 (p.6). In terms of this 
directive, the researcher needs to explain both the goals of 
the research.and all negati·ve consequences for the participants 
that maY arise out of the research ~rocedure. 
It is this aspect.of the Ethical Standards that has given rise 
to the most extensive debates in the literature on research in 
psychology. The major reason for this debate is that much 
research in psychology necessitates deception of the research 
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subjects in one form or another. Eisner (1977) identifies 
two forms of deception - instances where the subject is given 
misleading or erroneous information, and instances where the 
subject is given incomplete information. In both cases the 
subject is not given the opportunity to give informed consent 
for participation in the research procedures, which Eisner views 
as a negative factor in that the participant thereby loses his 
freedom of choice. The further negative effects of the use of 
deception are seen as follows by Eisner: 11 USing deception may 
make the subject feel foolish or embarrassed, alter his psycho-
logical state, particularly his self-esteem, and lead to a 
feeling of mistrust and cynicism 11 (p.234). She goes further to 
state that this latter feeling of mistrust has generalized in 
America to the point where many people are immediately suspicious of 
psychological research, expecting an element of deception to be 
involved. As it has been shown that suspicious subjects do not 
behave in the same way as naive subjects during experiments, Eisner 
maintains that the traditional use of deception in research has led 
to a situation where experimental results may be slanted anyway because 
of this developing suspicion, and that the use of deception is 
therefore self-defeating. 
The counter arguments to this position have been put forward by 
writers such as Resnick and-Schwartz (1973) and Helmchen and 
Muller (1975) who argue that in order to avoid perceived-demand 
effects in research, the actual goal of any research must of 
necessity be hidden from research participants. An example of 
such situations in psychological research-is the use of placebo 
treatment in order to measure the efficacy of new techniques of 
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psychotherapy. It is argued that it would be impossible to 
measure the effects of such techniques without such placebo 
groups which could be compared with both no-treatment control 
groups and the treatment group. To inform subjects that they 'may 
receive a placebo would influence their expectations anq 
contaminate the results of the research. Even where placebo 
research is not involved, Resnick and Schwartz (1973) have 
demonstrated that fully-informed subjects behave significantly 
differently from deceived subjects in research and that the 
application of informed consent in research settings therefore makes 
certain kinds of research difficult, if not impossible. 
Rugg (1975) has attempted to shed more light on this conflicted 
area by investigating the attitudes of potential research subjects 
towards the use of deception in research. His results showed that, 
where no stress was involved deception was generally regarded as 
acceptable, but stressful research procedures which involved 
deception were rejected.· Thus in a straightforward verbal 
conditioning experiment, deception would not be objectionable, but 
an experiment such as Milgram's where the subjects experienced high 
levels of anxiety and subjective distress would be regarded as 
unethical by the groups consulted by Rugg. Possible ameli.orative 
measures in research involving deception were also investigated·in 
this paper, and it was found that, where subjects were aware that 
they were involved in research but unaware of its exact purposes, 
careful post-research debriefing of the subjects had some 
ameliorative effects on the distress of the subjects. 
It appears, then, that the issue of informed consent by research 
participants conflicts directly with the use of deception in 
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some research. procedures. The main objections to .the use of 
deception is that it may result in negative consequences for 
the participants which are additional to the distress which 
arises out of other experimental procedures, while the major 
argument for the uses of deception is that in some cases it 
may be impossible to achieve the desired results with any other 
design. What can be concluded from the above arguments is that 
while the use of deception is not the optimum ethical choice of 
research design it is occasionally necessary. In the light of 
the above, the following steps could be suggested as ways of 
evaluating research in which deception appears a desirable option. 
According to Rugg (1975), where the research procedure does not 
involve stressful circumstances for the participants, the use of 
deception may be more justifiable, but nevertheless it must be 
accepted tha~ ethicall~ fully informed consent by participants is 
the optimum choice and therefore where possible the use of 
deception should be avoided or minimized. 
1) Consideration of alternatives to deception 
Eisner (1977) suggests the use of simple observational 
techniques and 11 Simulation 11 research in which participants 
are placed in simulated environments for extended periods of 
time, as alternatives to the traditional deception design, while 
o•Leary and Berkovec (-1978) suggest a number of alternatives to 
the use of placebo groups, including 11 best available 11 comparisons, 
component control comparisons, neutral expectancy and counter-
demand manipulation. Where a viable alternative exists to the 
proposed 11 deception 11 design, this alternative would be suggested 
as the ethical choice. 
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.2) Costs-benefits analysis 
Where deception appears t~ be the only available option, the 
researcher must satisfy himself that the value of the research 
goal outweighs~the disadvantages of the use of deception. This 
decision should be reached after consultation with colleagues 
uninvolved in the research project. 
3) Debriefing of subjects 
Rugg (1975) suggests debriefing subjects as the actual purposes 
of the research and the necessity to use deception as part of 
the design. This would presumably help to ameliorate any feelings 
of resentment that the subjects may feel towards being unwittingly 
forced to reveal aspects of their behaviour. 
In summary, wherever possible subjects should be fully informed 
of the factors operating in research procedures which may affect 
their emotional state or self-esteem and their consent to participate 
should be gained, but where the nature of the research requires some 
.. form of deception, researchers should ensure that the autonomy and 
well-being of their subjects are protected as far as possible by 
taking the precautions listed above. 
7.2.3 Withholding treatment and control groups 
Much psychological research,_~~peciaJ_ly----.J that which involves 
researc;hing new forms of treatment necessitates the use of 
untreated control groups ag~inst whom the efficacy of the new 
treatment can be compared. However, as the Working Group in 
current Medical/Ethical Problems (1977) points out: 11 Any 
clinical research which is not directly for the benefit of the 
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patients on whom it is performed poses certain ethical questions .. 
· (p.l4). Subjects who constitute control groups are not directly 
benefitting from the research procedures and concern has therefore 
been expressed about the ethicality of withholding treatment from 
such groups for the purposes of research. Such withholding could 
be seen as violating the principle of beneficence. 
This dilemma can be approached in a number of ways. Firstly, if 
the treatment being developed is in an area in which there has 
previously been no means of treatment, the control group could 
arguably be seen as being no worse off than before if no treatment 
is administered. If the experimental treatment proved to be 
successful after the research, such control groups could be 
assured the treatment once the research had run its course. Secondly, 
where treatment is available it does not seem unfeasible to compare 
the new treatment to the previous treatment which would be 
administered to the control group. The only justification for 
introducing a new treatment is where it is superior to previous 
methods on one or more dimensions. In such cases it does not 
seem necessary to deprive the control group of treatment in order 
to demonstrate the superiority of a new method. Finally, in all 
cases where a control group is being used, the subjects who 
constitute this group should give consent to participate on the 
understanding that they would operate as controls and as such not 
receive the potential benefits of a newly-developed treatment method 




One of the most important ways of ensuring the welfare and 
protection of research subjects, emphasized by the APA, is 
the as_surance of abscil ute confi dentia 1 ity by researchers. 
Because of the sometimes distressing nature of what subjects 
reveal during research, this assurance, important in all 
areas of psychological functioning, is especially important 
here. Subjects must be informed that in reporting research 
results, all names and possible identifying data will be 
omitted. All records of research findings should be similarly 
censored and, for computer storage, it is preferable that the 
subjects be assigned numbers. Where subjects are inmates of 
an institution, research data should not be kept in their general 
files, although there should be some record kept that they have 
been involved in a research project, because of the tendency to 
use the same institutional subjects in repe-ated research projects 
Access to the original research data should be restricted to the 
researcher and this data should not be released to other 
researchers without the permission of the individual participants. 
All research assistants should be made aware of the importance of 
maintaining the confidentiality of data recorded during research. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the discussion in this chapter that the 
psychologist who wishes to conduct research must be constantly 
alert to the ethical issues that are involved not only in the goals 
of his research but also in ;the methods by which he intends to achieve 
-~-h-~~e)oals. A process of careful balancing is necessitated throughout 
the process of research. In considering the goals of research the 
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balancing process involves weighing the anticipated beneficial 
uses of the research against the potential har~fuT uses, while 
in designing methodology the protection of the welfare of the 
human subjects becomes important with the balancing process 
involving evaluating the extent of the potential harm to the 
subjects and weighing this against the beneficial outcome of 








PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
In the discussion of professional codes of ethics in Chapter 
one, it was pointed out that one of the functions of such codes 
is to promote public trust and confidence in the profession by 
regulating the conduct of the members of the profession. The 
ethical justification for this function of professional codes 
is that without such confidence in the profession, members of 
the public who are in need of the services of the profession 
would be less likely to seek and acquire professional aid. 
It seems necessary, then, that in an ethical code for clinical 
psychologists a certain proportion of the regtilations should 
be concerned with establishing a particular public image of clinical 
psychologists as professionals which would inspire confidence in 
members of the public who may require psychological treatment. 
·While many of the directives discussed in previous chapters, 
particularly those of confidentiality and informed consent, may 
contribute significantly towards establishing and maintaining 
such an image, there are other areas of the psychologist's 
functioning not directly related to treatment of clients, such 
as the administration of the psychologist's practise and the way 
in which psychological services are made known to the public, 
which must also be regulated in order to protect this public 
image. It is with these issues that this chapter will be 
concerned. 
Before discussing the particular kinds of regulations which seem 
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appropriate in order to create and maintain a public image of 
the profession of clinical psychology which will inspire the 
necessary trust and confidence, it is necessary to consider 
briefly what would constitute such a desirable public image 
for psychology. The two primary factors which need to be 
communicated seem to be firstly the profession's primary concern 
with the psychological wellbeing of the community within which 
it operates and, secondly, its competence to promote this well-
being. 
With regard to the first issue, the profession as a whole and 
individual clinical psychologists must be seen as holding the 
client's welfare as of primary importance and not be seen to 
promote their own self-interests at the expense of the interests 
of their clients. For this reason, the profession must avoid 
being viewed as in any way exploitative, either materially or 
emotionally of the public who may at some time constitute its 
clientele, and must be seen as willing to co-operate. with other 
related professions where this would be in the best interests of 
individual clients. 
The second issue relating to competence of the profession as a 
. whole to achieve its aims and adequately fulfill its service 
functions implies that the profession must make public the 
standards of competence it requires of its members and must be 
seen to take appropriate steps to ensure that these standards are 
maintained. It is essential that the public believe that any 
individual member of the profession whom they consult will be 
competent to assist them and it is the profession's responsibility 





Thus, a professional code for clinical psychologists must 
regulate against exploitation of the public by individual 
professionals and must erisure that the behaviour of practitioners 
does not in any way bring the competence of the profession as a 
whole into question. A significant proportion of the regulations 
in both the APA and the South African ethical codes is concerned 
with these issues. These regulations and their justification will 
be considered under the two major headings of exploitation and 
·competence in the remainder of this chapter. 
EXPLOITATION 
In this section, in·lwhich regulations aimed at preventing the 
exploitation of the public will be discussed, three major areas 
in which potential exploitation may occur, will be considered. 
These are: remuneration for services, public statements, and co-
operation with other professions . 
. 8.1.1 Remuneration for Services 
While it is obvious that psychologists like any other professionals, 
depend on remuneration for their services for their livelihood, it 
is important that they are not and do not appear to be primarily 
concerned with personal ·mat~rial gain. ·Therefore, there need to 
be regulations which are primarily concerned with both the 
legitimate services for which remuneration may be received and the 
· exte.nt of this remuneration. 
As a general rule, clinical psychologists should be remunerated, 
in their professional capacity, solely for.those acts which are 
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directly beneficial to an individual client or clients. A broad 
range of services may be offered, including psychotherapy, psycho-
. logical assessment, supervision of professional colleagues, 
assessment and expert advice in legal proceedings, and professional 
consultation. The extent of the remuneration which may be 
received for each of these services should be determined by the 
regulating professional body and individual practitioners should 
not exceed these limits. Clients should be informed in advance of 
the fees for services to be offered and the APA code recommends 
that .. Psychologists willingly contribute a portion of their 
services to work for which they receive little or no financial 
return .. {Principle 6{d)). 
Both the American and South African codes prohibit both the 
receipt of commission for the recommendation of particular services 
or wares and the payment of commission to agencies or individuals 
for the referral of clients to their services. In addition, the 
South African code does not permit tendering for an appointment 
by a psychologist. 
These regulations are all aimed towards reducing financial 
competition between clinical psychologists, in order to maintain 
the image of the profession of clinical psychology as being non-
exploitative and concerne~ primarily with the welfare of the 
client. 
8.1.2 Public Statements by Clinical Psychologists 
The manner by which psychologists make themselves known to the 
public is obviously extremely important in creating and maintaining 
-175-
a particular public image. In both the South African and 
American codes there are very specific regulations as to the 
manner in which this may be done although these regulations 
differ in some respects. 
The common factor in both codes is the prohibition of advertising 
which consists of any statement about the quality of services to 
be offered or of any endorsement of services by clients or agencies. 
The justification for such prohibitions is firstly that such 
advertising is by its nature potentially exploitative, particularly 
as it would be aimed at an audience whose psychological resistance 
is low and therefore very susceptible to suggestions about quick 
and effective cures for their distress. Secondly, such advertis1ng 
by individual practitioners is obviously aimed at personal gain 
for the practitioner by acquiring more clients and therefore under-
mines the image of the psychologist as being concerned more with 
the client's interests than with his own. 
The points where the two codes differ are in the specific forms of 
advertisement that are prohibited. In America, psychologists 
may publicly announce their services where such an announcement is 
limited to the psychologist's name, qualification, address and 
telephone number and types of services offered - e.g. psychotherapy, 
group therapy, marital counselling, etc. However, in South Africa, 
all such public announcements are prohibited and when beginning 
practice the psychologist is limited to informing only other 
professionals who are registered with the Medical and Dental 
Council and institutions and agencies which offer psychological 
s~rvices. A psychologist's name may not be listed along with 
his qualification in any public arena including newspapers, and 
I 
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magazines, so that he as an individual is not.made directly 
known to the public. In addition, nameplates outside the offices 
where a psychologist practises are restricted in terms of size 
and location so that they do not attract the attention of the 
general public and ther~by constitute adVertising.· 
While these latter regulations are understandable and justified 
in that they prevent competition amongst psychologists to be 
interviewed in the media and develop extravagant signs and notices 
advertising their services, which· would again undermine the 
desirable image.the profession wishes to maintain, it does not 
seem that merely announcing services to the public through the 
means of, for example, a newspaper, would necessarily constitute 
·advertising. As in the American system, such announcements could 
be viewed as merely one way of providing information to the public 
as to the kinds of services which are available, and where they 
are located. As an alternative to the use of newspapers, a booklet 
could be produced by the professional body which would provide a 
list of psychologists available, the services they offer, and the 
areas in which they are located and this could be.distributed to 
be displayed in places such as doctor's waiting rooms and the 
waiting rooms ·in hospitals and other health institutions. While 
not excluding the possibility of recommendation of particular 
psychologists by other professionals, such a measure could 
increase the potential client's choice of psychologist by 
providing him with more complete information as to the services 
which are available than could an individual practitioner 
. consulted by the client. A further advantage of such a booklet 
being produced by the professional body would be the possibility 
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of directly r~gulating the size and nature of each individual 
practitioner•s announcement. 
8.1.3 Co~operation with other Professionals 
In order to provide the best possible service to the client the 
psychologist needs to be fully aware of the functions and 
competence of members of other related professions, and, where 
the services offered by such other professionals may contribute 
to the client•s welfare, the client should be referred to these 
practitioners. Examples of professionals whose services may 
complement those of the psychologist include medical general 
practitioners, psychiatrists, social workers, occupational 
therapists and speech therapists. In order to maintain good 
. working relationships with these other professionals, psychologists 
need to be aware of their traditions and practices and to respect 
these. It is unethical for a psychologist to publicly undermine 
the services or quality of services offered by other professionals 
whether this is done directly to enhance the status of his own 
profession or not. Where a·client consults a psychologist while 
already receiving services from another professional, the psycho-
logist must not offer his services until he has informed the 
other professional concerned of the referral and has come to an 
agreement regarding the case, and the .responsibilities of each 
professional with regard to the case. In summary, cordial and 
respectful relationships with other professionals must be 
maintained by psychologists and not undermined in public, in 





It has already been indicated that one of the hallmarks of a 
profession is that it ensures the competence of its members 
·by setting standards for basic qualifications and entrance into 
the profession and standards for ethical conduct by its 
practitioners. The maintenance of trust in the competence of its 
members is therefore one of the most important functions of a 
professional body. In order to maintain this trust, individual 
psychologists must be prohibited from undermining this and, for 
this reason, the American. and South African ethical codes prohibit 
"casting reflection explicitly or implicitly upon the probity or 
professional reputation" of any other clinical psychologist (SA 
code;.regulation 14). Where a psychologist becomes aware of 
.unethical or unprofessional conduct on the part of a colleague, 
- 'the APA code recommends that he first attempt to rectify the 
situation himself, and, where this does not succeed, then report 
~he psychologist concerned·to the professional regulating body 
(In South Africa this body would be the Professional Board for 
Psycho 1 ogy). 
In addition, in order to ensure the optimal functioning of the 
profession as a whole, it is desirable that psychologists report 
any new procedure which they have developed and which appears to 
be effective, in the psychological literature so that the general 
standard of professional services may be advanced. No psycho-
logist may therefore claim to have a 11 Secret remedy .. which he 




Finally, especially in reporting on research, .the significant 
contribution of ~ny colleague to one's own work must be 
acknowledged in the appropriate manner and all professional 
competition must be limited to the psychological literature. 
Public competition or professional jealousy undermines the 
general image of the profession because it frequently involves 
casting aspersions on the competence of individual practitioners 
within the profession. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has considered the public image of the profession 
of psychology and the functions of an ethical code in promoting 
-
this image. It was proposed that the two major elements of a 
desirable public image for clinical psychology are the non-
exploitative nature of the profession and its competence to 
fulfill the functions for which it was created~ The regulations 
contained within both the American and South African ethical 
codes which are ~imed at communicating this image were discussed 
in terms of their content and justification. 
CHAPTER NINE. 
) 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
In chapter four, the major criticism levelled at the existing 
ethical regulations for South African psychologists was that, 
possibly due to the fact that psychologists must be registered 
with and accountable to the South African Medical and Dental 
JCouncil, these regulations seem to be derived from the medical 
~ code .of ethics and therefore inadequately account for many 
~major areas of concern for psychologists. Other, more detailed, 
ethical codes adopted by the various psychological associations 
in the country were seen to be more applicable and useful to 
the profession but had no legal standing. In addition, it· 
. Jappears that these ~odes were based directly on the American 
v Ethical Standards and, as such, were not always adequate to 
~deal with specific ethical problems encountered by psychologists 
~ 
in South Africa. 
- .. . 
. ~- v It appears that, while the ethical principles to which psycho-
." logists should adhere are universally applicable, as are the 
\ 
"functions which they are required to perform, the social milieu · 
vin which they are located will give rise to particular 
''difficulties in fulfi 11 ing these functions in accordance with 
vethical principles. Thus it can be expected that, by virtue of 
the unique social structuring of South Africa, South African 
clinical psychologists will be confronted with difficulties 
which are different from those in other countries and the 
details of an ethical code derived for psychologists in a 
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different country such as America wi 11. not necessa ri 1 y be 
adequate in guiding South African psychologists in ethical 
decision-making. 
This chapter examines two of the major aspects of South 
Africa which distinguish it from other Western countries, 
and outlines some of the particular problems which are posed 
for psychologists by these aspects. The first to be 
~considered is the socio-political structure of the country 
vwhich is based on the principle of racial segregation, while 
~the second concerns the composition of the population which 
~con~ists of a minority of white Westernized people and a 
vmajority of black people, the bulk of whom originate from an 
v. 
indigenous, African cultural background considerably different 
/from the Western tultural background. Initially these two 
aspects will be considered separately, but it is apparent 
that the effects that they have on the psychologist in his 
functioning must be interactive and for this reason, in the 
final section of the chapter, they are considered together. 
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·. 9.1 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
It has been noted at various points in this thesis that there 
exists an inevitable tension between the ethical principles 
of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficience and justice, to 
which psychologists are committed in their practice, and 
societal norms, values and customs which may not be consonant 
with these principles. Psychologists are constantly faced 
with the difficulty of developing the capacity for free choice 
and autonomous action in clients within societies in which 
practices such as discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion and political ideals, mitigate against such individual 
autonomy. Whilst these difficulties are inherent in all 
societies to a certain extent, they are particularly pronounced 
in countries where discriminative practices are not merely 
customary, but lodged in the political and legal structures of 
the society and ther~fore less amenable to questioning and 
possible reform. In this section, the nature of the conflict 
between the psychologist•s ethical principles and the South 
African socio-political system will be outlined and the types 
of difficulties confronted by South African psychologists as a 
v result of this conflict will be discussed. It appears that the 
~particular socio-political setting of South Africa has bearing 
v 
on the psychologist in his professional functioning on two 
' I I 
v-levels. Firstly, it has implications for the mental wellbeing (/) 
/of the inhabitants of the country (who may constitute the 
vps~chologist•s clientele), and, secondly, it influences the 
.. ""psychologist •s functioning in his relationships with the ® 
,/ 
society as a whole, with the institutions.within which he may 
-183-
work and with individual clients. These implications will 
be further discussed in this chapter but it appears necessary 
first to outline briefly some salient features of the South 
African socio-political situation • 
. 9~1.1 The Socio-political structure of South Africa 
While a comprehensive analysis of the nature and origins of 
the complex socio-political structure of this country is 
impossible within the scope of this thesis, it may be 
possible to identify some of the major elements operative 
within the society which have relevance to the particular 
difficulties experienced by South African clinical psycho-
J logists. Many of these difficulties appear to-arise out of 
vthe policy of racial segregation which has been operative in 
v 
the country for over thi_rty years, and which influences almost 
all aspects of social interaction and development. 
The development of this policy finds its roots in the colonial 
history of the country. The white colonists gained political 
dominance by conquest and were responsible for developing and 
controlling the economy, using black race groups as the 
·-
labour base upon which the economy was founded. With the 
discovery of mineral wealth in the late nineteenth century, 
I. 
South Africa became a rapidly developing and industrializing 
country, but the colonial pattern of exclusive white control 
of the political and economic spheres was maintained. This 
pattern became legally enforced state policy in 1948 which 
ensured that white dominance in~political and economic 
decision-making has persisted until the present day. The 
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distribution of labour and benefits within the country has 
therefore remained unequal and divided along racial lines. 
The cheap labour force on which the economy is dependent 
has been ensured by the development of the legally enforced 
black migrant labour system. Concomitantly, economic 
benefits are maintained largely within the white group 
with other groups receiving reduced services on all levels 
including housing, health services, education and welfare 
facilities. The entire system has been protected by enforce-
ment through the legal apparatus and by the denial of 
effective political rights to other race groups, thus 
reducing potential threat to white domination and control 
in the economic sphere. 
While the policy of social, political and economic 
separation between race groups in South Africa is founded 
upon the principle of separate development which is intended 
to ensure the autonomy of all the groups, it can be seen, in 
the light of the previous discussion that, in practice, this 
does not occur and that the system in fact undermines the 
principle of autonomy in several important ways. Firstly, 
it is apparent that the separation occurs within the context 
of a common economy which is controlled by the white group. 
This means that other race 9roups are not economically 
independent and can therefore not be seen as autonomous in 
any real sense. Secondly, the social segregation of race 
. groups is achieved via a set of legal injunctions which 
influence almost all aspects of an individual •s life including 
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·where he may live, how and by whom he may be educated, whom 
he may marry and even with whom he may associate socially. 
Thus it. is apparent that the individual choices which may 
be made by members of the society are significantly 
·restricted and individual autonomous action is curtailed 
by legal prohibitions. With this admittedly cursory review· 
as a basis, discussion may now proceed to a consideration of 
the ways in which the socio-political structure of South 
Africa may influence the mental health of members of South 
African Society and the implications that it has for psycho-
logists in their role as promoters of mental health. 
· 9.1.2 Influences on Mental Health 
Much debate continues to be concerned with the factors which 
constitute the set causes of the universal problem of ••mental 
illness .. or psychological maladjustment. While there is 
. undoubtedly an organic basis to many types of mental illness, 
particularly in its extreme forms such as psychosis, it is 
~also apparent that optimal psychological development and well-
vbeing is hampered by conditions that pertain within most 
v 
human societies. Simply put, there is inevitably a conflict 
if between the individual •s desire to satisfy his basic needs 
vand achieve his individual aspirations and the societal 
conditions and demands which impede this achievement. Of 
course, both individual aspirations and the impediments to 
the achievement of these aspirations differ across societies 
and the degree and nature of the resulting conflicts and 
frustrations within individuals will therefore also differ. 
However, Maslow has constructed a hierarchy of human needs 
FIG 3 
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which he proposes as universal and therefore common to 
all societies. It may be useful therefore to employ his 
model as a framework within which to discuss some of the 
major factors operative in South African society which 
may hamper the development of optimal psychological 
wellbeing in all the members of this society. 
Maslow's theory identifies nine categories of human needs 
and aspirations and arranges them in a hierarchical ordering. 
Individuals must satisfy the more basic needs before 
aspiring to the satisfaction of other higher order needs. 
Figure 3 illustrates the ranking of these needs and 
aspirations. 
NEEDS 
to find self- fulfillment and 
realize one's potential 
AESTHETIC NEED'S 
symmetry, 





to achieve, be competent, 
and gain approval and recognition 
BELONGINGNESS AND LOVE NEEDS 
to affiliate with others, 
be accepted and belong 
SAFETY NEEDS 
to feel secure and safe, 
out of danger 
PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS hunger, thirst and so forth 
MASLowrs HIERARCHY OF ~EEDS 
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In all societies, individual members will be located at 
different points of the hierarchy and will therefore have 
differing aspirations, with the degree of economic wealth, 
development and advancement of the society as a whole 
determining the level at which the majority of individuals 
are located. In South Africa, with the differential 
allocation of economic benefits the level at which the 
majority of the white population is located can be expected 
to be higher than the level of the other groups. Thus, for 
example, while the white population group generally has 
both its physiological and safety needs recognised, this is 
not necessarily the case for the other groups who are not 
similarly advantaged within the system. To discuss the 
effects of South African society on the fulfillment of 
individual needs as though all groups were located at the 
same level may, therefore, constitute a distortion of the 
social reality of the country. As the white population group, 
due to its access to superior facilities, enjoys a standard 
of living comparable to that of Western countries such as the 
United States of America and Great Britain, and as the autonomy 
of individual members of this group is consequently less 
restricted, the socio-political situation in this country may 
be seen as having fewer implications for the satisfaction of 
needs within this group. For this reason, discussion of the 
implications of this system for psychological wellbeing will 
be confined to the other population groups, who, it must also 
be remembered, constitute the majority of the inhabitants of 
the country. 
Prior to this discussion, the effects of being unable to 
achieve aspirations at whatever level they are located should 
r 
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be considered. Within Maslow•s theory, full psychological 
development and well being can only be realised once 1...-al-l 
1 •• ----~ 
basic needs have been satisfied. In other words optimal ~~ 
mental and emotional functioning is possible only at the 
top end of the hierarchy. If an individual has been 
prevented at any level from moving upwards in the hierarchy 
one can expect a degree of psychological aistress arising 
out of the frustration he must inevitably experience. This 
distress may take the form of a number of psychological 
symptoms including depression, anxiety and alcoholism. It 
can ·be expected, therefore, that the prevalence of psycho-
logical problems within a society is to some extent 
influenced by the degree to which individuals within the 
society are able to realise the aspirations of the level on 
which they are operating. The remaining part of this section 
will consider the hindrances to the realisation of these 
aspirations experienced by the black population of South 
Africa. It must be emphasized, of course, that not all 
individual black inhabitants of the country are located at 
the same levels of the hierarchy, but there are certain common 
difficulties experienced by individuals at each level which 
arise out of the societal context of the country. The 
hindrances at each level will therefore be discussed 
separately. 
· a) Physiological and Safety Needs 
The needs of.individuals at these levels may be broadly 
·categorized as needs for adequate food, housing, health and 
material security. It is apparent that the satisfaction of 
these needs dependsupon the availability of employment which 
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can provide sufficient monetary gain to provide these 
necessiti~s. In South Africa, such gainful employment 
is not ensured for all members of society with a high 
unemployment rate (the most recent estimate being 407,000 
unemployed black people) and with many of those who are 
employed earning wages which are insufficient. In 1975 
it was calculated that 30% of black fa~ilies were earning 
below the poverty datum line (calculated at R.91 - 120 p.m.) 
and only 32% of black families had an income of over R.200 
per month. ·Thus, the acquisition of adequate material 
security is problematic for many of the black population. 
Housing represents an additional problem, particularly in 
the urban areas where black families are restricted to 
allocated residential areas and are dependent on the state 
to provide adequate housing. The construction of housing 
has not kept pace with the demand and as a result there is 
chronic overcrowding in the urban areas with, for example, 
houses in Soweto built to accommodate 4 people found by a 
survey conducted in 1981 to be accommodating up to 17 people 
(Unterhalter, (1982)). The lack of privacy and consequent 
irritability and frustration arising out of such conditions 
can only be seen as psychologically deleterious. 
b) Affiliation Needs 
These needs are traditionally satisfied by an individual 
locating himself within his family and within a broader 
cohesive community. One of the significant aspects of South 
Africa- society which militates against such location is the 
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migrant labour system, which necessitates that labourers 
from rural areas leave their families and live in hostels 
in urban areas for periods of six months at a time. This 
disruption of family life has inevitable negative consequences 
both for the labourers and their families who must, in order 
to satisfy their basic physiological and safety needs, 
experience repeated separation from significant members of 
the family (normally the fathers and older sons). The 
labourers themselves experience isolation and alienation 
from supportive social groups, for, while the families remain 
within their original group, the transient nature of the 
labourers in the urban areas prevents the formation of 
satisfactory alternative affiliations and social support 
systems within this context. 
The Group Areas Act which frequently gives rise to the removal 
of individuals and families from communities within which they 
have been established to newly construct~d housing schemes is 
also disruptive to this necessary process of the establishment 
of mutually supportive community affiliations. 
c) Esteem Needs 
These needs are necessarily connected to the perception of 
approval and recognition by others, which gives the individual 
a measure by which to assign himself value. There appear to 
be two major factors which for the black person would undermine 
the development of self-esteem. Firstly, it has been noted 
that there is a high degree of social separation between race 
groups and that this separation is accompanied by the unequal 
distribution of social benefits. Particularly in urban areas. 
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where there is a high degree of contact between members of 
different race groups, this differential allocation is 
patently obvious as is the fact that the facilities and 
services available to members of the white group are 
inevitably superior. Prolonged exposure to social situations 
in which one is allocated an apparently inferior status must 
interfere with the development of both group and individual 
self-esteem. This is possibly because rewards are traditinnally 
allocated on the basis of value and worth and the reception of 
.inferior rewards implies inferior value or worth within a 
society. The second major factor to be considered is that, in 
Westernised societies, social status is often associated with 
economic status and accorded on the basis of economic 
productivity and gains. Due to such factors as inferior 
education, job allocation and reluctance to train and employ 
black people as skilled members of the economy (because of the 
desire to maintain such positions for the white population 
whose employment !would otherwise be jeopardised), it is 
difficult for many black workers to achieve such economic 
status and they are therefore restricted to some degree, to 
. lower status employment and thereby to lower social status. 
d) Cognitive Needs 
In order to satisfy these re-latively higher order needs, 
major necessity is adequate educational facilities •. Once 
again, the demand for these facilities amongst the black 
population exceeds the rate at which they are provided and 
I 
education for the black population is therefore inferior and J 
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conducted in inferior surroundings, with over-crowding and 
understaffing of schools. The inferior quality of the 
education received by blacks makes it difficult for many 
to cope with the high standard demanded at universities and 
thereby restricts the number of black people who manage to 
enter the professions to which they may aspire. 
e) Aesthetic and self-actualization Needs 
It is understood that the achievement of these needs depends on 
the satisfaction of the previously discussed more basic human 
needs and it will be apparent from the previous discussion that 
the number of black South Africans who can aspire to these is 
limited. Indeed, if it is assumed that these needs depend on 
the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, it is 
doubtful that the number of South Africans of any race who can 
reach these levels is more than a small minority, but the denial 
of political and economic freedom experienced by. the black 
population must imply that the proportion of this population 
which reaches these levels is significantly lower than that of 
the white population. The cumulative effect of these social 
impediments to psychological development in South Africa implies 
that there must be a significant degree of psychological stress 
within the black population. South African psychologists are 
therefore faced with a large number of people who potentially 
could benefit from their services. The obvious needs are for 
services which can both prevent the development of psychological 
problems and treat them when they do arise. However, in 
attempting to achieve both the prevention and cure of these 
problems, psychologists in South Africa are confronted by socio-
political factors which are similar to these which have been 
-193-
described as contributing to the cause of these problems. 
These factors will be discussed in the following section 
and will be considered from the points of view of the 
psychologist in relation to the society as a whole, to the 
mental heal.th institutions within the country and to 
individual clients. 
··. 9. 2 MULTI-CULTURAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION v·· 
The development of particular individual values and attitudes 
is influenced by a variety of factors, one of the most significant 
being the cuitural milieu within which the individual is located. 
Cultural background determines, amongst other things, the nature 
of social hierarchies, accepted social roles and channels of 
communication, and basic beliefs about the relationship between 
man and the environment. Important differences may therefore be 
expected to exist between individuals with differing cultural 
backgrounds. 
The profession of psychology developed in the Western cultural 
system and therefore its basic assumptions about the nature of 
·men, as well as the ethical principles which it holds as of 
primary 1mportance are specifiyally Western in origin. As a 
result, psychologists may experience difficulties in understanding 
and working effectively with members of other cultural groups, 
whose assumptions and values may be significantly different. 
The nature of these difficulties and possible solutions to them 
should be areas of special .concern for South African psycho-
logists who, as has been pointed out, are working within a 
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multi-cultural society in which the majority of the 
population originate from indigenous African cultural 
backgrounds. In this section, the major aspects of 
the cultural diversity in South Africa which are potentially 
problematic for South African psychologists will be briefly 
considered, while the specific influences of these factors 
on the psychologist•s work in mental institutions and with 
individual clients will be discussed in the following section. 
The fundamental differences between the Western culture of ,, 
-··""-..... ..........._... ... ~ .... _..........,..,..__..., __ .....,......-_~_,.,.=...,...··-=·-·~=-·.........,--~'-'"-""='0,,..""" .. .,....,) __ ~-~-~~,._ 
the psychologist and traditional African cultures have been 
fairly well documented (BUhrmann (1977, 1978 and 1979); 
Schweitzer and BUhrmann (1978); Awanbor (1982); Fischer 
( 1962); Cheetham and Griffiths ( 1981)). The major~ which 
has been identified by these authors as significant in ----·----· 
jetermining differences in outlook and thereby constituting a 
..,. _____ ., ____ ,_,,_-.---, .. ~--~··----... .. --.... -""'"'-......-""'~""'~.,....~""""'',..''--~ ...... , .. -.....--•~-..,.·n.,., _____ .. ,....,,,....,~,..,,..,,,....._..,..,,._~, 
potential barrier to accurate understanding of clients by the 
I .. •· 
{/ 
--~·· _____ ,_,,.., .. ""'''""'''"···--"~"'"~""'_., ... , ...... -.----·-- ---.----~ ........................... ,... ------- ............... , ......... . 
psychologist, is the difference in the interpretation of causality I 
~--- -··--···--·····-- ----·· .... -~ .... --·· "'· .. -.·-·- ...... . . ....... .... ... . ._ ....... ----·· ...... ,. .. -.-............... ---.·-·---------~-----.. I 
in these two cultures. While psychologists attribute the 1 
i 
origins of psychological or behavioural maladjustment to 
essentially human factors, within traditional cultures these are 
attributed to factors which are non-human - normally the spirits 
of the ancestors. Thus, while the psychologist would concentrate 
on changing the individual •s perception of and relationship to 
other people or the broader social environment, traditional 
healers advise their clients on how to placate the ancestors 
in order to restore equilibrium within the individual. In 
addition to this basic difference in orientation, the psycho-
logist must also be aware of the social customs and norms 
existing in traditional cultural systems which determine the 






~a~-~- i~n--~~ich the individual may expre~s-~'!!o~i_o_!l~ 9r assert 
hJ_f!!~~lf ~-n _relation to other~. For example, what may be 
interpreted by a psychologist as unassertive behaviour may 
well be regarded as appropriately assertive within the 
individual's culture (eg Dowdall (1982)). It would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for psychologists to familiarize 
themselves with all the customs arising out of the traditional 
cultures in the country and, indeed, doing so may not be 
helpful in work with individual clients as particular customs 
vary between sub-,groups within the same broad cultural group. 
on client's behaviour is essential. 
I_n~SQJJ..t:b_Afrtc..~-' the difficulties of working with members of 
other cultural groups are further complicated by the fact that 
the black popuJ~tion group ma1_be seen~s b~in~ 1~.a process 
ofJ!'<!_~_sj_t~Qr)_,_. aba~doni ng __ their tradition a 1 cultures. and adopt-
ing the Western culture of the white population. This process 
----·---··- .......... ---- .. . - .. .. I 
can be attributed to the fact that, as is apparent from 
discussion in the previous section, the white group is dominant 
in all aspects of South African society and its cultural system 
has therefore also become dominant. Through the rapidly 
accelerating processes of urbanization and industrialization 
which have made a significant impact on all communities within 
the country, t_h_e ~estern culture of the white _gr:o~_P has 
concomitantly i~terfaced with and influenced the traditional 
cultures to the extent that at this point it is doubtful that 
a_ny of these cultures have been preserved in their ori gina 1 form. 
Members of the black population group may therefore be seen as 
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largely in the rural areas, on whom traditional beliefs 
'' ----- -- .. ~ ''>( ··-~··,•;·. '"C<•'_,• "'"" • .,_, ''•I •• '" "'·••"'--''"'""~""'·L .... -~ •. ,; 0 
and customs still exert a strong influence to those in the 
\..---.-~~....-.... '*'"'"'~'~·~_..,... ·-· .. --.-,.,~,- - •n-·;, __ ,, ... ,---...--,~,r--.--,-••·~· , • •• • ,_,,,_.,,- ,_ -•- • • ,o•-.o.o•----~~~---"' ,._.,..,.._ ""-~· '' ~·-
traditional customs and beliefs exert an equal influence 
') 
\ 




on all black clients and to do so would be both simplistic 
and detrimental to effective work with these clients. Extra~.,, ) 
;{{ 
~ '\'· \" ·-· 
sensitivity is therefore required by psychologists as to the / 
\ 
ways in which traditional cultural practises may influence \ 
black clients and the extent to which they in fact do ~ 
influence each individual client. 
A final point about the process of Westernization apart from 
., ....... ,.,.,_,...,,,_ _ _....,._"""'''~- ~-~~ ~-
the complications that it adds to the psychologist's attempts 
to understand black clients, is ~.!l~eote!!Ji.<!..l__gff_gf_t_tb"g_:t.Jt~=· 
O'Connell (1980), who point out that the process of urbanization 
which exposes people to a completely different culture and 
forces them to live within this culture may lead to feelings of 
alienation and isolation as traditional practises are seen to 
be inappropriate and ineffective within a Western society. A J 
p_er5_QQ__().f_ .. <1.d) .. U..~~-m_ent __ i_s t~e_r~_fo re __ ~-~~-~-~-!a..~}-~ __ (_i_~-~-..'I!~:t ___ inYQ.1_ye 
conflict and psychological distress within the individual~ 
.....,_,,,..._ ----~,.. ..... ___ ... - .. ·-· - ... _. . - - . . ... ~ .... ____ ,__ ...... ,-. ~---· . ,--------· . 
situation. 
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blacks is attributed to these difficulties in adjustment, 
but O'Connell points out that there has been a concomitantly 
higher incidence of 11 thwasa 11 (a Xhosa mental disorder, 
difficult to categorize within Western nosology) amongst 
rural Xhosa women who are exposed to 1 higher stress as the 
men leave the rural areas to seek work in the towns. 
I
~The process of Westernization of the black ~opulation therefore 
/both increases the likelihood of mental disorder in the black 
!/population and concomitantly complicates the understanding of 
jthis population by white psychologists who may view these 
I people as neither entirely rooted within their traditional 
f cultures nor as entirely Westernized. 
9.3 IrWLUENCES ON THE PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
9.3.1 The Psychologist and Society 
In Chapter fiveit was seen that much debate still centres on 
the question of whether psychologists as professionals should 
be concerned not only with the treatment of mental disorder 
but also with its prevention by challenging the societal factors 
which cause psychological malfunctioning. This debate is not 
near resolution at the present time, but the issues involved in 
it need to be considered within the South African context. It 
has been pointed out that in all societies some degree of 
frustration of needs and resultant psychological distress exists 
and that some of the frustrating mechanisms are si~ilar to those 
operating in South Africa. For example, the psychological 
negative effects of racial discrimination have long been a 
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source of concern to psychologists in America and there, as 
here, the question arises as to whether psychologists should 
actively oppose such discrimination. The crucial difference 
between the American and South African societies is, however,' 
that in the former racial discrimination is a social custom 
whereas in the latter this discrimination constitutes state 
policy. Actively opposing this discrimination in South Africa 
therefore involves opposition to the state and can be construed 
as a political stand, whereas this is not necessarily the case 
elsewhere. There therefore exists a perhaps realistic fear that 
should one's opposition to the state policy of racial 
discrimination be perceived as too active and vigorous and 
thereby constitute a threat to the security of the current \,~/ 
government, legal measures may be employed against one, whether 
or not this opposition was motivated by professional concern 
for the health of inhabitants of the country. However, this 
does not mean that such professional concern cannot be expressed 
and, in fact, if it is accepted that certain aspects of the 
state policy are detrimental to mental health, it may well be 
an ethical obligation of the South African clinical psychologist 
to bring this to the attention of the authorities by conducting 
research which will illuminate the extent of the detrimental 
influences and the implications that these have for the function-
ing of the society as a whole. 
9.3.2 The Psychologist in Mental Health Institutions 
The problems experienced by South African psychologi~ts within 
mental hospitals may be seen as caused both by the socio-political 
dispensation within the country which negatively influences the 
quality of facilities and treatment available to black ~atients 
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and by language and cultural differences which complicate 
understanding and treatment of mental disorders in these 
patients. 
While there are 9 954 beds in mental hospitals assigned to 
white patients, there are 9 068 beds assigned for black 
patients (Dept. of Constitutional Development and Planning 
(1980)). In view of the fact that the black population is 
four times larger than the white population, this allocation 
of beds means that black mental hospitals are frequently 
overcrowded and understaffed. This frequently results in 
premature discharge and a high turnover rate of patients 
which makes effective therapy and institution and management 
. of therapeutic ward programmes a difficult task. As a result, 
the psychologists role within the institution is often confined 
to that of diagnostician with the emphasis being on pharmaco-
logical management of patients. It is in the area of accurate "[ ---·--·· ... --.. -..-------~ 
Cheetham and Griffiths 
(1981) and BUhrmann (1976) have pointed to the disproportionate 
number of black atients who are diagnosed as schizophrenic 
within mental institutions. They suggest that this number may 
not in fact be reflective of the actual incidence of schizo-
phrenia in this population but may reflect errors in diagnosis 
arising out of a failure to distinguish culturally determined 
communication and behaviour from symptoms of schizophrenia. 
This would suggest that extra care should be taken in diagnosing 
patients in whom language and cultural differences may create 
barriers to accurate understanding. The extra care necessary 








determining which aspects of their behaviour and communication 
are culturally based and which may be indicative of mental 
disorder but it is precisely this extra time which is not 
available within black mental hospitals due to the factors 
mentioned above. The result of overcrowding frequently means 
that black patients are allocated less time for diagnosis and 
as~essment than are white patients and if this results as 
Cheetham and Griffiths suggest, in inaccurate diagnosis of 
these patients, they will be receiving incorrect treatment. 
In Chapter ,five it was pointed out that one of the basic ·rights 
of patients in mental hospitals, whose autonomy has been 
significantly curtailed, is the right to adequate treatment. 
All of the above discussion points to the problem that in 
many cases this basic right is not accorded to black patients. 
Ib~ __ q_IJ_e_~~io.r:L~T.i ses ~s __ t~. yJhat t~e _p~ycho 1 ogi ~ts in. South 
~f.!j-~<l ... f!lay __ do_~g all ey_i at~ ~his pro_bJ_~m. The negative aspects 
of black mental hospitals are frequently attributed to the 
differential allocation of funds for health services for blacks 
and regarded as being a result of state policy and therefore 
beyond the powers of the individual psychologist to change. 
However, psychologists may achieve some gains in this area by 
.,.,.._,....,.,~..,.......,....- ,..,___,__, -~-_,.......-.... -._, ---- -•"'"='"'"••~- ~----=-------·-·.-·-= ---~· ,...._ __ ,._~. ----'-----"'"·-,-"'".~-' "-~~---"""'_,.-.~""'....._.-:::_--_-__::, ._..,._ r .:~ 
R~~_ss~-~~ for reforms within the inst~~u_tions ·i·~--\'J~~~-~---~~-~ywork. 
Research into the nature and degree of the inadequacies of the 
institution and the effects that these have upon the adequacy 
of mental health care may carry some weight, and reports on 
this research could be forwarded both to the authorities of the 
institution and to the political and bureaucratic authorities 
responsible for these institutions such as the Department of 
Health and Welfare. Sufficient concern expressed by a 
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significant number of mental health workers may result in the 
pressure necessary for reforms to be instituted by these 
authorities. 
9.3.3 The Psychologist and individual Clients 
The problem of working with clients who belong to different 
race groups and who therefore have a different cultural back-
ground and experience differential social benefits is certainly 
not unique to South Africa and has been a subject of concern to 
American psychologists as well (e.g Mizio (1972) and Kadushin 
( 1972 n. The difficulties inherent in working across race and 
- --- ---~"'-~-~ .... ..,_.,,_,-....._ ... ,,.._,""'"'-"'-~ .. -·.,.--_~_,_,._-= .... -'""··-,,--.~- ·-· . '"""---.;·.-··-..--,_.., ... ..--...--.--.--.~'"'"~-- "'"".,.."""---......... .,...,..,._-~· ~~ ~- .. --~- ----..... ~ 
cul_!~!:~~ ,_l_j_~~-s- ~--~ ___ P?,Y~h~~~~~-~~PX _can. be r:oug~ly di vi ~~-d. ~ nto 
difficulties in establishing an adequate therapeutic relation~_ 
--~-.. '-'-'·-·--<-•~ .. ·-·~..-...,~..,.~~-~-- ...... _.~--- -. ,. ·- - - - ~ 
ship and difficulties in defining and achieving ther::apeutic _goals. 
---=------"~-... --.• ...-...-"-'•"-- ,.~ -~'-~-.,__..-._""-. .. , __ ~...-.--"'- .... ~ -~~_., .... , . .,..-.. - ..... ·. ' 
In establishing an effective therapeutic relationship, two major 
fD 
factors seem to be important. The first is a degree of_!:!~~- in 
the therapist, while the second is a recognition that the task 
;;._.) -~ 
_Q..f_~_~_bieving therapeutic goals is one which is shared ~qu(!Jly by __ 
-..-.-=-.,._-,_. __ ,,.,.,~,, •"<'""'"'...-,·~•- -~• ,·,.,, .,,,, • .__.,, ,,,-,,_,,, ·~· '" -' • v• •'•' .,,._..,.,..' '., ·- '"-~ --•• -· '• '•'•' ''"-""- ,...,._, -, - • ~ • 
the ther£.pJ~J-"~rut.£1ten_t. Kruger (1980) writes: 11 Within this 
relationship the reality of the client as a person can emerge 
but the client 1 s consciousness of his own reality is always 
co-constituted by the consciousness of his relationship with 
the therapist" (p.26). At this point it seems necessary to 
consider wb.aJ __ ~_s_pgc_ts_ of __ t_b~_t:>J~_ck cJ_i t?n~~-~-~.r~1a~i_g~-~~_ip_ltJi~b ... " 
the __ \ihiJe.J~~ra_p~i-~t may be aff~cted by the particular soci_~tal rJl'> 
~ir~-L!Ill.?JilDGe,s __ qLSnutb.__!'\frica. Firstly, as Kadushin (1972) 
points out; in societies where racism and its effects are 
prominent for the black person, the establishment of trust in 
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the therapist who as a white person may represent a feared 
and resented group of oppressors, presents immediate 
difficulties. Racial segregation fosters racial stereo-, 
types in both participants and the therapist may have to 
be aware that what he may experience as resistance on the part 
of the client may reflect a more basic difficulty in accepting 
that the therapist is genuinely concerned with his wellbeing 
and has an interest in him as an autonomous person. Fibush 
and Turnquest (1970) adress this problem and suggest that one 
way to combat it is to introduce the question of race and the 
client's feelings and fantasies about the therapist as a 
member of the "opposite'' race at an early point in the therapy. 
Through their research they found that tackling these issues 
early on in the therapeutic process made-the establishment of 
a good relationship and, thereby, effective therapeutic work 
easier for both therapist and client. 
The second issue inherent in the therapeutic relationship is 
the question of the balance of power. It has been seen that 
clients of any race frequently approach the therapist as an 
authority who will be able to remove their suffering by exercising 
his expertise. One of the initial tasks of therapy and one of 
the first steps on the road to autonomy within the client is to 
reduce this expectation and lead the client to take more 
responsibility for changing within the therapeutic process. In 
South Africa the superior status of the therapist as an expert 
is exacerbated by his superior social status by virtue of being 
a member of the white group; Many black clients will have been 
accustomed to assuming a passive inferior role in relation to 
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white people who they normally encounter in situations where 
the white person is an authority who makes all the decisions. 
The process of moving such clients towards a position where 
they are in a more equal relationship to the therapist is 
therefore made more problematic and it may be possible that 
the therapist will need to take a directive role for longer 
than usual, gradually allowing the client to assume more and 
more responsibility. This need to be initially directive may 
be especially important with clients who are strongly based 
in the traditional culture and are more familiar with 
traditional healers who assume a very powerful and directive role 
in relation to their clients. 
The difficulties of defining and achieving therapeutic goals 
vi may also stem from both socio-political and cultural origins. 
Firstly, in many cases the psychological distress of the client 
may be seen as attributable to or at least.aggravated by the 
circumstances outlined in the socio-political section of this 
chapter. It has been seen that these circumstances arise out 
of a complex legal structure and are therefore minimally amenable 
to change by either the therapist or the client. In many cases, 
therefore, the client may be prevented from making changes in 
his environment which would minimize the negative consequences 
he ·is experiencing. It has been seen that the purpose of 
therapy is not to help clients to adjust to adverse circumstances, 
but to remove the barriers which hamper autonomous action and 
·thereby hamper the client's ability to change these circumstances. 
'However, the fostering of the capacity for autonomous action in 
clients may have limited success in a society such as South 
. AfY-ica in which, as has been seen, certain types of autonomous 
action may be legally restricted. 
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In addition, the psychologist needs to be aware that the 
expression of autonomy may vary in different cultures and 
must avoid losing the client or causing unnecessary conflict 
within him by forcing upon him his own Western definition of 
autonomy. In Chapter fi\r.e, the danger of imposing values and 
goals on a client was indicated and this is particularly 
important where the client's cultural background may determine 
that his value system is significantly different from that of 
v the therapist. In working with black clients the therapist 
v must be especially aware of the possibility that such basic 
J'differences exist and, where necessary, must be prepared to·< 
Jexplore with the client what the significant aspects of his 
J culture are and where the client perceives himself as an 
/individual in relation to these aspects. This approach is 
not fundamentally different to the approach which should be 
taken with any client, but possibly more sensitivity is needed 
to this aspect of the therapeutic process and the therapist 
should more strongly guard against assuming commonality of 
values and attitudes where these may not exist. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the particular social circumstances in South 
Africa which have bearing upon the efficient functioning of 
clin1cal psychologists within the country have been briefly 
analysed. While many of these circumstances are not unique 
to this country and problems of racial discrimination and 
cultural differences are common to most countries, both of 
these problems are exacerbated in South Africa by a legally 
• 
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enforced policy of racial segregation. Although the problems 
of changing the system are considerable, it does seem, however, 
that psychologists as professionals may have a role to play 
in constantly alerting societal authorities to the negative 
effects that some practises have on the psychologist's area 
of concern, i.e. the healthy psychological development and 




On the basis of discussion within this thesis the following 
features would seem to be necessary components of an 
adequate ethical code for South African clinical psychologists. 
1) Explicit Philosophical Basis 
It has been seen that one of the major difficulties in ethical 
practice is the resolution of ethical dilemmas and that, where 
ethical codes are not explicitly linked to or based on one of 
the basic philosophical ethical theories, such resolution may 
be difficult and is likely to be motivated more by personal 
interest than by careful consideration of the ethical issues. 
It is therefore suggested that an ethical code developed for 
South African clinical psychologists be based on one of the major 
ethical theories outlined in this thesis. In this dissertation, 
the rule-utilitarian theory has been preferred, but this choice 
is one which may still be open to further consideration. The 
chosen ethical theory should be briefly but clearly outlined in 
the introduction to the ethical code. 
2) Ethical Principles of Psychologists 
The four ethical principles which should underlie the practice 
of psychologists have been identified in this thesis as the 
principles of autonomy, nonmaleficience, beneficence and 
justice. These principles should be identified and explained 
in the body of the code and it should be made clear that the 
specific rules and guidelines contained within the code are 
based on these principles. 
-207-
3) Specific Rules and Guidelines 
It has been seen that the effectiveness of the APA Code 
derives to a large extent from its origins in an empirical 
study of the practical situations faced by American psycho-
logists which required ethical regulation. It is suggested 
that in order to develop an equally effective code for South 
African clinical psychologists, a similar project should be 
undertaken. It would be expected that, should such a study 
be completed, the specific ways in which social circumstances 
unique to South Africa may affect ethical practice would be 
identified and regulations could be developed which would 
guide psychologists in this country in deal~ng with these 
especially problematic ethical situations. The rules and 
guidelines developed in this section should cover the major 
areas of functioning covered in this thesis- i.e. psychotherapy, 
psychological assessment and research - and should account for 
the particular aspects of each of these areas of functioning 
identified in this thesis as potentially ethically problematic. 
It is apparent that in order for an ethical code to be 
maximally useful, it must be as concise as possible. At the 
same time it is apparent that the ethical issues inherent in 
the practise of clinical p~ychology are numerous and complex and 
may need more explanation than can be encompassed within a basic 
ethical code. In order to assist psychologists in understanding 
th~ many ethical issues of relevance to themselves as 
professionals and in order to assist them to make ethical 
decisions on the basis of all the necessary information, it may 
be desirable to accompany the ethical code with a handbook which 
explains and expands on some 6fthe concepts within the code. 
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Thus, for example, while an ethical regulation may read, as 
in the APA code, that confidentiality must not be breached 
unless there is 11 Clear and imminent danger to an individual 
or to society11 ,(Principle 9(a)) within a handbook the concept 
of dangerousness and how this may be assessed could be explained 
more fully and in a way which would be useful to the psycho-
logist in these situations. 
Once an ethical code has been developed there must also be a 
mechanism by which the regulations within the code can be 
enforced. It is therefore recommended that a committee be 
created to adjudicate on complaints received about psychologists 
breaching any of these regulations. This committee could also 
be responsible for updating the ethical code at regular intervals 
and for ensuring that psychologists are sensitized to the 
importance of ethics in the profession by encouraging universities 
to include courses in ethics in their basic training programmes. 
In conclusion, it must be noted that in order to develop and 
implement an ethical code which will be effective in regulating 
· the conduct of South African psychologists, the profession of 
psychology in this country should be autonomous as regards 
policy-making and regulation of its members. As has been noted 
in chapter four this is not presently the case in South Africa 
as the profession of psychology is ultimately responsible to 
the South African Medical and Dental Council. It would perhaps 
be beneficial to both the profession and the public it serves 
should it develop into a profession in the true sense - that is, 
one which is autonomous and directly accountable to the public 
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for guaranteeing the professional competence and ethical 
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